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DIVIDING BAIL REFORM 
 
(FORTHCOMING IOWA LAW REVIEW) 
 
Shima Baradaran Baughman* 
 
There are few issues in criminal law with greater momentum than bail reform. 
In the last three years, states have passed hundreds of new pretrial release laws, 
and there are now over 200 bills pending throughout the states. These efforts are 
rooted in important concerns: Bail reform lies at the heart of broader recent debates 
about equitable treatment in the criminal justice system. Done right, bail keeps 
dangerous individuals off the streets; done wrong, it keeps those with less economic 
means in jail longer. Some jurisdictions are eliminating money bail. Others are 
adopting risk assessments to determine who to release. Still others are changing 
state statutes and constitutions and factors that judges consider in the bail decision.  
All of these reforms are fundamentally flawed. This is because near all of these 
bail reform efforts consider all crimes as interchangeable—failing to distinguish 
minor and serious crimes. This Article is the first to identify this pervasive 
shortcoming in bail reform and makes two important contributions to the literature. 
First, it distinguishes between minor and serious crimes, and proposes systematic 
changes to bail reform based on the seriousness of the crime. It argues that 
individuals charged with misdemeanors—accounting for the vast majority of 
criminal cases—should be released presumptively and not detained except in rare 
circumstances. This right is rooted in history and constitutional rights and even 
squares with a plain interpretation of current state laws. Second, it shows how 
rethinking bail will matter in important ways, demonstrating that this modest-
seeming proposal can have widespread theoretical and practical impact. Indeed this 
change will dramatically alter the landscape of state bail laws, bail schedules and 
risk assessments. In addition, it will have serious impact on some of the most 
important criminal law debates of our time, including equity of application in 
criminal law, prison overcrowding, and due process protection.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Many American jurisdictions have undertaken bail reform efforts in recent 
years.1 States and cities have eliminated money bail,2 adopted new state laws,3 and 
changed factors for considering bail.4  
                                               
1 See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/110-5(a-5) (2018) (creating a presumption that any 
conditions of release imposed shall be nonmonetary in nature and that courts shall impose 
the least restrictive means necessary); IND. CODE § 35-33-8-3.8 (2017) (mandating that 
courts consider releasing a defendant without money bail if the results of a pretrial risk 
assessment show that the defendant does not present a substantial risk of flight or danger); 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.10 (West) (effective Oct. 1, 2019) (classifying defendants as low-
risk, medium-risk, or high-risk and setting various conditions for release based on these 
categories); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-64a(a)(2) (2017) (barring cash-only bail for certain 
crimes and restricting the use of financial considerations for release in misdemeanor crimes); 
N.J. STAT. ANN § 2A:162-17 (West 2017) (creating categories of pretrial release conditions 
applicable in certain circumstances); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-105 (2017) (imposing 
conditions on bond for certain offenses); UTAH CODE. ANN. § 77-20-1 (West 2017) (allowing 
persons eligible for bail to be released with or without money bail based on the court’s 
discretion); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3967 (2018) (permitting any person with a bailable public 
offense to be released on his own recognizance or on the execution of bail, as specified by 
the court); ALASKA STAT. § 33.07.010 (Lexis Advance 2018) (pretrial services program that 
provides pretrial risk assessment, makes recommendations concerning pretrial release 
decisions and provides supervision); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.20 (2018) (requirements 
that the court “must or may” order recognizance or bail, unless the offense falls into a limited 
category of exceptions); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 17.03–17.033 (Lexis Advance 2017) 
(creates instances in which eligible defendants may be released on a personal, non-monetary, 
bond at the court’s discretion); see also TRENDS IN PRETRIAL RELEASE: STATE LEGISLATION 
UPDATE, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/ImageLibrary/WebImages/Criminal%20Justice/pretrialenact
ments_2017web_v02.pdf; PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., THE STATE OF PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN 
AMERICA (2017), 
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?Documen
tFileKey=f9d452f6-ac5a-b8e7-5d68-0969abd2cc82&forceDialog=0. 
2 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.10 (West) (effective Oct. 1, 2019),  Thompson v. Moss Point, 
2015 WL 10322003, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 6, 2015), TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 17.03-
17.033 (Lexis Advance 2017),  Powell v. City of St. Ann, No. 4:15-CV-00840-RWS (E.D. 
Mo. Sept. 3, 2015), Pierce et al. v. City of Velda, 2015 WL 10322003, at *1 (E.D. Mo. 
June 3, 2015). 
3 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.10 (West) (effective Oct. 1, 2019); 2017 NEW 
MEXICO COURT ORDER 0006 (C.O. 0006) (The New Mexico Supreme Court: “A designee 
shall release a person from custody on personal recognizance, subject to [] conditions of 
release . . . if the person has been arrested and detained for a . . . misdemeanor, subject to [] 
exceptions . . . .”); 2017 ARIZONA COURT ORDER No. 2014-12 (The Arizona Supreme Court: 
“Arizona Code of Judicial Administration section 5-201 authorizes courts to operate pretrial 
service programs… 5-201(E)(1) approves use of the validates pretrial risk assessment 
tools…”) 
4 SHIMA BARADARAN BAUGHMAN, THE BAIL BOOK: A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT BAIL 
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The motivations behind these efforts are admirable, as problems with bail are a 
major contributor to the staggering problem of mass incarceration. But the reforms 
are missing a fundamental first step. All of these efforts ignore a vital piece of the 
puzzle: misdemeanors.  
This isn’t a small piece. The United States criminal justice system is largely 
made up of misdemeanors.5 About 90% of arrests—and the majority of the 13.2 
million annual convictions—are based on misdemeanor charges.6 And most of these 
defendants end up in jail—not because they are ineligible for release—but simply 
because they cannot afford to pay bail.7  
Constitutionally, release before trial is a clearly established, historically 
supported right for defendants charged with minor crimes.8 From the time of 
medieval English law until very recently, a natural bail dividing line existed between 
what we now call misdemeanors and felonies.9 Those charged with nonviolent or 
less serious crimes were expected to be released in almost all cases, while those 
charged with capital crimes would be granted bail where they would be unlikely to 
flee.10 Over time, though, due to a blurring of crimes and disintegration of due 
process, the landscape shifted. Now, individuals charged with most crimes—both 
misdemeanor and felony—face a presumption of detention rather than a 
                                               
IN AMERICA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1–17 (2018) (discussing changing factors in 
pretrial release throughout various states). 
5 ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND, 164–65 (2018); Megan Stevenson 
& Sandra Mayson, The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice, 98 B.U. L. REV. 732, 764 (2018); 
Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, Rethinking Misdemeanor Neglect, 64 UCLA L. REV. 738, 743 
(2017); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1315 (2012). 
6 Natapoff, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1315. ALEXANDRA 
NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME 281, 256-58 (Basic Books 2018) (conducting a 
comprehensive review of misdemeanors filed nationwide). 
7 “Bail means jail,” is the reality expressed by misdemeanor defense attorneys in New 
York City. KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 5, at 64–65. 
8 Misdemeanor bail is a longstanding constitutional right that can be traced back to the 
Magna Carta. Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 
723, 727, 728 (2011) [hereinafter Baradaran, Presumption of Innocence] (noting that the 
Magna Carta spawned a presumption of innocence which led to “presumed bail for all 
noncapital cases”); Shima Baradaran Baughman, The History of Misdemeanor Bail, 98 B.U. 
L. REV. 837, 861 863 (2018) [hereinafter Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail] 
(explaining that reasonable bail “has been codified since the Magna Carta”). 
9 Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 837 (discussing how, under the common law, those charged with felonies had 
fewer rights because of the often violent and serious nature of the crime while those charged 
with misdemeanors were generally released on bail). 
10 Id. at 871 ( “[T]he general rule and practice was that those charged with anything 
other than a capital crime were released on bail, unless there was strong evidence that the 
defendant would flee the jurisdiction”); Baradaran, Presumption of Innocence, supra note 
Error! Bookmark not defined., at 728–29 (explaining that “English bail law presumed that 
defendants would be released”).  
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presumption of pretrial release.11 In the modern U.S. criminal system,12 a significant 
number of those charged with misdemeanors end up in jail.13 Once defendants end 
up in jail, they are more likely to stay in jail and take a plea deal or admit guilt even 
if they are innocent, and their chances of winning their cases decreases 
dramatically.14 While almost all defendants charged with misdemeanors should be 
released before trial as a constitutional right, a significant number end up in jail.15  
This Article is the first to recognize the historical difference between treatment 
of misdemeanor and felony bail and advocate a return to this approach. Relying on 
original hand-collected data from all fifty states on existing state laws and bail 
reforms, this Article proposes that a misdemeanor-felony distinction is imperative 
to ongoing bail reforms. It shows that most jurisdictions are treating misdemeanor 
cases exactly the same as felony cases when it comes to bail.16 It then demonstrates 
                                               
11 BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 4; Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note 
Error! Bookmark not defined., at 871 (explaining that there is no longer a presumption of 
pretrial release in misdemeanor cases); Baradaran, Presumption of Innocence, supra note 
Error! Bookmark not defined., at 752. 
12 Baradaran, Presumption of Innocence, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., 
at 748; Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 863. 
13 BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 1–17; see Charlie Gerstein, Plea Bargaining and the 
Right to Counsel and Bail Hearings, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1513, 1534 (2013) (noting that in 
New York, “25 percent of nonfelony defendants are held on bail”); Napatoff, supra note 
Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1321–22 (“In New York, the vast majority of such 
defendants cannot pay their bail”); ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. 
DEF. LAW., MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN 
MISDEMEANOR COURTS 11 (2009), 
www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defenseupdates/misdemeanor/$FILE/Report.pdf (estimating 
based on a sample of twelve states that approximately 2.5 million people in the United States 
are held on bail they cannot afford for misdemeanor charges every year). 
14 BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 82–85 (explaining that “justice is much more attainable 
from outside of a prison cell” because “preparing one’s case is much more difficult when the 
defendant is in jail than if the defendant were immediately released,” that “[e]ven for 
prisoners in pretrial detention who are innocent, accepting a plea bargain for time served is 
very tempting because they just want to leave jail and return to their families and jobs,” and 
that “[m]ost defendants are not released before trial because they cannot afford to pay bail”); 
KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 164–65 (defendants 
“are much more likely to take a plea to get out of jail than they would if they were outside 
fighting the case”).  
15 See supra note 13. 
16 While national data is spotty, the numbers we do have reveal that many jurisdictions 
are detaining misdemeanor defendants as often as all other defendants. Stevenson & Mayson, 
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 732 (“[T]he universe of human knowledge is 
accessible from tiny devices that we carry everywhere . . .. Yet we know absurdly, 
embarrassingly, vanishingly little about our misdemeanor justice system”); NATAPOFF, supra 
note 6, at 281 (providing a helpful national analysis of misdemeanor cases in 2015); see also 
infra note 201 and 206. 
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that the underlying problem of bail reform efforts is a fundamentally flawed analysis. 
Even though by every account—historically, constitutionally and according to 
modern state statutes—misdemeanors are less serious crimes, misdemeanors are 
treated the same as felonies for bail purposes.17 Applying the same factors in 
misdemeanor release as for felony release has caused preventable criminal justice 
system failures—including prison overcrowding, inequitable treatment of 
defendants, and due process violations.18 
Although misdemeanor cases outnumber felony cases three to one,19 
misdemeanor crimes have traditionally been overlooked,20 underfunded,21 and 
                                               
17 While constitutionally, a bail right still exists for most crimes—most especially 
misdemeanors—in recent decades an alarming trend demonstrates that courts regularly deny 
pretrial release to millions of defendants charged only with misdemeanors. 
Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 
871 (Today, misdemeanor defendants are detained at rates similar to those for felony 
defendants in some areas). 
18 Because most of the defendants who are denied bail are misdemeanor defendants, 
many defendants in America are unable to obtain release before trial. There are certainly 
many contributing factors that have caused this problem, including the neglect of 
misdemeanors in the overall system, the lack of resources for misdemeanor courts, and the 
failure of the right to counsel for this important right. Some of these will be discussed in Part 
II.B.  
19 Stevenson & Mayson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 764 (stating 
that there were 13.2 million misdemeanor cases in 2016, which is three times as many as 
felony cases, and that this ratio hasn’t changed in a decade). 
20 Id. at 734. As Stevenson and Mayson found, ignorance about misdemeanors “has 
been due, in part, to inattention. Although far from perfect, data on misdemeanors is 
available; what has been lacking is the will to investigate. Misdemeanors have historically 
been perceived as unimportant.”  
21 The inattention on misdemeanor justice has led to underfunding and neglect with 
high caseloads and  limited resources. DANIEL J. HALL, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 
RESHAPING THE FACE OF JUSTICE: THE ECONOMIC TSUNAMI CONTINUES 2 (2011), 
https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Files/PDF/Information%20and%20Resources/Budget%20R
esource%20Center/Hall.ashx (noting that “[s]ome courts are having a difficult time keeping 
pace with the volume of litigation” and consequently “[i]t now takes more than a year for a 
misdemeanor case to be set for trial” in many Minnesota districts). Jenny Roberts, Why 
Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 277, 282 (2011) (“The high-volume misdemeanor system is clearly in crisis. 
Misdemeanor defenders handle caseloads far above nationally recommended standards, yet 
have few resources to investigate and perform the core tasks for their clients’ cases. They 
practice in overcrowded courts where defendants are pressured to enter quick guilty pleas 
without adequate time to consult with the attorney they may have just met.”); Joe, supra note 
Error! Bookmark not defined., at 778 (noting that “in some 
jurisdictions, misdemeanor offenses comprise almost 80 percent of court dockets and a 
comparable proportion of public defender caseloads,” that “[p]ublic defenders represent at 
least 80 percent of state criminal court defendants who challenge the validity of their arrests,” 
and that “[t]his massive demand combined with limited resources forces public defender 
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misunderstood in this country by scholars and policy makers.22 And despite 
misdemeanors comprising the bulk of criminal cases, the American criminal justice 
system remains almost totally centered on felonies.23  
This is in part because of disparities in data. Misdemeanor reform in the United 
States has always been hampered by the sheer difficulty of gauging the contours of 
the problem. Criminal statutes, cases, and statistical analyses have traditionally 
focused only on felonies. There is no national database tracking misdemeanors,24 
and data has been limited to a few counties that have tracked their own misdemeanor 
data in an effort to achieve greater efficiency.25 Good national data has been 
nonexistent until recently.26  
This dearth of information results somewhat because of the partly true but 
misguided rationale that misdemeanors are less important crimes. Misdemeanors are 
typically less serious crimes for which punishment can vary but generally 
incarceration is limited to no more than a year.27 As less serious charges,28 
misdemeanors are often considered less complicated and with less at stake at 
sentencing.29 In contrast, some felonies are punishable up to life in prison or even 
                                               
offices to make difficult resource allocation decisions that provide services to one client or 
group of clients at the expense of providing certain services to others”). 
22 Stevenson & Mayson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 734 
(highlighting the work of Malcolm Feeley and Jonathon Simon’s work on misdemeanors). 
23 See Jenny Roberts, Informed Misdemeanor Sentencing, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 171, 
176 (2018) [hereinafter Roberts, Informed Misdemeanor Sentencing] (discussing that in 
theories of punishment, criminal law textbooks almost exclusively address felonies). 
24 THOMAS COHEN & BRIAN REVES, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF STATISTICS, 
Pretrial Release of Felony Defendants in State Courts, Nov. 2007, at 1. 
25 Id. 
26 But see Stevenson & Mayson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 740 
and NATAPOFF, supra note 6. 
27 Joe, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 743, 752 (stating that 
“[h]istorically, the criminal process for misdemeanor offenses encouraged minimal 
protection because it placed an offender at little risk for formal confinement or significant 
socioeconomic consequences.”). 
28 There is of course an argument that with the growth in number of felonies and crimes 
in general, that the line between misdemeanors and felonies is now blurred. More felonies 
look like misdemeanors and it may be hard to distinguish the two crimes sometimes (and 
some crimes are even listed as both felonies and misdemeanors). I acknowledge this 
argument as an important one, and acknowledge that the number of felonies should certainly 
be reduced and where appropriate less serious felonies should be downgraded to 
misdemeanors in sentencing schemes. Restoring the original definitions of felonies as serious 
crimes and misdemeanors as minor crimes is an important step. This will certainly be part of 
the overarching solution to overcriminalization and ending mass incarceration. However, this 
is not an argument that will be addressed directly in this article. 
29 Joe, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 758 (Foundationally 
misdemeanors are less serious, but minimizing misdemeanor convictions has serious 
consequences, due to the collateral effects of such convictions); Roberts, supra note 21, at 
295 (stating there is “general acceptance that attorneys can handle more misdemeanors than 
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death. So while misdemeanors are less serious crimes—and historic evidence is 
strong that this has always been the case—the treatment and consequences of 
misdemeanor crimes no longer supports this popular assumption.30 While 
misdemeanor sentences are shorter, there is evidence that misdemeanors are not 
actually less complicated,31 and often the stakes are just as high in misdemeanor 
cases as in felony cases. Indeed, there is also evidence that there is a more careless 
atmosphere for protecting due process with misdemeanor charges.32 Today any 
conviction (misdemeanor or felony) has serious collateral consequences.33 Any jail 
time even for a less serious crime leads to loss of a job, increased recidivism risk 
and other devastating effects on defendants’ lives.34  
                                               
felonies . . . [due to] the high numbers of misdemeanors in the criminal justice system, 
combined with the reality of a limited pool of resources.”). 
30 Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 848–57. 
31 Roberts, supra note 21, at 303–06. 
32 See State v. Young, 863 N.W.2d 249, 253 (Iowa 2015); see also ODonnell v. Harris 
Cty., Texas, No. CV H-16-1414, 2017 WL 1735456, *70 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2017) (evidence 
shows that defendants charged with misdemeanors who are detained until trial are convicted 
at a higher rate, plead guilty at a higher rate and receive sentences twice as long then those 
defendants who are released); see also Pedersen v. State, No. A-10958, 214 WL 453693 (Ak. 
Ct. App. Sept. 10, 2014) (defendant was arrested on a felony charge and was entitled to a 
preliminary hearing within 10 days, during which if the State could not show probable cause, 
he was entitled to release, but the State lowered the charge to a misdemeanor to avoid his 
release). Often attorneys have handled many more misdemeanors at the same time as 
felonies, and are less experienced. See Joe, supra note 5, at 743. 
33 John G. Malcolm, The Problem with the Proliferation of Collateral Consequences, 
19 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 36, 37 (2018) (noting that criminal convictions “can affect, 
among other things, an ex-offender’s ability to get a job or a professional license; to get a 
driver’s license; to obtain housing, student aid, or other public benefits; to vote, hold public 
office or serve on a jury; to do volunteer work; and to possess a firearm”); Michael 
Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions 
and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 634–
36 (2006), (“Collateral consequences . . . include a vast network of ‘civil’ sanctions that limit 
the convicted individual’s social, economic, and political access. These sanctions flow from 
both felony and misdemeanor convictions . . . . [M]any attach automatically upon the 
conviction by operation of law. These federal and state consequences are vast and wide-
ranging. Some of the most notable include temporary or permanent ineligibility for public 
benefits, public or government-assisted housing, and federal student aid; various 
employment-related restrictions; disqualification from military service; civic 
disqualifications such as felon disenfranchisement and ineligibility for jury service; and, for 
non-citizens, deportation.”). 
34 BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 82–89 (discussing pretrial detention’s costs to a 
defendant: a lowered chance of successfully defending a case, a reduced chance of striking 
a favorable plea bargain, economic harm such as job loss, an increased risk of recidivism, 
and possible exposure to harsh jail conditions); Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, 
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 872–81 (noting that consequences of pretrial 
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Although misdemeanors have been overlooked because they have been 
perceived to impose minor consequences, we now know that these crimes have 
significant impacts on mass incarceration.35 A growing focus of recent legal 
scholarship on misdemeanors attempts to fill this gap because it affects so many 
Americans every year, particularly disadvantaged groups.36 Yet, bail reform scholars 
                                               
detention include loss of their “jobs, apartments, and sometimes children and family 
stability,” “future arrests and recidivism,” “less of an opportunity to prepare her case,” 
deportation, loss of civil rights, ostracism, and loss of public benefits); see Roberts, supra 
note 21, at 286–88 (discussing the many collateral consequences of misdemeanor arrests and 
records in the lives of defendants). 
35 Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 844 (noting that misdemeanor charges are much more common than felony 
charges and flood the criminal justice system). Stevenson & Mayson, supra note Error! 
Bookmark not defined., at 734 (arguing that “[w]e do not know even the most basic facts” 
about our misdemeanor justice system).   
36 NATAPOFF, supra note 6, at 281; Stevenson & Mayson, supra note Error! 
Bookmark not defined., at 732 (discussing the “profound racial disparity in the 
misdemeanor arrest rate for most—but not all—offense types.”); KOHLER-HAUSMANN, 
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined. ( discussing the prevalence of misdemeanor 
adjudication that affects hundreds of thousands of individuals beyond those incarcerated in 
prisons or convicted of felonies); Roberts, supra note 21, at 277 (describing the 
representation crisis in misdemeanor bail defense and the possibly devastating effects on 
indigent individuals); Irene Oritseweyinmi Joe, The Prosecutor’s Client Problem, 98 B.U. 
L. REV. 885 (2018) (describes the various approaches scholars take in addressing mass 
misdemeanor convictions); Greg Berman & Julian Adler, Toward Misdemeanor Justice: 
Lessons from New York City, 98 B.U. L. REV. 981, 982 (2018) (addressing the nearly two 
hundred thousand misdemeanor cases each year in New York in which “[t]he vast majority 
(eighty-six percent) … involve people of color.”); Malcolm M. Feeley, How to Think About 
Criminal Court Reform, 98 B.U. L. REV. 673, 674 (2018) (holding misdemeanor injustices 
caused by the “institutional design of the adversarial process” which is “not up to the task of 
delivering justice to those charged with misdemeanors.”); Jenn Rolnick Borchetta, Curbing 
Collateral Punishment in the Big Data Age: How Lawyers and Advocates Can Use Criminal 
Record Sealing Statutes to Protect Privacy and the Presumption of Innocence, 98 B.U. L. 
REV. 915, 916–17 (2018) (explaining that racial disparities in police targeting results in arrest 
information data that disproportionately affects people of color in bail applications); Jenny 
Roberts, The Innocence Movement and Misdemeanors, 98 B.U. L. REV. 779, 827–30 (2018) 
(describing the misdemeanor wrongful conviction narrative as one “of disproportionately 
harsh consequences, permanence, and racial bias.”); Eisha Jain, Proportionality and Other 
Misdemeanor Myths, 98 B.U. L. REV. 953, 954–55 (2018) (explaining that the use of 
misdemeanor charges can be abused by bad actors, and that even lawful actors “lack the 
ability to regulate whether arrest and conviction records trigger deeply disproportionate civil 
penalties.”); Samuel R. Gross, Errors in Misdemeanor Adjudication, 98 B.U. L. REV. 999, 
1009–10 (2018) (explaining that eighty-five percent of guilty pleas in Harris County, Texas 
were by innocent defendants who were overwhelmingly male and disproportionately black). 
See also Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 872–73 (noting the “detrimental and often life-altering” affect that 
misdemeanors have on defendants with disadvantaged defendants “routinely plead[ing] 
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and policy makers still have not recognized the importance of distinguishing 
misdemeanors and felonies and still propose solutions that equate all crimes.37 The 
failure to think carefully about bail reform has produced consequences well beyond 
the realm of bail itself. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II provides a rich, layered account of the 
historical basis for bifurcating misdemeanors and felonies in every part of the 
criminal justice system. It uncovers the ancient underpinnings of the misdemeanor 
right to bail, and the ways it has always been treated differently from felony bail. It 
overviews the bail decision and the risks unique to misdemeanor bail. Finally, it 
discusses the various pretrial release options faced by a typical misdemeanant in 
America. Part III demonstrates—with a unique comprehensive state analysis that—
sometimes driven by actual state law, and sometimes just by default—judges 
overwhelmingly use the same factors to determine misdemeanor release as they do 
to determine felony release. This is an improper application of the constitutional 
right to bail as misdemeanor defendants and felony defendants have historically 
been treated differently for bail purposes.38  
This Article has the potential to impact some of the most important criminal-
law debates of our time—and to change the course of hundreds of current pending 
bills.39 Bail systems across America need reform in order to prevent the wholesale 
                                               
guilty to get out of jail because they cannot afford bail or because they do not want to risk 
trial.”). 
37 Many scholars, including myself, have failed to distinguish felony and misdemeanor 
differences in scholarship and have focused primarily on felonies. See e.g., TIMOTHY R. 
SCHNACKE, CENTER FOR LEGAL AND EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES, “MODEL” BAIL: 
REDRAWING THE LINE BETWEEN PRETRIAL RELEASE AND DETENTION, 190 (2017) 
http://www.clebp.org/images/04-18-2017_Model_Bail_Laws_CLEPB_.pdf; Shima 
Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 513–23 (2012); 
Crystal S. Yang, Toward an Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399 (2017) (focusing 
on bail reform in general rather than on misdemeanor bail reform);  Matthew J. Hegreness, 
America’s Fundamental and Vanishing Right to Bail, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 909 (2013) (same). 
38 Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined. at 863–64 (Historically, when people were “charged with noncapital crimes, which 
were misdemeanors, they had the right to release”). A defendant charged with a misdemeanor 
has a clear historic right to bail, without any judicial investigation. Unless the court can prove 
an unusual extenuating circumstance, it should be quick to release a misdemeanor defendant.  
39 The collateral consequences of the bail reform flaws identified here are far-reaching 
and devastating. See Roberts, supra note 21, at 286–88 (discussing the many collateral 
consequences of misdemeanor arrests and records in the lives of defendants); Paul Heaton, 
Sandra Mayson, & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor 
Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 713–18 (2017) (discussing “empirical evidence 
on the downstream impacts of pretrial detention on misdemeanor defendants”); Natapoff, 
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1316–17 (discussing the significant harmful 
consequences that misdemeanor convictions can have on those convicted); Jenny Roberts, 
Crashing the Misdemeanor System, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1089, 1090–91 (2013) 
(discussing a misdemeanor conviction’s effect on “future employment, housing, and many 
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stripping of due process rights of defendants. A first step includes dividing 
misdemeanors and felonies in all aspects of bail, including applying presumptive 
release in misdemeanor bail, discontinuing the application of felony release factors 
and money bail to misdemeanors, and fixing faulty risk assessment instruments. 
Addressing these flaws should have serious implications—with a significant one 
being that the majority of people detained pretrial can be released, massively 
reducing prison overcrowding.40 
 
II.  BAIL AND MISDEMEANOR DEFENDANTS: NATIONWIDE APPROACHES 
 
Today there are approximately 13 million misdemeanors filed in the United 
States.41 Although misdemeanor arrests and cases have declined over the last 
decade,42 they still consume the criminal justice system at three times the rate of 
felonies.43 Misdemeanors constitute a wide variety of minor crimes. An exhaustive 
national list is difficult since there are over 3,000 federal misdemeanors and several 
hundred in each state, and they are growing in number.44 Some common 
misdemeanors in the United States are assault, shoplifting, public lewdness, criminal 
mischief, harassment, some forms of credit card fraud, animal cruelty, criminal 
trespass, and vandalism.45 The right to bail for misdemeanor crimes is clear, however 
has changed today from how it was handled historically. 
                                               
other basic facets of daily life”). 
40 Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 841–42 (noting that our “broken bail system” is the primary cause of mass 
incarceration); BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 10. 
41 Stevenson & Mayson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 764. 
42 Id at 738. 
43 Id. at 764. 
44 Com. v. Flaherty, 25 Pa. Super. 490, 493 (1904) (explaining that “[m]isdemeanors 
are either by statute or at common law [and] have one characteristic distinction of being ‘less 
than felony’ in common”); see also William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal 
Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, n.32 (2001); Paul Rosenzweig, Overcriminalization: An 
Agenda for Change, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 809 (2005); Erik Luna, The Overcriminalization 
Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 746 (2005). 
45 See Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 853 (citing ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.46.320 (1980 West) (first degree criminal 
trespass); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.15 (2010 McKinney) (second degree criminal trespass); 
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.61.118 (2010 West) (first degree harassment); ALASKA STAT. 
ANN. § 11.46.484 (1996 West) (fourth degree criminal mischief); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 145.00 
(2008 McKinney) (fourth degree criminal mischief); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.00 (2015 
McKinney) (public lewdness); CAL. PENAL CODE § 459.5 (2014 West) (shoplifting); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 16-11-770 (2007 West) (first conviction of a graffiti vandalism); 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/17-37 (2011 West) (stating a credit card holder who permits another 
person to use it with intent to defraud the issuer commits a misdemeanor); CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 502.6 (2002 West) (the use of a scanning device to obtain the information from a payment 
card magnetic strip without permission); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 434.640 (1978 West) (the 
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This Part focuses on several important aspects of misdemeanor bail. Part II.A 
establishes bail as a historically guaranteed right for misdemeanor crimes. Part II.B 
explores the unique challenges of misdemeanor bail in today’s courts—including 
the speedy processing and the lack of a right to counsel for misdemeanor defendants. 
Part II.C overviews the common methods for release on misdemeanor bail 
throughout the states. All of these preliminary matters are vital to understanding Part 
III, which focuses on the flaws afflicting bail reform efforts throughout the states.  
 
A.  Brief History of Misdemeanor Bail Right 
 
Historically, due process principles prohibited detention before trial for 
misdemeanor crimes. Defendants charged with noncapital crimes had the right to 
release.46 All misdemeanors were noncapital crimes under the common law.47 And 
misdemeanor charges came with a guarantee of bail.48 Eventually, courts gained 
broad discretion in fixing bail and courts sometimes set bail in murder and other 
capital (or felony) cases.49 Bail was provided as a right for misdemeanor cases—not 
subject to court discretion like felony cases—even when defendant was considered 
guilty.50 Indeed, this guarantee to a reasonable bail has been honored under the 
                                               
signing of a credit or debit card with intent to defraud the issuer); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 
11.61.140 (2017 West) (animal cruelty); CAL. PENAL CODE § 597t (1971 West) (confining 
an animal and failing to provide “adequate exercise”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 245.00 (public 
lewdness); CAL. PENAL CODE § 490.2 (petty theft); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.224 (assault)).   
46 “By the ancient common law, before and since the conquest, all felonies were 
bailable, till murder was excepted by statute: so that persons might be admitted to bail before 
conviction almost in every case . . .” WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, THE AMERICAN STUDENT’S 
BLACKSTONE: COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, IN FOUR BOOKS 1002–03 
(George Chase ed., 4th ed. 1919). 
47 See Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 857 (“Capital crimes under the English common law were serious felonies, like 
murder, arson, and serious theft and would not allow release where there was strong evidence 
against the defendant. And all misdemeanors were noncapital crimes, therefore there was no 
imprisonment before trial when people were charged with misdemeanors.”). 
48 See id. at 864; JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PLEADING 
AND EVIDENCE AND THE PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES 154 (Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Company, 3d ed. 1880). 
49 See Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 858; BISHOP, supra note 48, at 154-55. 
50 See Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 858; see also JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PLEADING 
AND EVIDENCE AND THE PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL CASES 155-57 (Boston: Little, Brown, and 
Company, 3d ed. 1880) (“One held to answer for a misdemeanor may give bail equally 
whether he is guilty or not.”); see also JOSEPH CHITTY, ESQ., PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 96 (Brookfield: E. Merriam & Co. 2nd ed. vol. 1, 1832) (“[S]mall 
misdemeanors, or any offense below felony, must be bailed unless they be excluded from it 
by some special act of parliament.”); JOHN WILDER MAY, THE LAW OF CRIMES 73 (Boston: 
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common law as far back as the Magna Carta.51 Misdemeanor defendants were not 
detained before trial, and were even released when they had missed a few court dates 
for misdemeanor offenses.52 In fact, it was only when a defendant failed to appear 
in court three times that he was arrested and forced to pay a fine.53 As such, 
misdemeanor defendants were released before trial, without regard to their 
likelihood to appear in court. Overall, historically, misdemeanor bail was respected 
as a constitutional right.54   
Bail in misdemeanor cases is considered a matter of right.55 Indeed, 
misdemeanor bail has historically been treated as such under the law—and remains 
a right under the law.56 Most states continue to distinguish between misdemeanors 
and felonies, either by constitution or statute.57 Accordingly, states continue to 
                                               
Little, Brown, and Company 2nd ed., 1893) (“Every prisoner must at common law be 
allowed bail upon a commitment, unless he is charged with a capital offense.”).   
51 Magna Carta (1215) (“A freeman shall not be amerced for a slight offence, except in 
accordance with the degree of the offence;”) 
52 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, THE AMERICAN STUDENT’S BLACKSTONE: COMMENTARIES 
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, IN FOUR BOOKS 75 (George Chase ed., The Banks Law 
Publishing Co. 4th ed. 1919) (1877) (Misdemeanors came with “great importance to the 
public [of] the preservation of . . . personal liberty.”).  
53 A TRANSLATION OF GLANVILLE 27–28 (John Beames, trans., John Byrne and Co. 
1900) (authorized facsimile of the original, University Microfilms, 1969) (It was only upon 
missing the third summons that the accused’s “body shall be taken,” and his Pledges (his 
sureties who would guarantee his appearance) be made to pay a fine.). 
54 Baughman, Presumption of Innocence, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., 
at 729. 
55 Constantino v. Warren, 684 S.E.2d 601, 604 (Ga. 2009); see also Hobbs v. Reynolds, 
289 S.W.3d 917, 920 (Ark. 2008) (stating that, under state law, all persons are “bailable” 
except for in capital offenses); see also Williams v. City of Montgomery, 739 So. 2d 515, 
518 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (discussing the Alabama Bail Reform Act: “In all cases of 
misdemeanors and felonies, unless otherwise specified, the defendant is, before conviction, 
entitled to bail as a matter of right . . . .”); see also People v. Barbarick, 214 Cal. Rptr. 322, 
324–26 (Ct. App. 1985) (finding that because the defendant was charged with only a 
misdemeanor, he had a statutory right to bail: the power to grant bail “is not . . . an arbitrary 
discretion to do abstract justice according to the popular meaning of that phrase, but is a 
discretion governed by legal rules to do justice according to law . . . .”) (quotations omitted); 
People v. Arnold, 132 Cal. Rptr. 922 (App. Dep’t Super Ct. 1976); Sellers v. State, 145 
S.E.2d 827, 827–28 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965) (“It is only in misdemeanor cases that one convicted 
is entitled to bail as a matter of law) (citing Code § 27-901) (citing Bennett v. Davis, 111 
S.E.2d 733 (Ga. Ct. App. 1959)); State v. Langley, 611 P.2d 130, 130 (Haw. 1980) (“Person 
arrested for petty misdemeanor or misdemeanor offense does not possess absolute right to 
immediate release, but, rather, a right to release without unnecessary delay on payment of 
bail.”); see also State v. Barthold, 110 N.W.2d 493 (1961). 
56 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, THE AMERICAN STUDENT’S BLACKSTONE: 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, IN FOUR BOOKS 1001 (George Chase ed., Banks 
& Brothers 3d ed. 1890) (1877). 
57 Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
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articulate a right to bail for all noncapital defendants to be released on bail.58 This of 
course results in misdemeanor defendants retaining the right to release before trial. 
Today forty-eight states favor pretrial release for all noncapital defendants, 
established either by state constitution or statute.59 According to the National 
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), eighteen states and the District of 
Columbia require a separate hearing on whether a defendant will be held or released 
                                               
defined., at 858–60; see also SCHNACKE, supra note 37, at 139. 
58 See e.g., Ex parte Colbert, 805 So.2d 687, 688 (Ala. 2001) (internal citations omitted) 
(stating that Alabama Constitution provides “absolute right to bail in all noncapital cases”); 
Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 
871; SCHNACKE, supra note 37, at 139 (noting that states initially indicated that capital 
defendants should be detained and later added violent felons; but made clear that everyone 
else should be released). 
59 ALA. CONST. art. I, § 16; ALA. CODE § 15-13-108; ALASKA CONST. ART. I, § 11; 
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.30.011(d); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 22; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ § 
13-3961(a), 13-3967(a); ARK. CONST. art. II, § 8; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-84-110; CAL. 
CONST. art. I, § 12; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1270.5, 1271; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 19; COLO 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-101; CONN. CONST. art. I, § 8; DEL. CONST. art. I,  § 12; DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 11, §§ 2103 2116; D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14; FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 907.041(4); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-6-1(e), 17-6-13; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 12; HAW. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 804-3, 804-4(a); IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 6; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2902; 
ILL. CONST. art. I, § 9; 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/110-4; IND. CONST. art. I, § 17; IND. 
CODE ANN. § 35-33-8-2; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 12; IOWA CODE ANN. § 811.1; KAN. CONST. 
BILL OF RIGHTS, § 9; KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-2802, 59-29a20; KY. CONST. § 16; LA. CONST. 
art. I, § 18; LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 330–31; ME. CONST. art. I, § 10; ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1003(3)–(4); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 5-202; MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 276, §§ 58, 58A; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 15; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 765.5, 
765.6(1); MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7; MISS. CONST. art. III, § 29; MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-5-33; 
MO. CONST. art. I, § 20; MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 544.455, 544.470; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 21; 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-9-102; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 9; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 7; NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 178.484; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 597:1, 597:1c, 597:2(III-a); N.J. CONST. 
art. I, § 11; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 
27; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 15A-533, 15A-534.6; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 11; OHIO CONST. 
art. I, § 9; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2937.222; OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 8; OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 22, § 1101; OR. CONST. art. I, §§ 14, 43;  OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135.240; PA. CONST. 
art. I, § 14; 42 PA. STAT. AND CONST. STAT. ANN. § 5701; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 9; 12 R.I. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. § 12-13-1; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 15; S.C. CODE ANN. § 22-5-510; S.D. CONST. 
art. 6, § 8; TENN. CONST. art. I, § 15; TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-102; TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 
11, 11a, 11c; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 17.152–.153; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 8; UTAH 
CODE ANN. §§ 77-20-1, 77-36-2.5(1); VT. CONST. art. II, § 40; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 
7553, 7553a, 1043, 1044, 1063; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-120–19.2-120.1; WASH. CONST. 
art. I, § 20; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1C-1; WIS. CONST. art. I, § 8; WIS. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 969.01, 969.035; WYO. CONST. art. I, § 14; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-10-101. See also 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURE, Pretrial Release Eligibility (2013), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/pretrial-release-eligibility.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2018). 
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pretrial.60 In these hearings, the prosecution provides information to the court and 
based on that information, the court makes a finding as to whether the defendant 
should be released.61 However, the states that do require a separate hearing do so 
only for more serious violent crimes, largely felonies and crimes involving domestic 
violence.62 A separate hearing does not take place for misdemeanor cases.63 
Unfortunately, a hearing or a right to bail does not translate into actual release for 
all misdemeanors because practically speaking these rights are not being respected.64  
Most Americans who encounter the criminal justice system will do so through 
the petty offenses that make up misdemeanor charges; they will not be charged with 
rape or murder.65 However, especially when it comes to misdemeanors—bail is 
among the least visible parts of the criminal process.66 It has been ignored by policy 
makers and scholars in such a way that we lack a firm understanding of how 
misdemeanor bail decisions are made nationwide. However, what we do know is 
that there is a right to bail for misdemeanor offenses. 
 
B.  Pretrial Stage is Especially Important for Misdemeanors 
 
                                               
60 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Pretrial Detention, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/pretrial-detention.aspx (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2018) [hereinafter NCSL, Pretrial Detention].  
61 Id. 
62 See id. In twelve states and the District of Columbia have provided courts with 
explicit time frames within which the hearing must take place. Id. 
63 The finding of probable cause and a separate preliminary hearing is not required for 
misdemeanor cases in many jurisdictions. See e.g., Anjali Pathmanathan, Myth of 
Preliminary Due Process for Misdemeanor Prosecutions in New York, 42 N.Y.U REV. OF 
LAW AND SOC. CHANGE 83 (2018) (In New York, a defendant must simply read and sign the 
charging instrument and has no opportunity to contest the truth of the charges and the state 
does not actually have to present evidence for a prima facie case in a preliminary probable 
cause hearing). “In some states, preliminary hearings are held in every criminal case. In other 
states, they are held only if the defense requests them. In still other states, they are held only 
in felony cases.” Id. 
64 Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 864 (“As the law developed . . . , the use of bail changed from being a general 
right—particularly for misdemeanor crimes—to something that discriminates between 
defendants based on ability to pay bail”); SCHNACKE, supra note 37, at 140 (“Today, our 
understanding of a clear in-or-out system, articulated as bail (release) and no bail (detention), 
is clouded by the fact that our practical administration of bail is completely aberrant to 
historical notions. Today, we say that a defendant is bailable and yet detain him. We order a 
defendant to be released, and yet allow a condition of that release to keep him in jail.”).  
65 Stevenson & Mayson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 732.  
66 Marian R. Williams, The Effect of Attorney Type on Bail Decisions, 28(I) CRIM. JUST. 
POL. R. 3, 5 (2017) (discussing how the bail systems is particularly unfair for poor defendants 
for a variety of reasons).  
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The consequences of being held in pretrial detention can be significant—even 
for a misdemeanor. Besides the potential dangers of jail,67 the consequences of even 
short jail stays can be catastrophic for misdemeanor defendants—many of whom are 
poor. These consequences include effects on employment, earnings, family 
destabilization, housing and even broader community effects where incarcerated 
people are concentrated.68 Not only can pretrial detention impact the defendant’s 
personal life, it can influence the ultimate result of the criminal case against her, 
causing long-term harm. Pretrial detention induces innocent defendants to plead 
                                               
67 See Joseph A. Bick, Infection Control in Jails and Prisons, 45 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 1047, 1047 (2007); see also John J. Gibbons & Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, 
Confronting Confinement: A Report of the Commission on Safety and Abuse in America’s 
Prisons, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 385, 399–400 (2006); Jonathan Abel, Staph Sends 
Pinellas Jail Inmate into Coma, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Feb. 27, 2008), 
ttp://www.sptimes.com/2008/02/27/Northpinellas/Staph_infection_sends.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/G3WL-2MMU].  
68 BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 87; Shima Baradaran Baughman, Costs of Pretrial 
Detention, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1, 5–7, (2017) [hereinafter Baughman, Costs of Pretrial 
Detention] (discussing the direct costs to detainees and indirect costs to societies that pretrial 
detention imposes); MICHAEL REMPEL ET AL., JAIL IN NEW YORK CITY: EVIDENCE-BASED 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM 6 (Jan. 2017), 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/NYC_Path_Analysis_Final%
20Report.pdf. Heaton et al. supra note 39, at 711–12 (”[T]]hose detained pretrial are more 
likely to commit future crimes . . . .”); Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note 
Error! Bookmark not defined., at 872–81 (noting that consequences of pretrial detention 
include loss of their “jobs, apartments, and sometimes children and family stability,” “future 
arrests and recidivism,” “less of an opportunity to prepare her case,” deportation, loss of civil 
rights, ostracism, and loss of public benefits). 
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guilty,69 causes defendants to be convicted three times as often,70 receive three times 
longer sentences,71 higher bail amounts, and even commit more future crime.72   
Despite the important implications on a defendant’s life, the pretrial detention 
decision is a very quick one that lacks adequate attention by courts or attorneys. 
Most defendants appear at an arraignment without an attorney, even though the 
majority of their cases are resolved at this stage. In a 2010 study, researchers 
observed misdemeanor arraignments in twenty-one Florida counties. The 
researchers found that in roughly eighty percent of cases, arraignments lasted no 
longer than three minutes and that seventy percent of cases were resolved at the 
arraignment.73 Another study that focused on New York Legal Aid misdemeanor 
arraignments showed similar results.74 In this study, 69 percent of all misdemeanor 
cases were resolved at arraignment.75 Though the presence of counsel in these 
situations may be beneficial to some defendants, many “feel enormous pressure from 
all sides to enter a quick guilty plea.”76 The same terse treatment has been found in 
                                               
69 Heaton et al., supra note 39, at 714 (”[A] detained person may plead guilty—even if 
innocent—simply to get out of jail.”); BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 84 (“Even for prisoners 
in pretrial detention who are innocent, accepting a plea bargain for time served is very 
tempting because they just want to leave jail and return to their families and jobs.”); State v. 
Young, 863 N.W.2d 249, 253 (Iowa 2015) (”[P]retrial detention significantly and adversely 
impacts the truth-finding process by preventing effective assertion of defenses and increasing 
pressures to plead guilty as a matter of convenience.”). 
70 BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 5 (“Defendants detained before trial are more likely to 
be convicted if they go to trial, four times more likely to be sentenced to jail, and three times 
more likely to receive prison sentences than similar people released pretrial.”). 
71 Meghan Sacks & Alissa R. Ackerman, Bail and Sentencing: Does Pretrial Detention 
Lead to Harsher Punishment?, 25 CRIM. JUSTICE POL’Y REV. 59, 59 (2012); see also Marian 
R. Williams, The Effect of Pretrial Detention on Imprisonment Decisions, 28 CRIM. JUSTICE 
REV. 299, 299–316 (2013); Baughman, Costs of Pretrial Detention, supra note 68. Indeed, 
misdemeanor sentences are often rushed and deemed insignificant, even though they do 
accompany jail time that has lifechanging consequences. Roberts, Informed Misdemeanor 
Sentencing, supra note 23, at 178–80; J.C. Oleson et al., The Effect of Pretrial Detention on 
Sentencing in Two Federal Districts, 33 JUST. Q. 1103, 1114–17 (2016) (pretrial detention 
leads to more severe punishment). 
72 Heaton et al., supra note 39, at 714; BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 81. 
73 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, THREE MINUTE JUSTICE: 
HASTE AND WASTE IN FLORIDA’S MISDEMEANOR COURTS 16–17 (2011). See also 
Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 
841 (discussing how such decisions are often “two-minute decisions,” and citing research to 
that effect). 
74 Roberts, supra note 21, at 307 (describing a study where lawyers essentially “kn[ew] 
the going rate” of misdemeanor cases and tried to take only those cases that c[ould] be 
disposed of at arraignment.”). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
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studies of felony bail arraignments.77 In a study conducted in New York City,78 the 
authors found that of the misdemeanor cases that were not disposed of at 
arraignment, 79% were released with no conditions. The other 21% of misdemeanor 
cases faced the possibility of pretrial detention. Of the 21%, 3% posted bail at 
arraignment, 25% were detained on bail, and 1% were remanded without bail.79 With 
the combination of courts focused on freeing resources for “more serious cases,” 
overworked attorneys trying to resolve misdemeanors as quickly as possible,80 and 
defendants who likely do not fully understand the importance of their initial 
appearance, it is clear that misdemeanor arraignments are not given nearly enough 
attention. With problems arising at the arraignment stage even when defendants are 
accompanied by counsel, it is even more troubling that most criminal defendants are 
not represented at all at the arraignment.81 
Misdemeanor defendants are also at a special disadvantage because in some 
public defender offices, misdemeanor cases are largely assigned to less experienced 
attorneys,82 who also appear before less experienced judges.83 Research has shown 
that there is a correlation with a criminal defense attorney’s level of experience and 
the outcome a criminal case.84 Criminal defendants with more experienced attorneys 
are more likely to avoid jail time and receive lower than average sentences.85 But 
misdemeanor cases are not always simpler than felony cases. Misdemeanors can 
present complex factual and legal challenges unto themselves, demanding more time 
and resources from criminal defense lawyers. The fact that misdemeanors are given 
to less experienced attorneys and in larger volumes makes it difficult to ensure an 
                                               
77 Sarah Ottone & Christine Scott-Hayward, Pretrial Detention and the Decision to 
Impose Bail in Southern California, 19 CRIMINOLOGY, CRIM. JUST., L. & SOC’Y 2, 18 
(forthcoming). One study conducted by scholars Sarah Ottone and Christine Scott-Hayward 
observed arraignments in California courts. The study focused on Los Angeles County and 
Orange County. The researchers visited fifteen “court locations” to observe arraignments for 
felonies. Bail hearings were consistently “short and uncontested.” Id. And in one court the 
judge did not “explicitly invite argument on bail.” Id. at 24. Even then, observers found 
“arguments . . . over the amount of bail were rare” and requests for lower bail were generally 
denied. Id. at 25. 
78 MICHAEL REMPEL ET AL., JAIL IN NEW YORK CITY: EVIDENCE-BASED 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM 1 (Jan. 2017), 
http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/documents/NYC_Path_Analysis_Final%
20Report.pdf. 
79 Some individuals detained at arraignment later made bail. The authors found that 
only 10% of misdemeanors were detained throughout their entire case. 
80 Roberts, supra note 21, at 307. 
81 More than half of defendants appear at their initial hearings without counsel. 
BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 108–10. 
82 Joe, supra note 5, at 743. 
83 Roberts, Informed Misdemeanor Sentencing, supra note 23, at 188. 
84 Joe, supra note 5, at 745. 
85 Id. 
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attorney is able to protect a defendant’s constitutional rights.86 In addition, only 
roughly half of judges nationwide are required to obtain a legal qualification to serve 
as a misdemeanor judge.87 Some of these judges are also elected, which may 
disincentivize judges from seeking innovative approaches to handling criminal 
cases.88 
Many misdemeanor defendants who appear for their first appearance are not 
required to have an attorney, even though the Supreme Court has affirmed this 
right.89 In Rothgery v. Gillespie County, the Supreme Court held that an indigent 
defendant is entitled to the presence of counsel at every “critical stage” of a criminal 
case.90 The Court defines “critical stages” as proceedings between an individual and 
agents of the State (whether “formal or informal, in court or out, that amount to 
‘trial-like confrontations,’ at which counsel would help the accused in coping with 
legal problems or ... meeting his adversary[.]”)91 A court hearing regarding pretrial 
detention is a critical stage in a criminal case since the judge “must consider the 
weight of the evidence against the accused or the likelihood of conviction when 
determining conditions of pretrial release.”92 In thirty-two states, however, criminal 
procedure rules allow a defendant to attend initial appearance before a court without 
counsel,93 despite the fact that decisions regarding the defendant’s release and 
amount of bail are often made at these hearings.94 In 28 states, defendants have no 
right to counsel when the court initially makes decisions regarding their physical 
liberty.95 For instance, though the New York Court of Appeals has decided that 
                                               
86 Soolean Choy, Extending Meaningful Assistance to Misdemeanor Defendants, 22 
TEX. J. ON C. L. & C. R. 73, 88–89 (2016). 
87 RON MALEGA & THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS STATE COURT 
ORGANIZATION, 2011, at 5 (2013) (about 59% are required to obtain a legal qualification 
aside from a law degree). 
88 Jessica A. Roth, The Culture of Misdemeanor Courts, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 215, 230–
32 (2017). 
89 Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008) (The Supreme Court has 
determined that the right to counsel attaches at a “criminal defendant’s initial appearance 
before a judicial officer . . . .”); John Gross, The Right to Counsel But Not the Presence of 
Counsel: A Survey of State Criminal Procedures for Pre-Trial Release, 69 FLA. L. REV. 3, 
840 (2018) (discussing how “Supreme Court has never specifically addressed whether there 
is a legal requirement that counsel be present at a defendant’s initial appearance where his 
liberty is subject to restriction.”); BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 115, 123 (“The reality of the 
right to counsel is that it is not universally provided by all states to indigent defendants before 
their bail hearing.” And noting that only ten states provide counsel for the bail hearing.). 
90 Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty, 554 U.S. 191, 212 (2008).  
91 Id. at 212 n.16 
92 Id.; Gross, supra note 89, at 865–66. 
93 Gross, supra note 89, at 841. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 841–50 (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, 
Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
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indigents are entitled to counsel at bail hearings, indigent defendants are still not 
always represented at these hearings.96  
In practice, however, even misdemeanor defendants who are entitled to counsel 
do not always receive assistance.97 Data is limited, but in one Bureau of Justice 
study, thirty percent of convicted and jailed misdemeanor defendants reported that 
they did not receive representation.98 Some are not offered representation. Many 
refuse it, pleading guilty without representation due to a lack of understanding of the 
collateral consequences of such a plea.99 In localities in New York, there have been 
reports of “widespread” lack of representation in misdemeanor cases where the 
defendant was entitled to counsel.100 In Williamson County, Texas, a class action 
filed by the Texas Fair Defense Project showed that hundreds of misdemeanor 
defendants who were technically indigent were being denied their right to counsel.101 
As of 2007, in Florida the number of misdemeanor defendants represented by 
counsel has dropped by forty percent since 1999.102   
Nationally, public defender officers are often overloaded with misdemeanor 
cases and lack the number of attorneys to meet the demand. Indeed, only 12% of 
offices nationally are able to meet the demands of national caseloads.103 And even 
appearances of misdemeanor defendants often occur with 30 or more at a time who 
appear at the same time and speak to a prosecutor briefly and stand before a judge. 
Often defendants do not feel like they have an option other than taking a plea deal 
and getting through their case.104 It may come as no surprise that there are no specific 
                                               
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Maine); see also 
BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 116 (discussing the major disadvantages that defendants face 
when attending a bail hearing without the benefit of counsel). 
96 Gross, supra note 89, at 849–50. 
97 Choy, supra note 86, at 82 (citing COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERV., 
FINAL REPORT THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 15 (2006)). 
98 Erica Hashimoto, The Problem with Misdemeanor Representation, 70 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 1019, 1023 (2013). 
99 Roberts, supra note 21, at 297, 307 (“They may feel enormous pressure from all sides 
to enter a quick guilty plea ”). 
100 Choy, supra note 86, at 81–84.  
101 Id. at 84. 
102 Hashimoto, supra note 98, at 1028–29 (2013). 
103 JUSTICE POLICY INST., SYSTEM OVERLOAD: THE COSTS OF UNDER-RESOURCING 
PUBLIC DEFENSE 10 (2011) (Over 70 percent of county-based public defender offices lacked 
enough attorneys to meet national caseload standards, while 23 percent of offices had less 
than half of the necessary attorneys to meet caseload standards. Approximately 12 percent 
of county public defender offices with more than 5,000 cases per year had enough lawyers 
to meet standards). 
104 Roberts, supra note 21, at 295, 306–07 (describing “assembly line” justice where 
defendants appear in a large group and are pressured to take plea deals); Argersinger v. 
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 34 (1972) (“the volume of misdemeanor cases, far greater in number 
than felony prosecutions, may create an obsession for speedy dispositions, regardless of the 
fairness of the result”); State v. Young, 863 N.W.2d 249, 253 (Iowa 2015) (efficiency wins 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3358662 
 DIVIDING BAIL REFORM (FORTHCOMING IOWA LAW REVIEW) 21 
   
 
professional standards for effective representation specific to misdemeanor 
practice.105 In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court laid out a two-pronged 
ineffective assistance test, but even that has never been applied to misdemeanor 
cases.106 And misdemeanor defendants are not always entitled to counsel, unlike 
felony defendants.107 Rather, the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases is triggered 
only where the punishment of the charged crime includes jail time—regardless of 
whether jail time is actually imposed.108 Thus defendants often do not have counsel 
at the bail stage, and only receive it later when they face jail time. 
Overall, the challenges presented for misdemeanor defendants are significant. 
Most do not have the right to counsel—their cases are often resolved at arraignment 
where no attorney has yet been appointed in many cases. They are often represented 
by overburdened attorneys in overflowing courts. They face little option but to take 
a plea agreement and the consequences of their case can be significant if they are 
forced to face even a few days of jail time. Jail time for defendants often means a 
loss of employment and housing and even increased crime in their future. Despite 
these devastating factors, national priorities do not often consider the plight of 
misdemeanor defendants. 
The next section discusses another important preliminary matter about 
misdemeanors: options for pretrial release in misdemeanor cases. In order to 
understand bail reform efforts, it is important to consider the various ways 
defendants are (and are not) released before trial. 
 
C.  Pretrial Release Options for Misdemeanors 
 
The pretrial process is not standardized among jurisdictions throughout the 
states. Each state has different misdemeanor release standards, and standards can 
even vary by city or county in individual states. There has not—to this date—been 
a comprehensive national analysis of the types and rates of release for 
misdemeanors. While this section briefly covers each type of release and some 
comparative release rates, it is by no way comprehensive. Typically, whether being 
booked into jail or appearing for a bail hearing, the authority will generally conduct 
an individualized analysis to determine whether the defendant should be released, 
how she should be released, and the conditions which should apply. Even though a 
fact specific analysis must take place, it is important to note that most judges are not 
                                               
over accuracy in misdemeanor cases). 
105 Choy, supra note 86, at 77. 
106 Id. Roberts, supra note 21, at 283. 
107 See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding that “absent a knowing 
and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as 
petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.”). Though 
only 10 states guarantee counsel at the initial bail hearing for felony cases, it is likely that 
even fewer states guarantee counsel for misdemeanor cases. BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 
115, 123. 
108 Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662 (2002) 
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presented with even basic information about the defendant.109 In many jurisdictions 
they rely solely on a police probable cause statement, and the hearing takes place in 
just a couple of minutes.110 The presumption of bail in misdemeanor cases has 
survived—in theory, that is, but courts now regularly conduct case-by-case analyses 
that result in misdemeanor defendants being held in pretrial detention, either due to 
being denied bail altogether or being unable to pay bail. These case-by-case factors 
are discussed in detail for felony and misdemeanor cases in Part III.A.  
At the initial appearance, the judge has several options in releasing or detaining 
a defendant. Generally, when a misdemeanor defendant appears the judge can order 
one of the following. First, release of defendant on personal recognizance.111 
Second, the judge can set a money bail amount that defendant must personally pay 
or pay with the help of a commercial bail bondsman.112 If defendant cannot afford 
bail, the defendant will face detention. Third, the judge can deny bail altogether and 
order pretrial detention. Fourth, a judge can release a defendant with certain 
conditions that relate to the crime she is charged with—for instance a restriction of 
any contact with a victim. A fifth choice, though not usually one of the courts’, is 
for the police officer to issue a citation instead of taking the misdemeanor defendant 
into custody. Almost all states permit law enforcement to essentially give the 
misdemeanor defendant a “ticket” or summons for the criminal violation and show 
up to court at an assigned date.   
These misdemeanor release options will be explained in more detail including 
their release statistics for misdemeanors, starting with citations in lieu of arrest. 
Understanding the types and availability of release for misdemeanors demonstrates 
how far we have departed from historic and constitutional guarantees of release and 
will also set the stage for understanding the differences between felony and 
misdemeanor bail laws in the next section. 
 
                                               
109 For instance, a recent survey of judges in Utah “revealed that judges lack basic 
information when making pretrial release decisions.” OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR 
GENERAL, STATE OF UTAH, A PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF UTAH’S MONETARY BAIL SYSTEM 
(2017), available at 
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?Documen
tFileKey=ce65ff35-ba9c-77fb-8922-b9417faecd6e. 
110 Predicating their bail decisions mostly on probable cause statements, judges in most 
of the state have “[l]ittle reliable information about a defendant’s risk of flight or danger to 
the community.” OFFICE OF THE LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR GENERAL, STATE OF UTAH, A 
PERFORMANCE AUDIT OF UTAH’S MONETARY BAIL SYSTEM (2017), available at 
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?Documen
tFileKey=ce65ff35-ba9c-77fb-8922-b9417faecd6e. 
111 See e.g., People v. Maynard, No. 2007KN0002279, 2007 WL 488914 (N.Y. Crim. 
Ct. Feb. 15, 2007) (stating that if the State is unable to put on a trial within 30 days of the 
defendant being detained on a misdemeanor charge he or she is entitled to either (1) release 
on his or her own recognizance or (2) bail).  
112 Id.  
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1.  Citations in Lieu of Custody  
 
A highly favored method of dealing with misdemeanors nationally is citations 
in lieu of arrest or custody—where there is no bail hearing. Almost 80 percent of 
state jurisdictions have a statute that empowers law enforcement to issue either a 
summons or a citation instead of arresting or continuing custody of a misdemeanor 
offender. A citation offers a pretrial option that can encourage a defendant to appear 
while avoiding pretrial cost and collateral consequences. Twenty-four states have 
established a presumption of “citation in lieu of arrest.”113 This authority is largely 
provided on a discretionary basis.114 Arkansas and Mississippi statutes specifically 
                                               
113 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Citation in Lieu of Arrest, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/citation-in-lieu-of-arrest.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2018).  
114 See ALA. CODE § 11-45-9.1 (“Municipality may authorize any law enforcement 
officer . . . to issue a summons and complaint to any person charged with . . . any Class C 
misdemeanor or violation not involving violence, threat of violence, alcohol or drugs.”); see 
also ARK. R. CRIM. P. 5.2 (officer “may issue a citation . . . .”); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
11, § 1907 (1995) (“the officer may, but need not, give the person a written summons”); see 
also FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.125 (“notice to appear may be issued by the arresting officer”); see 
also HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 803-6 (2007) (“the police officer may, but need not, issue a 
citation”); see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-3901 (1983) (“the law enforcement officer may” 
issue a citation); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-4-1 (2005) (court “may” issue a summons, 
officer “may” issue summons); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2408 (2010) (“officer may” 
issue notice to appear); see also LA. CIV. CODE CRIM PROC. ANN. art. 209 (1996) (“the 
magistrate may issue a summons”); see also LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 211 (2011) 
(Officer “may issue a written summons”); see also MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 4-101 
(2016) (Police officer “may” issue a citation); see also MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-3-18 (1980) 
(“such person may . . . be released” and given “written notice to appear”); see also NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 178.4851 (2007) (a court, sheriff, or chief of police “may release without 
bail”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178.4851 (2007) (“the person shall, in the discretion of the 
peace officer, either be given a misdemeanor citation”); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
594:14 (2014) (“he or she may” issue written summons); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1-
6 (2013) (law enforcement officer “may offer” person arrested for petty misdemeanor a 
citation in lieu of arrest); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-302 (2003) (“An officer may 
issue a citation” for misdemeanors); see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 209 (1967) (Law 
enforcement “may issue citation” for misdemeanor); see also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
133.055 (2012) (“A peace officer may issue a criminal citation” for misdemeanor and 
felonies subject to misdemeanor treatment.); see also 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-7-11 
(1977) (peace officer “may issue a summons” for misdemeanor); see also TEX. CRIM. PROC. 
CODE ANN. § 14.06 (2015) (A peace officer “may . . . issue a citation” for some 
misdemeanors); 21. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-18 (2012) (misdemeanor defendants “may be 
issued” a citation); see also VT. R. CRIM. P. 3 (“officer may issue a citation” for non-
witnessed misdemeanors); see also WA ST CR LTD JURIS CrRLJ 2.1 (the arresting officer 
“may serve upon the person a citation” for misdemeanor and gross misdemeanors); see also 
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1-5a (1982) (officer “may issue a citation” any misdemeanor 
committed in law-enforcements presence); see also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.085 (2017) 
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refuse to limit law enforcement on the factors they should consider, explicitly stating 
that the ones provided are not exhaustive.115 Sixteen state statutes do not provide a 
list of factors at all.116 Eight states go even farther to favor citation in lieu of custody, 
requiring that a citation be issued for misdemeanor offenses unless certain 
exceptions apply.117 
Whether issuing a citation is discretionary or not, law enforcement officers are 
almost always required to make an individualized inquiry in determining whether it 
is appropriate or not.118 This inquiry in many jurisdictions looks much like the fact-
                                               
(officer “may issue a citation” for misdemeanors); see also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-2-103 
(2011) (“A citation may issue” for any misdemeanor). 
115 ARK. R. CRIM. P. 5.2 (“other relevant facts such as . . . .”); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-
3-18 (1980) (“other facts relating to the persons arrest that would bear on the question of his 
release”). 
116 ALA. CODE § 11-45-9.1 (“Municipality may authorize any law enforcement officer 
. . . to issue a summons and complaint to any person charged with . . . any Class C 
misdemeanor or violation not involving violence, threat of violence, alcohol or drugs.”); 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-105 (1994) (“arresting authority is satisfied that the person 
arrested will obey”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-1h (1984) (misdemeanor defendant “may, 
in the discretion of the arresting officer” be issued a summons); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 
1907 (1995) (“the officer may, but need not, give the person a written summons”); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 19-3901 (1983) (“a law enforcement officer may” issue a citation); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 35-33-4-1 (2005) (court “may” issue a summons, officer “may” issue summons); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2408 (2010) (“officer may” issue notice to appear”); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 257.728 (2008) (“the arresting officer shall prepare . . . a written citation”); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 594:14 (2014) (officer “may” issue summons); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 
31-1-6 (2013) (law enforcement officer “may offer” citation in lieu of arrest for petty 
misdemeanors); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-302 (2003) (“An officer may issue a citation” 
for misdemeanors); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 209 (1967) (Law enforcement “may issue a 
citation” for misdemeanors); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133.055 (2012) (“A peace officer may 
issue a criminal citation” for misdemeanors or felonies subject to misdemeanor treatment); 
12 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-7-11 (1977) (peace officer “may issue a summons” for 
misdemeanor); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 41-15-11 (2005) (the arresting officer “shall” issue a 
summons for misdemeanors); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-18 (2012) (Misdemeanor defendant 
“may be issued” citation). 
117 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.015 (2017) (“a peace officer shall issue a citation”); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.728 (2008) (“the arresting officer shall prepare . . . a written 
citation”); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.01 (“must issue a citation and release the defendant”); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.26 (1978) (In case of minor misdemeanor, “the officer shall not 
arrest the person, but shall issue a citation”); PA. R. CRIM. P. 519 (“The arresting officer shall 
promptly release from custody” first and second degree misdemeanor defendants); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 41-15-11 (2005) (the arresting officer “shall” issue a summons for 
misdemeanors); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-118 (2012) (peace officer “shall issue a citation” 
for misdemeanors); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-74 (2014) (“the arresting officer shall” issue a 
summons for most misdemeanors). 
118 There may be constitutional problems with this fact finding by officers, but this is 
beyond the scope of this Article. This section explains that officers in determining to make 
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specific analysis courts conduct when making a pretrial detention decision, but there 
are multiple factors that are specific to law enforcement that are often included. 
Under most state statutes, whether the defendant is likely to appear for a future court 
date is a factor law enforcement officers must consider.119 If defendant is unlikely to 
appear, the officer will make an arrest instead of issuing a citation. For example, 
under Hawaii law “[w]hen a police officer arrests a person without a warrant for a 
misdemeanor, the police may, but need not, issue a citation, if the police officer finds 
                                               
an arrest make a factual inquiry into whether the defendant will fail to appear in court or 
whether defendant poses a danger to others. The officer then determines whether to arrest 
defendant or issue a citation. It is possible that this level of fact finding should be left to the 
discretion of a judicial officer, not a peace officer. However, this question is left for another 
day. 
119 See, e.g, ALA. CODE § 11-45-9 (“If any person refuses to give a written recognizance 
to appear by placing his signature on the summons and complaint, the officer shall take that 
person into custody and bring him before any officer or official who is authorized to approve 
bond.”); see also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-105 (West) (“When a person has been 
arrested without a warrant, he may be released by the arresting authority on its own authority 
if[] . . . The offense for which the person was arrested and is being held is a misdemeanor or 
petty offense and the arresting officer or a responsible command officer of the arresting 
authority is satisfied that the person arrested will obey a summons commanding his 
appearance at a later date.”); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1907 (West) (“In any case 
in which it is lawful for a peace officer to arrest without a warrant a person for a 
misdemeanor, the officer may, but need not, give the person a written summons in 
substantially the following form[] . . . [i]f the person fails to appear in answer to the 
summons, or if there is reasonable cause to believe that the person will not appear, a warrant 
for the person's arrest may issue.”); see also FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.125 (“If a person is arrested 
for an offense declared to be a misdemeanor of the first or second degree or a violation . . . 
notice to appear may be issued by the arresting officer unless[] . . . the accused has no ties 
with the jurisdiction reasonably sufficient to assure the accused’s appearance or there is 
substantial risk that the accused will refuse to respond to the notice [or] it appears that the 
accused previously has failed to respond to a notice or a summons”); see also HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 803-6(b) (West) (“In any case in which it is lawful for a police officer to arrest 
a person without a warrant for a misdemeanor, petty misdemeanor . . . if the police officer 
finds and is reasonably satisfied that the person[] [w]ill appear in court at the time 
designated[]”); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.015 (West) (“[A] peace officer shall 
issue a citation instead of making an arrest for a misdemeanor committed in his or her 
presence, if there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person being cited will appear to 
answer the charge.”); see also NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.1771 (West) (a police officer 
may give a citation for a misdemeanor unless “the peace officer has reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe the person will disregard a written promise to appear in court.”); see also 
PA. R. CRIM. P. 519 (“The arresting officer shall promptly release from custody a defendant 
who has been arrested without a warrant, rather than taking the defendant before the issuing 
authority, when the following conditions have been met[] . . . the arresting officer has 
reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant will appear as required.”); see also TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 40-7-118 (West) (“No citation shall be issued under this section if . . . [a] 
reasonable likelihood exists that the arrested person will fail to appear in court.”); see also  
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and is reasonably satisfied that the person . . . will appear in court at the time 
designated.”120 Many other states allow officers to consider the likelihood of the 
person receiving the citation to appear in court in determining whether to arrest that 
individual.121 Whether the defendant has a history of not appearing for court dates is 
consequently a factor law enforcement often consider, with seven state statutes 
specifically addressing it.122  
Additionally, whether the defendant poses danger is also a judgment a law 
enforcement officer must often make before issuing a citation or summons.123 A 
                                               
120 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 803-6 (2007). 
121 See also ARK. R. CRIM. P. 5.2; see also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-3901 (1983); see 
also IOWA CODE ANN. § 805.1 (2002); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.015 (2017); see 
also MD. CODE ANN., Crim. Proc. § 4-101 (2016); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
257.728 (2008); see also MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.01; see also NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-422 
(2017); see also NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 171.1771 (West through 2017 Regular Session); 
see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-1-6 (2013); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-302 
(2003); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.26 (1978); see also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
22, § 209 (1967); see also OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133.055 (2012); see also TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 40-7-118 (2012); see also TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 14.06 (2015); see also 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-18 (2012); see also VT. R. CRIM. P. 3; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 
19.2-74 (2014); see also WA ST CR LTD JURIS CrRLJ 2.1; see also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-
1-5a (1982); see also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.085 (2017); see also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-2-
103 (2011). 
122 ARK. R. CRIM. P. 5.2 (“whether the accused previously has failed to appear in 
response to a citation.”); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.125 (“previously has failed to respond” and “past 
history of appearance”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 805.1 (2002) (“previously failed to appear”); 
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-427 (1974) (“the accused has previously failed to appear”); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.26 (1978) (previous failure to appear); VT. R. CRIM. P. 3 
(“previously failed to appear”); WA ST CR LTD JURIS CrRLJ 2.1 (“whether the person 
previously failed to appear”); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.085 (2017) (“The accused has 
previously failed to appear or failed to respond to a citation.”). 
123 ARK. R. CRIM. P. 5.2 (“whether detention is necessary to prevent imminent bodily 
harm to the accused or to another”); see also FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.125; see also IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 805.1 (2002) (a police may issue a citation instead of making a warrantless arrest or 
continuing custody unless “detention appears reasonably necessary in order to halt a 
continuing offense or disturbance or to prevent harm to a person or persons.”); see also KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.015 (2017) (“a peace officer shall issue a citation instead of making 
an arrest for a misdemeanor committed in his or her presence, if there are reasonable grounds 
to believe that the person being cited will appear to answer the charge” unless “the 
misdemeanor is . . . [a]n offense in which the defendant poses a risk of danger to himself, 
herself, or another person.”); see also LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 211 (2011) (“When 
it is lawful for a peace officer to arrest a person without a warrant for a misdemeanor . . . he 
may issue a written summons instead of making an arrest if all of the following exist[s]: . . . 
The officer has no reasonable grounds to believe that the person will cause injury to himself 
or another or damage to property or will continue in the same or a similar offense unless 
immediately arrested and booked .”); see also MD. CODE ANN., Crim. Proc. § 4-101 (2016) 
(“a police officer shall charge by citation for[] . . . any misdemeanor or local ordinance 
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defendant is unlikely to receive a citation in lieu of arrest if the officer determines 
that defendant poses a risk of bodily injury to others or himself.124 Indeed, several 
states have determined that violent crimes or crimes that indicate that the defendant 
will be a danger to the community if she is released present a complete bar to the 
issuance of a citation.125 About thirteen statutes explicitly name the dangerousness 
                                               
violation that does not carry a penalty of imprisonment [and] . . . for which the maximum 
penalty of imprisonment is 90 days or less . . . if . . . the officer reasonably believes that the 
failure to charge on a statement of charges will not pose a threat to public safety.”); see also 
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.01 (“In misdemeanor cases, peace officers who decide to proceed with 
prosecution and who act without a warrant must issue a citation and release the defendant 
unless it reasonably appears[] the person must be detained to prevent bodily injury to that 
person or another[.]”); see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-118 (2012) (stating that a police 
officer may issue a citation in lieu of making an arrest unless “[t]here is a reasonable 
likelihood that . . . persons or property would be endangered by the arrested person[.]”); see 
also VT. R. CRIM. P. 3 (stating that a police officer may issue a citation in lieu of making an 
arrest if the officer has probable cause to believe the defendant has committed misdemeanor, 
but an arrest may be made if the officer has probable cause to believe an arrest is necessary 
“to prevent harm to the person detained or harm to another person.”); see also VA. CODE 
ANN. § 19.2-74 (2014) (stating if a misdemeanor defendant has been arrested, the officer 
may then issue a summons to appear in court, unless “person is reasonably believed by the 
arresting officer to be likely to cause harm to himself or to any other person . . . ”); see also 
WA ST CR LTD JURIS CrRLJ 2.1 (“Whenever a person is arrested or could have been arrested 
pursuant to statute for a violation of law which is punishable as a misdemeanor or gross 
misdemeanor the arresting officer[] . . . may serve upon the person a citation and notice to 
appear in court[]” and in deciding whether to release the defendant, the officer should 
consider “whether detention appears reasonably necessary to prevent imminent bodily harm 
to himself, herself, or another, or injury to property, or breach of the peace[.]”); see also W. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1-5a (1982) (a law enforcement officer may issue a citation in lieu of  
making an arrest for “[a]ny misdemeanor, not involving injury to the person, committed in a 
law-enforcement officer’s presence[,] [p]rovided[] [t]hat the officer may arrest the person if 
he has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is likely to cause serious harm to himself 
or others[.]”); see also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.085 (2017) (stating that a law enforcement 
officer may issue a citation for misdemeanors and may consider whether “[t]he accused 
appears to represent a danger of harm to himself or herself, another person or property[]” in 
deciding whether to release.); see also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-2-103 (2011) (stating that the 
police may offer a citation for misdemeanor offenses and release the accused “after 
investigation, it appears that the person[] . . . [d]oes not present a danger to himself or 
others[.]”). 
124 See e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.125 (“If a person is arrested for an offense declared to 
be a misdemeanor of the first or second degree or a violation . . . notice to appear may be 
issued by the arresting officer unless[] . . . the officer has reason to believe that the continued 
liberty of the accused constitutes an unreasonable risk of bodily injury to the accused or 
others”). 
125 See ALA. CODE § 11-45-9.1 (“Municipality may authorize any law enforcement 
officer . . . to issue a summons and complaint to any person charged with . . . any Class C 
misdemeanor or violation not involving violence, threat of violence, alcohol or drugs.”); 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-105 (1994) (stating that law enforcement may not issue a 
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of the defendant as a factor for law enforcement to consider with citations.126 
Moreover, a few states have specifically targeted those involving intoxication, 
particularly DUIs, and have prohibited citations in lieu of arrest for DUI cases.127  
Overall, citations in lieu of arrest are a viable pretrial release option that many 
states have adopted to avoid misdemeanor detention. This option can allow an 
officer to not arrest an individual—and avoid jail time—if certain factors are met. 
Often the individual must not pose a danger to others, must be able to appear in 
court, and must not be charged with certain crimes—like a DUI. The growth of 
citations may be one cause of the decrease in misdemeanor arrests nationwide,128 
and may prove to be a welcome reduction in the future of misdemeanor cases 
nationwide.129 
 
                                               
citation for a domestic violence crime); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.015 (2017) (law 
enforcement may issue citations on misdemeanor offense except for violations of protective 
orders); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133.055 (2012) (police may not issue a citation for assault 
between family or household members); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-118 (2012) (stating that 
law enforcement ma not issue a citation for a DUI, or traffic misdemeanors, car accidents 
resulting in serious bodily injury or death and no driver license—citations are authorized (but 
not mandatory) for shoplifting, issuance of bad checks, driving with a revoked or suspended 
license, assault or battery, and prostitution); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 14.06 (2015) 
(stating that law enforcement may not issue a notice to appear for public intoxication); VT. 
R. CRIM. P. 3 (stating that law enforcement may not issue a citation when misdemeanor is 
assault against family member, violation of court order, violation of foreign abuse prevention 
order, misdemeanor offense against vulnerable adult, DUI after prior conviction, violation 
of hate-motivated crime injunction, violation of condition of release, stalking, simple assault, 
recklessly endangering another person, failure to register as sex offender or cruelty to a 
child.); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-74 (2014) (stating that law enforcement may not issue a 
summons for DUIs, minors driving after consuming alcohol); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1-5a 
(1982) (stating that law enforcement may not issue citations for misdemeanors involving 
injury to the person); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.085 (2017) (stating that law enforcement may 
not issue citations in domestic abuse cases). 
126 See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 5.2; see also FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.125; see also IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 805.1 (2002); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.015 (2017); see also LA. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 211 (2011); see also MD. CODE ANN., Crim. Proc. § 4-101 (2016); see also 
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.01; see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-118 (2012); see also VT. R. CRIM. 
P. 3; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-74 (2014); see also WA ST CR LTD JURIS CrRLJ 2.1; 
see also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1-5a (1982); see also WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.085 (2017); 
see also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-2-103 (2011). 
127 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-74 (2014); see also VT. R. CRIM. P. 3; see also CODE ANN. 
§ 40-7-118 (2012); see also ALA. CODE § 11-45-9.1. 
128 Stevenson & Mayson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 750 (noting 
that “more than half of misdemeanor cases in some jurisdictions originate with a citation or 
summons rather than arrest”).  
129 However if citations are accompanied by fines (or require incarceration if 
defendant cannot pay a fine), this presents a similar problem as money bail and is not good 
policy. 
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2.  Release on Personal/Own Recognizance (ROR) 
 
In some instances, a court releases a misdemeanor defendant on personal 
recognizance (ROR). Release on recognizance is where a defendant gives her word 
to the court that she will appear for her court date.130 This type of release allows a 
defendant to be released without posting any money or having a surety sign a bond 
with the court.131 Some states have explicit statutory presumptions of release in non-
capital cases—especially for misdemeanors.132 The majority of misdemeanor 
defendants should ideally be released on recognizance, and this has been the historic 
default. ROR does not discriminate based on the amount of money a defendant has 
in her bank account or by her race. But today, nationally only about 24% of state 
felony and misdemeanor defendants receive ROR.133 However, some jurisdictions 
have much higher rates for misdemeanors, like NYC for instance, releases about 
75% of misdemeanor defendants on ROR according to one study.134 However, in 
                                               
130 For more detail, see BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 39–59 (discussing types of pretrial 
release). 
131 BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 43; Recognizance, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. 2014). 
132 See WASH. SUP. CT. CRIM. P. R. 3.2(a) (West) (“Any person, other than a person 
charged with a capital offense, shall at the preliminary appearance or reappearance pursuant 
to rule 3.2.1 or CrRLJ 3.2.1 be ordered released on the accused’s personal recognizance 
pending trial . . . ”); see also ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.30.011(b) (West through 2017 First 
Regular Session) (“A person charged with a misdemeanor . . . and who is assessed by a 
pretrial services officer as . . . low to moderate risk shall be released on the person’s own 
recognizance or upon execution of an unsecured appearance bond or unsecured performance 
bond[.]”); see also CAL. PENAL. CODE § 1270 (West through 2017 Regular Session) (“A 
defendant who is in custody and is arraigned on a complaint alleging an offense which is a 
misdemeanor . . . shall be entitled to an own recognizance release unless the court makes a 
finding on the record . . . that an own recognizance release will compromise public safety or 
will not reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant as required.”); see also COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-113(1) (West through 2017 First Regular Session) (requiring ROR 
for Class 3 misdemeanors); see also 2017 NEW MEXICO COURT ORDER 0006 (C.O. 
0006) (The New Mexico Supreme Court: “A designee shall release a person from custody 
on personal recognizance, subject to [] conditions of release . . . if the person has been 
arrested and detained for a . . .  misdemeanor, subject to [] exceptions . . . .”); see also CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-64a(a)(2) (2017) (“If the arrested person is charged with no offense 
other than a misdemeanor, the court shall not impose financial conditions of release on the 
person . . .”); see also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597:2 (2016) (“A person charged with a class 
B misdemeanor shall be released on his personal recognizance[] . . .”); see also People ex 
rel. Alvarez v. Warden, Bronx House of Det., 178 Misc. 2d 254, 680 N.Y.S.2d 153 (Sup. Ct. 
1998) (finding that, under state law, a defendant is entitled to ROR within 5 days of arrest if 
an information is not filed against him or her). 
133 BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 163. 
134 In NYC in 2008, in slightly more than three-quarters (90,605) of the cases, 
defendants were released pending trial on their own recognizance. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 
THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: BAIL AND PRETRIAL DETENTION OF LOW INCOME NONFELONY 
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recent years more defendants are detained pretrial—even for misdemeanors—as 
ROR rates have decreased substantially since 1990.135  
To reverse this trend, twenty-one states have enacted statutes providing the 
presumption of release or non-monetary bail.136 Though less common, Alabama and 
New York have specifically given courts permission—maybe even a command—to 
release on ROR individuals charged with misdemeanor crimes.137 But all states that 
have adopted a “presumption of release” have also adopted exceptions to it. 
Commonly, violent crimes and sex-related crimes are the exception to the 
presumption of ROR.138 For example, in Alaska, defendants charged with certain 
misdemeanor crimes, such as sex offenses and crimes “involving domestic 
violence,” are not entitled to release on personal recognizance.139 Georgia and 
Mississippi have also targeted domestic violence crimes as crimes that do not qualify 
for bail in some instances.140 Additionally, the court may deny release on personal 
recognizance if it finds “clear and convincing evidence” that the defendant’s court 
appearance cannot be reasonably assured upon release.141 More often, courts merely 
                                               
DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY 1 (2010), https://www.hrw.org/report/2010/12/02/price-
freedom/bail-and-pretrial-detention-low-income-nonfelony-defendants-new-york#. 
135 BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 163 (“Release on recognizance . . . was the most 
common type of pretrial release in 1992, but by 2006, this had declined by 33 percent.”). 
136 See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Guidance for Setting Release 
Conditions, http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/guidance-for-setting-
release-conditions.aspx (last visited Feb. 8, 2018) [hereinafter NCSL, Setting Release 
Conditions]. 
137 See ALA. CODE § 15-13-4 (“Any judge or magistrate . . . may, in his discretion, 
release on his own recognizance any prisoner charged with a misdemeanor.”); N.Y. CRIM. 
PROC. LAW § 530.20(1) (McKinney 1979) (stating that “the court must order recognizance 
or bail” for “offenses of less than felony grade only.”). 
138 See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.30.011(b) (2018) (exceptions for “a sex offense . . . 
or a crime involving domestic violence”); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 853.6(2) (2009) 
(Exceptions for crimes specified in Section 1270.1, such as serious and violent felonies); see 
also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-64a(A) (2017) (stating that a misdemeanor defendant may 
be ROR unless the crime charged involved a “family violence crime”); see also N.M. R. 
CRIM P. 5-408(B)(2) (exception for battery, aggravated battery, assault against a household 
member, battery against a household member, criminal damage to property of a household 
member, harassment of household member, stalking, abandonment of child, negligent use of 
a deadly weapon, enticement of a child, criminal sexual contact, criminal trespass, telephone 
harassment, violation of protection order, DUI). 
139 ALASKA STAT. ANN.  § 12.30.011(b) (West through 2017 First Regular Session); 
see also 2017 New Mexico Court Order 0006 (2017) (there is no presumption of release for 
the following misdemeanors: battery, “criminal damage to property of a household member,” 
harassment, stalking, “abandonment of child . . . ,” “negligent use of a deadly weapon . . . ,” 
“enticement of a child . . . ,” “criminal sexual contact . . . ,” criminal trespass . . . ,” “violating 
a protective order . . . ,” driving under the influence . . .”).  
140 Both statutes disallow law enforcement form setting bail before the defendant sees 
a judge. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-5-37 (2012); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 17-6-1 (2017). 
141 ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.30.011(b)(2) (West through 2017 First Regular Session).  
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have the discretion to release a defendant on personal recognizance based on certain 
factors.142 These factors will be discussed in Part III, and are identical to factors 
considered for felony release. 
 
3.  Money Bail 
 
Money bail is where a defendant must pay an amount of money to a court or to 
a commercial bondsman to be released before trial.143 The most popular way money 
bail is handled is commercial money bail, where a defendant pays a portion of the 
bail amount to a bail bondsman and then forfeits this money. The bondsman is then 
responsible to ensure that defendant appears in court. It is currently the most popular 
type of release for felony defendants nationally.144  
Between 1990 until 2009, ROR dropped dramatically as money bail increased 
in popularity nationwide.145 Between 1990 and 2009, the rate of pretrial release with 
                                               
142 See ALA. CODE § 15-13-4 (West through end of 2017 Regular Session) (stating that 
the judge has the discretion to release misdemeanor defendant on personal recognizance); 
see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3967(A)-(B) (West 2015) (stating that a felony or 
misdemeanor defendant may be released on personal recognizance or bail, depending on 
certain factors); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2105(a) (2013) (“The court shall release 
a person accused of a bailable crime on the person’s own recognizance or upon the execution 
of an unsecured personal appearance bond”); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.520 (2014) 
(stating that the court may release a felony or misdemeanor defendant on person 
recognizance or bail “unless the court determines in the exercise of its discretion that such a 
release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required, or the court 
determines the person is a flight risk or a danger to others.”); see also MO. ANN. STAT. § 
544.455(1) (2013) (“Any person charged with a bailable offense . . . may be ordered released 
. . . on his personal recognizance, unless the associate circuit judge or judge determines, in 
the exercise of his discretion, that such a release will not reasonably assure the appearance 
of the person as required.”); see also NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178.4851(1) (2007) (“Upon a 
showing of good cause, the court may release without bail any person charged with a 
misdemeanor or felony.”).  
143 See BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 46. 
144 Id. at 158. 
145 This is in large part due to the lobbying effort of the national money bail movement. 
See BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, 178–79 (describing the efforts of the American Bail Coalition 
to lobby counties, police, courts, judges, chambers of commerce, rotary clubs, and others to 
convince them that commercial bail is more effective than pretrial services programs).  
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financial conditions crept up from 40 to 62 percent in felony cases.146 And by the 
early 2000s, ROR accounted for only twenty-four percent of all pretrial releases.147  
Misdemeanor defendants are generally not held without bail but are detained 
because they cannot afford to pay the bail amount, and so remain detained. For 
instance, in Houston, Texas, between 2008 and 2013, “more than half of all 
misdemeanor defendants were detained pending trial; their average bail amount was 
$2,786.”148 A study of Maryland’s pretrial release decisions in 2017 found that 19 
percent of misdemeanor defendants were held without bail.149 Other jurisdictions are 
less likely to set money bail, for instance, a New York City study demonstrates that 
bail was set for only 21 percent of defendants.150 Only 1 percent of cases were 
remanded without bail.151 
Although firm national numbers do not exist, the numbers of misdemeanor 
defendants who now have to pay money to be released before trial nationwide has 
increased. Numbers for misdemeanor release are more difficult to locate, but in New 
                                               
146 See BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 157–59; see also Crystal S. Young, Toward an 
Optimal Bail System, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1399, 1401 (2017) (“These high rates of pre-trial 
detention have been coupled with the increasingly prevalent use of financial conditions of 
release. For example, between 1990 and 2009, the fraction of felony defendants who were 
released with financial conditions increased from 40% to 62%. Indeed, the majority of 
defendants are detained before trial because they cannot afford to pay relatively small 
amounts of bail. In New York City, 46% of misdemeanor defendants in 2013 were detained 
because they were unable to post bail of $500 or less”).  
147 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY 
DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS 2 (2007), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf.  
148 ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, MISDEMEANORS, in ACADEMY FOR JUSTICE, A REPORT ON 
SCHOLARSHIP AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM (2017), available at 
https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=177005005066089065095106070102002007
0090250230510350240671261220260021220111040860810431180571010520271171030
2407911401512310902105703808208506500612007401706709908909305003811412711
9117025081027072115021101094005099094076115100020122086088124117106105&E
XT=pdf. 
149 CHRISTINE BLUMAUER ET AL., ADVANCING BAIL REFORM IN MARYLAND: PROGRESS 
AND POSSIBILITIES 13 (2018), available at 
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?Documen
tFileKey=6286908b-8228-0970-9c72-e9ee52f91c9b&forceDialog=0. 
150 MICHAEL REMPEL ET AL., JAIL IN NEW YORK CITY: EVIDENCE-BASED 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM (2017), available at https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-
assets/downloads/Publications/jail-in-new-york-
city/legacy_downloads/NYC_Path_Analysis_Final-Report.pdf (and almost 80% were 
released on ROR). 
151 MICHAEL REMPEL ET AL., JAIL IN NEW YORK CITY: EVIDENCE-BASED 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM (2017), available at https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-
assets/downloads/Publications/jail-in-new-york-
city/legacy_downloads/NYC_Path_Analysis_Final-Report.pdf. The study further found that 
18 percent of misdemeanor defendants were detained following arraignment, while only 10 
percent were detained throughout the case. Id. 
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York roughly twenty-five percent of misdemeanor defendants must pay to be 
released before trial.152 In Baltimore, nearly fifty percent must pay.153 Similarly, in 
California about fifty percent of individuals booked on misdemeanors are required 
to post bail.154 In Oklahoma County, the largest population center in Oklahoma, 
2017 data indicates that 78% of misdemeanor defendants are required to pay to be 
released.155 Surprisingly, this is down from 92% of misdemeanor defendants in 
2016.156  
When evaluating this data, it is important to note that numbers vary drastically 
between judges.157 One study conducted in Buffalo, New York focused on five 
judges over a four-month period.158 Depending on the judge, misdemeanor 
defendants were required to post bail anywhere from 42 percent to 83 percent of the 
time.159 As one researcher notes, “even if money’s ability to detain is not eliminated, 
states may want to create a more rational process for detention that does not rely 
upon unattainably high monetary conditions of bond to detain certain unmanageable 
defendants.”160 National data is still not available on misdemeanor release but will 
hopefully be released soon.161 Regardless, given the numbers we do have, there is 
certainly an indication that misdemeanor cases are much less likely than they were 
historically to be released on ROR. Many misdemeanor defendants now have to pay 
                                               
152 Natapoff, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1321. 
153 Id.  
154 SONYA TAFOAY ET AL., PRETRIAL RELEASE IN CALIFORNIA 11 (May 2017), 
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_0517STR.pdf (“[O]nly one-half of individuals 
booked for misdemeanors … secure some form of pretrial release.”) 
155 Ben Botkin, Jail stays for low-level misdemeanors differ by county, ENID NEWS & 
EAGLE (June 4, 2018), https://www.enidnews.com/news/local_news/jail-stays-for-low-
level-misdemeanors-differ-by-county/article_afa901dc-14b6-5ff1-9a4c-a72ca25217f5.html 
(“In December 2017, Oklahoma County granted no-bail releases to 22 percent of 
misdemeanor defendants released in December 2017.”). 
156 Id.  
157 This is similar to felony bail numbers as there is little consistency between judges 
within the same county and nationwide. See Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 37, at 538. 
158 Anna Maria Barry-Jester, You’re Been Arrested. Will You Get Bail? Can You Pay 
It? It May All Depend on Your Judge, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 19, 2018), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/youve-been-arrested-will-you-get-bail-can-you-pay-it-
it-may-all-depend-on-your-judge/.  
159 Id. This is consistent with my own prior research on judges. Baradaran & McIntyre, 
supra note 37, at 526 (“[D]efendants with similar characteristics are released in some 
jurisdictions but often held in others.”). 
160 SCHNACKE, supra note 37, at 146. 
161 It looks like National Center for State Courts has just finished the data-gathering 
stage with data that should be released regarding national misdemeanor detention and other 
important pretrial issues. Effective Criminal Case Management Project (ECCM), NAT’L 
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, https://www.ncsc.org/services-and-experts/areas-of-
expertise/caseflow-and-workflow-management/effective-criminal-case-management.aspx 
(last visited Dec. 19, 2018). 
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money bail to be released before trial—and this prohibits most poor defendants from 
obtaining release before trial. 
 
4.  Conditional Release for Misdemeanors 
 
Another type of release for misdemeanor defendants is conditional release.162 
This is where a court makes a contract with a defendant to be released in exchange 
for the defendant following a certain set of conditions while they are released.163 In 
sixteen states, court must “impose the least restrictive” conditions to ensure the 
defendant appears for future court dates.164 All states except New York, South 
Carolina, West Virginia, and Utah, permit its courts to apply “any condition [it] . . . 
considers reasonably necessary” to ensure the defendant’s appearance.165 In other 
states, the conditions must relate to the crime charged.166  
In some jurisdictions the relevance requirement is stricter than in others. For 
example, in a Georgia case, the court of appeals concluded that a trial court acted 
within its power when it assessed bail to a defendant charged with battery under the 
condition that the defendant “not intimidate, threaten, harass, verbally or physically 
abuse or harm [the victim and] to have no contact with [the victim] . . . . Do not 
telephone or write letters to [the victim]. Do not engage in any type of following or 
surveillance behavior. . . ”167 But in Texas, the condition must be relevant to ensuring 
                                               
162 See BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 52. 
163 See Clarke v. State, 491 S.E.2d 450, 451 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997); see also Dudley v. 
State, 496 S.E.2d 341 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (“bond pending appeal for misdemeanor offenses 
. . . does not have to be unconditional, as long as conditions are reasonable under facts and 
circumstances of case.”); see also OHIO R. CRIM. P. 46 (listing the available conditions courts 
may impose on bail). 
164 NCSL, Setting Release Conditions, supra note 136.  
165 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURE, Pretrial Release Conditions 
(2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/pretrial-release-
conditions.aspx#/ [hereinafter NCSL, Pretrial Release Conditions].  
166 Dudley v. State, 496 S.E.2d 341, 343 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the trial court 
had abused its discretion where the defendant was appealing a battery conviction and the 
judged imposed the following conditions for bail: “[a] total prohibition against working in 
law enforcement, bail bonding, dog training, or private investigation during post[-]trial 
motion and appeal process, curfew, travel restrictions, and total banishment from county in 
which offenses occurred . . .”). 
167 Clarke v. State, 491 S.E.2d 450, 451 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (“Trial court has inherent 
authority to place conditions on bail in misdemeanor cases, which will be upheld by Court 
of Appeals absent an abuse of discretion; placing such conditions on bail is not the same 
thing as refusing to set bail, which is forbidden by Code in a misdemeanor case. Trial court 
has inherent discretion to release a misdemeanor defendant on his own recognizance pending 
trial or to require payment of a bail bond. When a misdemeanor defendant is charged with a 
violent crime against a specific victim, it is within the trial court’s inherent powers to require 
as condition of bail that the defendant avoid any contact with the victim.”).  
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the defendant appears in court.168 In a Texas case, the court determined that a 
condition that disallowed the defendant from driving a vehicle in a negligent 
homicide case was not sufficiently related to ensuring the defendant’s appearance in 
court.169 Washington has a similar rule, requiring courts to consider a number of 
factors, but ultimately the purpose of the condition on bail is to “reasonably assure” 
that the defendant appears,170 and ensure the defendant does not pose a danger to the 
public or the administration of justice.171 These factors look similar to those state 
courts commonly consider in deciding whether to release a defendant on bail or 
ROR, but these factors do differ in part. 172 For example, a Washington court should 
consider whether a “responsible member of the community” is willing to “vouch” 
for the defendant and “assist the accused in complying with conditions of release.”173  
There are numerous conditions courts can apply. In most states, the court may 
require electronic monitoring and pretrial supervision of the defendant.174 Most 
jurisdictions also permit courts to impose restraints on a defendant’s movement, 
such as “house arrest, work release, curfew and in-patient treatment.”175 Other 
conditions that courts commonly apply include no contact with the victim of the 
crime which the defendant is charged with (no contact order), travel restrictions, 
limitations on who the defendant may associate with, and restrictions on where the 
defendant may live.176 Additionally, some courts may impose upon the defendant 
such conditions including committing no crimes and maintaining contact with her 
attorney.177 Less common conditions include probation from using controlled 
substances, substance abuse monitoring and treatment, maintaining employment, 
and restrictions of possessing firearms.178 Overall, most conditional release allows a 
defendant a large amount of freedom to maintain their job and home environment 
and is often favored by defendants over money bail.  
 
5.  Misdemeanor Detention before Trial 
 
Some counties automatically detain without bail, at least for a time, certain 
categories of misdemeanor defendants. Common misdemeanor offenses that are 
                                               
168 Ex parte Anderer, 61 S.W.3d 398, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). 
169 Id. 
170 State v. Rose, 191 P.3d 83, 85–86 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008); see also WASH. R. CRIM. 
P. 3.2 (West 2018) (noting as many as nine non-exhaustive factors courts shall consider).  
171 State v. Rose, 191 P.3d 83, 85 (2017).  
172 Id. 
173 Id. (citing WASH. R. CRIM. P. 3.2 (West 2018)).  
174 NCSL, Pretrial Release Conditions, supra note 165. This is typically through a 
pretrial supervision program. See BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 52–56. 
175 NCSL, Pretrial Release Conditions, supra note 165. 
176 Id. 
177 State v. Rose, 191 P.3d 83, 88 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017) (citing WASH. R. CRIM. P. 3.2 
(West 2018)). 
178 NCSL, Pretrial Release Conditions supra note 165. 
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denied bail categorically include domestic violence, DUI and violation of 
antiharassment conditions.179 For instance, in King County, Washington, the 
misdemeanor bail schedule specifies that defendants alleged to have committed the 
following misdemeanors are to be held without bail pending a court hearing: a 
domestic violence offense, a DUI offense, fourth degree assault, harassment, a 
violation of an antiharassment order, stalking, or communication with a minor for 
immoral purposes.180 Aside from the listed misdemeanor offenses, it is rare for a 
court to order detention for a misdemeanor defendant before trial. 
Even courts who deny bail for a small category of defendants, still recognize 
that the purpose of bail is only to ensure that defendant appears for court.181 For 
instance, a Connecticut statute states: “court shall, in bailable offenses, promptly 
order the release of such person upon the first of the following conditions of release 
found sufficient to reasonably ensure the appearance of the arrested person in 
court.”182 In rare instances, courts have been reversed for denying bail in 
misdemeanor cases. In Hobbs v. Reynolds,183 the Supreme Court of Arkansas held 
that the circuit court's denial of bail for a defendant being charged with a 
misdemeanor was an abuse of discretion.184 However, courts are a lot more lenient 
with “whatever terms and restrictions” courts set that are deemed appropriate, 
including money bail that is often prohibitively expensive.185 With the general 
presumption of release in mind, courts have historically recognized the need for 
detention before trial to be limited, especially with misdemeanors.186 
However, there are recently more exceptions in various states. For example, In 
People v. Wilboiner, the Criminal Court in New York City held that courts had the 
power to hold a defendant without bail, even in a misdemeanor case, if the court 
                                               
179 In the Matter of a Uniform Bond Schedule for Maricopa County Limited Jurisdiction 
Courts, Admin. Order No. 2015-002 (Super. Ct. Ariz. 2015), available at 
https://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/SuperiorCourt/AdministrativeOrders/AdminOrder
s/Admin%20Order%202015-002.pdf. For example, in Maricopa County, Arizona, 
“[i]ndividuals charged with a domestic violence offense may not secure release prior to 
appearing before a judge who will determine appropriate conditions of release.” Id. 
180 TMCLR 3.2 Bail Schedule, 
https://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/?fa=court_rules.display&group=municipal&ruleid=
municipalmuntuk103.2&set=muntuk. 
181 Weisheit v. State, 969 N.E.2d 1082, 1086 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Phillips v. 
State, 550 N.E.2d 1290, 1294 (Ind.1990)) (“The purpose of bail is to ensure the presence of 
the accused at trial.”). 
182 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-64a(a)(1) (West 2017). 
183 375 Ark. 313, 316 (2008). 
184 Id. 
185 Id. (quoting Reeves v. State, 261 Ark. 384, 548 S.W.2d 822 (1977)).  
186 See, e.g., Constantino v. Warren, 285 Ga. 851, 853 (2009). In Georgia, a sheriff may 
also accept a defendant’s driver’s license in place of bail after the defendant has been 
incarcerated for five days and if the bail equal to or less than $1,000 § 13:2.Bail 
considerations, Ga. Magistrate Court Handbook § 13:2 (2016-2017 ed.) O.C.G.A. § 17-6-
2(a). 
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determined that a defendant may be an incapacitated person who would fail to appear 
for a competency examination if they were released on recognizance or bail.187 
Wisconsin courts allow additional circumstances where bail can be denied for 
misdemeanor cases. In Wisconsin, the Preamble to the Forfeiture and Misdemeanor 
Bail Schedules188 states that individuals who are arrested for misdemeanors, 
including misdemeanor traffic offenses, must be released without bail unless “(a) 
the accused does not have proper identification; (b) the accused appears to represent 
a danger of harm to him or herself, another person, or property; (c) the accused 
cannot demonstrate sufficient evidence of ties to the community; (d) the accused has 
previously failed to appear in court or respond to a citation; or (e) arrest or further 
detention is necessary to implement legitimate investigative action.”189 There are 
additional situations in other states where courts are permitted to deny bail to 
misdemeanor defendants, which look a lot like felony factors.190 The problem with 
this approach—as discussed more fully in the next section—is that misdemeanor 
defendants are lumped together with much more serious and maybe dangerous 
felony defendants. Overall, in considering briefly the types of release and the release 
types, it is clear that the virtually automatic release right for misdemeanor defendants 
is no longer available. The next section will carefully discuss state laws and the 
reasons why misdemeanor defendants no longer obtain presumptive release. As 
discussed, this has severe consequences not only for misdemeanor release rates but 
for national bail reform as a whole. 
 
III.  THE FELONY-CENTRIC NATURE OF BAIL REFORM 
 
Historically and by law in many states, misdemeanor defendants should be 
released before trial as a matter of right. However, as discussed in the previous 
section, we know based on the existing national numbers that this is not the case.191 
Many jurisdictions detain misdemeanor defendants for minor crimes. But what we 
                                               
187 People v. Wilboiner, 35 Misc. 3d 193, 199, 936 N.Y.S.2d 873, 877 (Crim. Ct. 2012). 
188 Wisconsin Judicial Conference, State of Wisconsin Revised Uniform State Traffic 
Deposit Schedule and Trespass to Land Deposit Schedule, 2 (2017) (Preamble for Forfeiture 
and Misdemeanor Bail Schedules). 
189 § 12:13.Pretrial release—Uniform misdemeanor bail schedule, 9 WIS. PRAC., 
CRIMINAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 12:13 (2d ed.) 
190 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 903.046 (2018) (effective Oct. 1, 2016) (FL legislature has 
limited the circumstances under which bail may be denied. Included in the list is: the nature 
and circumstances of the offense; the weight of the evidence; family ties; past and present 
conduct; the danger posed if defendant is released on the community or victim; and the 
source of funds used to pay the bail); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1270 - 1270.1(a) (individuals 
charged with misdemeanors are presumptively entitled to release unless the court believes 
releasing the defendant would jeopardize public safety or there would be a court appearance 
issue). 
191 See supra Part II.5 for discussion. We do not have complete national misdemeanor 
release numbers. 
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do not know is whether there is a cohesive national standard by which to judge 
misdemeanor bail. Or whether the standards for judging misdemeanor bail are 
similar to or less strict than those of felony bail. These are the questions this section 
strives to answer. And what we discover is that while a misdemeanor charge 
generally signals that the crime at issue is less serious than a felony, misdemeanors 
are, in many ways, treated similarly to felonies.192 In other words, many jurisdictions 
rather than presumptively releasing misdemeanor defendants and considering 
factors before release of felony defendants, instead rely on the exact same standard 
for both types of crimes.  
Today, the right to release exists by law for defendants in all criminal cases,193 
with an exception for death penalty cases.194 This is consistent with the common 
law, which did not guarantee the right to bail in capital cases.195 And in many 
jurisdictions the right to release in felony cases is not considered “a matter of right,” 
but one of discretion.196 By contrast, historically at common law, the right to bail in 
                                               
192 Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 870–83 (explaining that historically, misdemeanor defendants were almost 
always released pretrial, but that in recent years, misdemeanor defendants have been detained 
at similar levels as felony defendants). 
193 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952) (“Thus in criminal cases bail is not 
compulsory where the punishment may be death.”); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8 (1951) 
(explaining that a defendant is entitled to pretrial release until proven guilty as the spirit of 
bail is to “enable the[] [defendant] to stay out of jail until a trial has found them guilty”); 
Baradaran, Presumption of Innocence, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 776.  
194 See State v. Kastanis, 848 P.2d 673, 674 (Utah 1993) (quoting UTAH CONST. art. I, 
§ 8) (“All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses when 
the proof is evident or the presumption strong.”); see also State v. Garrett, 16 Ariz. App. 
427, 428 (1972) (quoting Ariz. Const. art. II, § 22); see also Perez v. State, 897 S.W.2d 893, 
894 (Tex. App. 1995) (citing Tex. Const. art. I, § 11) (“The Texas Constitution recognizes 
the right to bail by sufficient securities in all criminal offenses except when the probability 
of assessing the death penalty is strongly indicated.”); see also Fry v. State, 990 N.E.2d 429, 
434 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Ind. Const. art. 1, § 17.2) (‘“[o]ffenses, other than murder or 
treason, shall be bailable by sufficient sureties. Murder or treason shall not be bailable, when 
the proof is evident, or the presumption strong.’”). 
195 People v. Watson, 35 N.Y.S. 852, 852 (Gen. Sess. 1895) (“[U]under the common 
law and statute law of England, the right to bail in cases of misdemeanor was held to belong 
to the accused, but the right to bail in cases of felony was never recognized or conceded.”); 
see also Baradaran, Presumption of Innocence, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., 
at 728–29 (discussing how at common law bail was historically presumed for all criminal 
charges except murder).  
196 See Williams v. State, 228 Ga. App. 289, 290 (1997) (“It is only in misdemeanor 
cases that one convicted is entitled to bail as a matter of law.”); see also People ex rel. Devore 
v. Warden of New York City Prison, 40 Misc. 2d 943, 945, 244 N.Y.S.2d 505, 508 (Sup. Ct. 
1963) (quoting People ex rel. Shapiro v. Keeper of City Prison, 290 N.Y. 393, 397–398, 49 
N.E.2d 498, 500 (1943)) (“admission to bail before conviction is a matter of right in 
misdemeanor cases and a matter of discretion in all other cases.”); see also People v. Watson, 
14 Misc. 430, 431–32, 35 N.Y.S. 852, 853 (Gen. Sess. 1895) (stating that in New York, “in 
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misdemeanor cases was largely presumed.197 But today misdemeanants are detained 
pretrial in some jurisdictions at the same rate as felony defendants.198 Both felony 
and misdemeanor defendants are detained because they cannot afford small amounts 
of money bail.199 Thorough statistics on the pretrial release of felony defendants tell 
us that between 1990 and 2004, courts released 62 percent of felony defendants prior 
to trial.200 Although there are not good national numbers on misdemeanor release, in 
some jurisdictions, the same number of felony and misdemeanor defendants (up to 
seventy percent) are not released before trial because they cannot afford bail.201 And 
                                               
cases of misdemeanor the right to bail is absolute, but in cases of felony the right to bail is 
one of discretion.”). 
197 Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 128 (discussing how the right to misdemeanor bail was largely associated with 
the presumption of innocence.)   
198 Id. at 135 (citing CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP, MARIE VANNOSTRAND & 
ALEXANDER HOLSIGNER, ARNOLD FOUND., INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT OF PRETRIAL 
DETENTION ON SENTENCING OUTCOMES 9 (Nov. 2013), http://luminosity-
solutions.com/site/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Investigating-the-Impact-of-Pretrial-
Detention-on-Sentencing-Outcomes-3.pdf.).  
199 Id. (citing NATALIE R. ORTIZ, NAT’L ASS’NS COUNTIES FOUND., COUNTY JAILS AT 
A CROSSROADS: AN EXAMINATION OF THE JAIL POPULATION AND PRETRIAL RELEASE 8 
(2015), 
http://www.naco.org/sites/default/files/documents/Final%20paper_County%20Jails%20at
%20a%20Crossroads_8.10.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5W4-TE33]) (“In cases when the 
defendants cannot pay money bail, they remain in jail. For example, the U.S. Bureau of 
Justice Statistics reported that more than one-third of felony defendants in large counties 
were unable to meet their financial conditions for pretrial release and were thus held on bond 
in jail in 2009. Although there are no national level data on similar rates for misdemeanor 
cases, pretrial detention rates . . . in misdemeanor cases range from 22 percent on average in 
Kentucky counties to 48 percent in cases with bail amounts less than $1,000 in New York 
City.”). However, another study found that defendants arrested for felonies are twenty-five 
percentage points less likely to be released than those arrested for misdemeanors, a forty-six 
percent decrease. WILL DOBBIE, JACOB GOLDIN & CRYSTAL YANG, NAT’L BUREAU ECON. 
RES., THE EFFECTS OF PRE-TRIAL DETENTION ON CONVICTION, FUTURE CRIME, AND 
EMPLOYMENT: EVIDENCE FROM  RANDOMLY  ASSIGNED JUDGES 17 (2016), 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/cyang/files/dgy_bail_july2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZKV-
NU2E]. 
200 US DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF STATISTICS, Pretrial Release of Felony 
Defendants in State Courts, Nov. 2007, at 1. 
201 Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 135, with AM. BAR ASS’N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, FREQUENTLY ASKED 
QUESTIONS ABOUT PRETRIAL RELEASE DECISION MAKING 
3, http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/acjc/bail%20pretrial%20release/faqpretrial. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/UGS9-L5YB] (last visited Apr. 28, 2018) (misdemeanants in New 
York City). We do know that money bail is required in about seventy percent of felony cases 
nationally. COHEN & REAVES, supra note 24, at 3. Of those felony defendants, fifty-three 
percent remain in jail, mostly because they cannot pay the money bail. See id. Of those felony 
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in many jurisdictions, at least half of misdemeanor defendants are detained before 
trial.202 Another 2018 study that analyzed data from over 400,000 cases in two 
different states found that 37.5 percent of misdemeanor defendants are detained 
pretrial.203 Most states do not release the majority of misdemeanor defendants, as 
only 14 states have a 10% release rate for misdemeanors.204 
The historical precedent for treating misdemeanors differently from felonies is 
clear.205 Historically, courts would release misdemeanor defendants on bail without 
a discussion. However, some felony defendants would only be released if they did 
not pose a flight risk, and later in the 1960s to 1980s if they did not pose a danger or 
the weight of the evidence against them was not strong.206 And even though felony 
defendants still retain the presumption of bail in most cases, some courts have 
discussed the rationales behind treating felonies differently than misdemeanors in 
terms of bail. The rational is largely intuitive: felonies are generally more serious 
crimes than misdemeanors. Despite the differing histories between felony and 
misdemeanor bail and the differences in crimes, these charges are treated very 
similarly before trial.  
                                               
defendants that remain in jail, eighty-eight percent remain detained throughout the pretrial 
period solely because they cannot afford their bails. See THOMAS COHEN & TRACEY 
KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN 
COUNTIES (2006) at 7, available at https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc06.pdf at 7 
(last accessed Jan. 14, 2019). And as the use of money bail increases, the release rates 
decrease. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra. This is also the case with misdemeanors, at least in New 
York. Id. For instance, in 2008, eighty-seven percent of NYC defendants charged with 
misdemeanors who had money bail amounts of $1000 or less could not post bail and were 
detained pretrial. Id. About 75% of these defendants had nonviolent, nonweapons related 
offenses and would likely have been safe to release. See also Ben Botkin, Jail stays for low-
level misdemeanors differ by county, ENID NEWS & EAGLE (June 4, 2018), 
https://www.enidnews.com/news/local_news/jail-stays-for-low-level-misdemeanors-differ-
by-county/article_afa901dc-14b6-5ff1-9a4c-a72ca25217f5.html. (discussing that in some 
counties upwards of 70% of misdemeanor defendants are not released). 
202 See supra note 148; see also supra note 153. 
203 Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin, & Crystal S. Yang, The Effects of Pretrial Detention on 
Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 
AM. ECON. REV. 201, 212 (2018); see also supra note 201. 
204 PRETRIAL JUST. INST., THE STATE OF PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 11–12 (2017), 
available at https://university.pretrial.org/viewdocument/state-of-pretrial-justice-in-americ 
(last accessed Jan. 2, 2019) 
205 Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 844 (explaining that misdemeanor defendants were guaranteed bail in common 
law England while felony defendants were not). 
206 See Baradaran, Presumption of Innocence, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 738–39 (explaining that Congress (1) “unintentionally opened the way for 
predictions of future guilt and pretrial weighing of evidence in the bail decision” by passing 
the 1966 Federal Bail Reform Act and (2) departed significantly “from the longstanding 
tradition that allowed pretrial detention only to assure appearance of the accused at trial” by 
enacting the Bail Reform Act of 1984). 
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In most states, there are not different factors for releasing defendants charged 
with a misdemeanor and a felony. The process for bail differs from state to state, but 
many states now endanger a misdemeanant’s due process rights by allowing 
detention based on a balance of factors. Misdemeanor defendants are also denied 
bail due to bail schedules and risk assessments. These are three important ways that 
felonies and misdemeanors are improperly connected before trial. This section will 
address all three in order. First, the factors for felony release have been applied to 
misdemeanor bail, without any consideration in many states. Second, bail schedules 
have been applied to misdemeanor cases as with felony cases, forcing misdemeanor 
defendants to be detained before trial because they cannot afford bail. Third, risk 
assessments are increasingly being applied as an improvement to money bail but 
sometimes end up treating misdemeanors like felonies and leading to increased 
detention for misdemeanor offenses, or failing to reduce detention overall. All three 
of these problems ignore the history of misdemeanor offenses and the minor nature 
of such crimes. Misdemeanors are less serious crimes and should be treated as such. 
In categorizing them with felonies as most states do, we ignore their history and 
accompanying constitutional rights, allowing for excessive detention of people 
who are overwhelmingly safe to release. Further the conflation of felony and 
misdemeanor bail decisions have plagued the current national bail reform 
movement, leading to reforms that are actually antithetical to improving rights. 
 
A.  Felony Factors Applied to Misdemeanors Wholesale 
 
Many states apply felony factors to determine whether to release 
misdemeanor defendants before trial. Relying on felony factors to evaluate 
release for non-violent misdemeanants ignores the presumptive release right for 
misdemeanor defendants.207 For felony defendants, ensuring that defendant is not 
a flight risk has been the historic concern and is one that can be accomplished with 
a variety of non-detention options.208 Over time, courts have moved from merely 
analyzing flight risk to a pretrial evaluation of guilt through the analysis of additional 
                                               
207 Id. at 741–42 (noting that historic presumption-of-innocence principles allow bail to 
be refused only for flight risk and that consideration of other factors violates those 
principles); Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT 
DEFINED., at 859 (“Though there was no specific absolute right to bail in misdemeanor cases, 
the general rule and practice was that those charged with anything other than a capital crime 
were released on bail, unless there was strong evidence that the defendant would flee the 
jurisdiction”). 
208 Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 37, at 501 (noting that, “As an unintended 
consequence, the Bail Reform Act of 1966 opened the door for judges to consider additional 
factors besides flight risk in determining whether to release defendants pretrial.”) See Lauryn 
P. Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. 837, 894–
95 (2016) (citing financial and supervision conditions as well as travel restrictions). 
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factors for felony cases.209 This approach treads on the pretrial presumption of 
innocence for felony defendants—but is even more offensive when used with 
misdemeanors. 
Though preventative detention—detention of defendants who pose a danger to 
others—was traditionally only intended for the legitimately dangerous to the public, 
such as capital offenders, “dangerousness” has been used to detain a much larger 
swath of individuals, including those who pose an extremely low risk of violence.210 
Many states consider danger to others as a factor in pretrial release. Indeed at least 
28 states and the District of Columbia urge courts to consider factors well beyond 
flight risk in the detention calculation for felonies.211 Other factors range from 
employment and financial situation to a history of depression and reputation.212 
States vary as to whether they make any distinction between applying these felony 
factors to felony defendants only, and whether they remain silent on distinctions 
between felony and misdemeanor pretrial evaluation.213  
Most states do not distinguish release factors for misdemeanors and felonies, 
and apply felony factors for misdemeanor cases. For example, the South Carolina 
pretrial detention statute makes no distinction between defendants charged with 
felony or misdemeanor offenses.214 When making pretrial release decisions, South 
Carolina judges can look far beyond flight risk and consider factors such as family 
circumstances, employment status, character, criminal record, and mental 
condition.215 Other states follow a slightly different approach which can ultimately 
lead to the same result. In Arkansas, by statute,216 the pretrial release inquiry 
involving the weighing of factors must be conducted in all felony and 
misdemeanor cases.217 As a result of this pretrial weighing, many 
                                               
209 Baradaran, Presumption of Innocence, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., 
at 741–42. 
210 Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 37.  
211 Id. at 511. In the context of evaluating danger, many state statutes give judges a lot 
of leeway, such has utilizing an ‘“including but not limited to’ clause, or permi[ting] judicial 
officers to consider ‘any other factor’ relevant to making a determination of dangerousness.” 
See also infra note 252 for list of states. 
212 Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 37, at 511. 
213 SCHNACKE, supra note 37, at 140–41 (noting that states tend to fall into one of three 
groups: states that provide no right to bail in their state constitutions, and therefore have 
rigorous statutory detention provisions; states that have broad right-to-bail provisions, and 
tend to have obvious stated lines between bailable an non-bailable offenses, and states that 
have “preventative detention” statutes tend toward preventative detention for many 
defendants beyond those who are a flight risk (the traditional category for preventative 
detention.). 
214 S. CAR. CODE. ANN. § 17-15-30; ARK. CODE ANN. § 8.4(a). 
215 S. CAR. CODE. ANN. § 17-15-30. 
216 ARK. CODE ANN. § 8.4(a). 
217 Id. This assumes of course that the prosecuting attorney does not stipulate that the 
defendant may be released on his own recognizance. 
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misdemeanor defendants do not obtain release and result in Arkansas jails 
housing significantly more pretrial defendants than convicted defendants.218 
And in Massachusetts, a very typical state, the judge will consider for both 
felony and misdemeanor cases the following factors: if the defendant is a 
flight risk; has a criminal record; has a history of fleeing prosecution; has 
family ties, financial resources, is employed, has a mental illness, and his 
reputation in the community.  The bail magistrate will also take into 
consideration whether the defendant’s release will harm the community 
and/or the victim of his crime.219  
The factors courts consider in determining whether to release felony 
defendants have now been transferred wholesale to misdemeanor defendants. 
The following sections consider the most common factors closely. The first 
of the felony factors courts consider in deciding whether to grant release is 
defendant’s failure to appear in court—which most courts inaccurately equate 
with flight risk.220 The second is defendant’s dangerousness. Third, courts 
consider the nature of the charge against defendant and weight of the 
evidence. Fourth, the criminal history of the defendant. Fifth, community ties 
and employment status. These factors will be discussed in order. 
 
1.  Defendant Appearance at Trial 
 
The first and original purpose of bail—and the only justified historic reason to 
detain an individual—is flight risk, or the worry that defendant would flee the 
jurisdiction and not appear for trial.221 At common law, misdemeanor defendants 
were generally released before trial because it was thought that bail was enough to 
ensure the defendant would appear given the minor consequences of the lesser 
crime.222 In felony capital cases where a death sentence was possible, bail was not 
                                               
218 Arkansas Profile, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (2014), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/profiles/AR.html.  
219 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 276, § 58. 
220 These factors are not one in the same, and flight is much more rare. See Lauryn P. 
Gouldin, Disentangling Flight Risk from Dangerousness, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. 837 (2016) 
(comparing flight risk and failure to appear and demonstrating that flight is uncommon).  
221 See BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 18 (“Bail determinations historically served the 
purpose of ensuring that the defendant appeared at trial and there were no decisions about 
guilt, as guilt was properly determined before trial.”); Baradaran, Presumption of Innocence, 
supra note 8, at 728 (“[T]he primary purpose of bail was to ensure a defendant’s presence at 
trial . . . .”); Shima Baradaran, The Presumption of Punishment, 8 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 391, 401 
(2014) [hereinafter Baradaran, Presumption of Punishment] (”Bail was primarily used as an 
incentive to ensure that defendants appeared at trial and it was not denied based on a 
defendant’s presumed guilt or innocence . . . .”). 
222 WM. L. CLARK, JR., HAND-BOOK OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 86 (Wet Publishing Co., 
St. Paul, Minn., 1895). The bail for misdemeanor defendants historically was either a surety 
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considered sufficient to dissuade the defendant from fleeing.223 “[T]he only reason 
to treat capital defendants differently than others was the greater risk they posed of 
defeating the purposes of bail.”224 In today’s world, it is virtually impossible for a 
typical defendant to leave the country undetected and the risk of flight is rare.225 
What is more common however, are defendants failing to appear in court (even 
multiple times) due to neglect or error.226 Historically, a failure to appear or even 
several, did not prohibit release before trial for misdemeanor crimes.227 Now, 
however, many courts deny bail, even for misdemeanor defendants based on 
previous failures to appear in court. Denial of bail, particularly for misdemeanor 
crimes is unnecessary because failure to appear in court can so easily be avoided. 
Many states successfully prevent failure to appear with simple reminder calls, texts 
or post cards.228 
Despite these practical considerations, in many states, consideration that a 
defendant will not appear weighs heavily in a court’s decision to grant or deny 
bail.229 A defendant’s past history of failing to show up to court dates is an indicator 
                                               
who would vouch for the defendant or a small amount of money or property left with the 
court that would be returned to defendant. See Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, 
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 861. This is far from the commercial bail that 
misdemeanor defendants have to pay today that is financially prohibitive for most poor 
defendants and not returned to defendant after appearance in court. 
223 CLARK, JR., supra note 222, at 86. 
224 Ariana Lindermayer, What the Right Hand Gives: Prohibitive Interpretations of the 
State Constitutional Right to Bail, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 267, 307 (2009) (discussing how 
proof of guilt has become “domina[ted]” defendants’ liberty interest in the bail decisions).  
225 Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 677, 689 (2018) 
(providing evidence that vast majority (83 percent) of felony defendants appear for all 
scheduled court appearances, and that only 3 percent of all released felony defendants 
remained fugitives after a year). 
226 Id. at 729–30 (laying out the range of reasons defendants may fail to appear such as 
“being unaware of or forgetting the date of the court appearance (which might reflect either 
ineffective notice by the court or poor calendar management by the defendant); illness or 
other unforeseen personal emergencies; external logistical challenges including employment 
conflicts, childcare issues, or lack of transportation; confusion or ignorance about the process 
or a general lack of capacity to navigate the process (this may reflect the complexity of the 
system and/or the defendant's cognitive limitations); fear of punishment relating to the 
pending charge; or lacking the funds to pay fines and fees that are owed at the courthouse”).   
227 See supra note 55 to 56. 
228 “A simple reminder to defendants by pretrial services is effective in reducing failure 
to appear rates.” BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 208. A 2010 study of fourteen Nebraska county 
courts showed that, without any reminder, 12.6 percent of defendants failed to appear in court 
but “with any postcard the failure to appear rate dropped . . . to 9.7 percent.” Id. at 209. And 
a postcard that mentioned possible sanctions for failure to appear reduced the rate to 8.3 
percent. Id. 
229 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-64a(2) (2017) (requiring the court to consider “any prior 
record of failing to appear”); see also ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.011(i)(7) (2018) (requiring the 
court to consider “the person’s record of appearance at court proceedings”); NEB. REV. STAT. 
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of whether the defendant will appear to future dates.230 As many as ten state statutes 
explicitly state that a past failure to appear is a consideration in the pretrial detention 
decision.231 Among those, Colorado—a recently lauded bail reform state,232—allows 
failure to appear as a reason to deny bail.233 Additionally, both Colorado and 
Connecticut have made clear that a court can deny ROR for misdemeanor offenses 
due to past failure to appear.234 Some courts consider a defendant’s failure to appear 
                                               
§ 29-427 (1974) (authorizing a peace officer to detain an arrestee if “the accused has 
previously failed to appear in response to a citation”); 
ARK. R. CRIM. P. Rule 5.2(d)(vi)(E) (2018) (allowing a law enforcement officer to consider 
“whether the accused previously has failed to appear in response to a citation” in determining 
whether to continue custody or issue a citation); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-113(1)(e) (2013) 
(prohibiting personal recognizance if “[t]he arrested person has previously failed to appear 
for trial for an offense concerning which he or she had given his written promise to appear”); 
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.125 (2012) (allowing the arresting officer or booking officer to issue a 
notice to appear depending on the accused’s “past history of appearance at court 
proceedings”); IOWA CODE § 805.1(3)(b)(6) (2002) (requiring law enforcement to consider 
“[w]hether a person has previously failed to appear in response to a citation” in issuing a 
citation in lieu of arrest); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-427 (1974) (requiring the arresting officer to 
consider whether “the accused has previously failed to appear in response to a citation” in 
deciding whether take the accused into custody); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.26(A)(4)(a) 
(West 1978) (prohibiting an officer from issuing a citation if the accused has previously 
failed to “[a]ppear at the time and place” stated in a previous citation); VT. R. CRIM. P. 3(c)(5) 
(2017) (authorizing an officer to arrest the accused instead of issuing a citation if the “person 
has previously failed to appear in response to a citation, summons, warrant, or other court 
order”); WASH. REV. CODE. § 2.1(b)(2)(iv) (2017) (requiring law enforcement officers to 
consider “whether the person previously has failed to appear in response to a citation and 
notice issued pursuant to this rule or to other lawful process.”); WIS. STAT. § 968.085(2)(e) 
(2017) (allowing law enforcement officer to consider whether “[t]he accused has previously 
failed to appear or failed to respond to a citation.”); see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
3967(B)(13) (West 2015); see also ARK. R. CRIM. P. 8.5(b)(vii); see also CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 1270(a) (West through 2017 Regular Session); see also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-4-
103(5)(j) (2014); see also DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 11, § 2105(a) (2013); see also FLA. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 903.046(2)(d), 907.041(1) (2016, 2017); see also IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-8-4 
(2017). 
230 Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 37, at 558.  
231 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5.2(d)(vi)(E) (2018); see also FLA. STAT. § 3.125 (2013); IOWA 
CODE § 805.1(3)(b)(6) (2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-427 (1974); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2935.26 (West 1978); Vt. R. CRIM. P. 3(c)(5) (2017); WASH. REV. CODE. § 2.1(b)(2)(iv) 
(2017); WIS. STAT. § 968.085(2)(e) (2017); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-113(1)(e) (2013); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-64a(2) (2017). 
232 MICHAEL R. JONES, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., COLORADO: AN EXAMPLE OF 
PRETRIAL JUSTICE REFORM IN PROGRESS (2014), available at 
https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/PJCC/Panel%202%20Reforms%20Jones%
202014-06%20CO%20Progress%20Report%20for%20NCSC.ashx. 
233 COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-113(1)(e) (2013). 
234 Id. (stating the court may deny ROR if the defendant “previously failed to appear”); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-64a(a)(2)(iii) (2017) (stating the court may deny ROR where the 
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among several other factors in considering release, but not necessarily as the only 
determinative one.235 
Some jurisdictions have determined that when a defendant fails to appear for 
court on the current crime charged, she waives her right to bail.236 But this approach 
is harsh and definitely not universal. For instance, in State v. Blair, the defendant 
failed to show for court, but the trial court was found to have abused its discretion 
for denying him bail, because that failure had not been willful.237  
Overall, a number of states use failure to appear as a reason to deny bail to 
misdemeanor defendants. What is troubling is that states who have undergone bail 
reform are among these states. Failure to appear should not be a reason to detain any 
defendant—misdemeanor or felony—given that studies repeatedly have shown that 
it is an easily prevented problem. Despite strong data on this, as indicated in Part 
III.B, risk assessments often improperly consider failure to appear in denying release 
to individuals. 
 
2.  Dangerousness of Defendant 
 
Dangerousness of defendant was not even a factor that courts could permissibly 
consider in determining bail until the 1980s,238 but now it is the number one 
consideration of courts in determining pretrial release.239 Many statutes and state 
                                               
defendant has a “prior record of failing to appear”). 
235 See Constantino v. Warren, 684 S.E.2d 601, 604 (Ga. 2009) (citing OCGA § 17-6-
1(e)); see also FLA. STAT. § 903.046(2)(a)–(m) (2016). Case law shows that state courts 
consider past failure to appear in denying bail. For example, in Wilboiner, a New York case, 
the defendant was originally arraigned on a trespass charge. The defendant failed to appear 
for a court hearing, his record indicated that his competency had been questioned before, and 
at a court hearing he did not appear to understand the charges against him. He was arrested 
on a warrant days later. Based on these facts, the criminal court determined that the defendant 
was not likely to show for subsequent court hearings or a court-order examination and, thus, 
could lawfully be held without bail. People v. Wilboiner, 936 N.Y.S.2d 873, 877 (N.Y. Crim. 
Ct. 2012) (held pending a competency examination). 
236 See supra note 233–34. 
237 State v. Blair, 39 So. 3d 1190, 1191 (Fla. 2010) (holding that the trial court failed to 
find Blair’s failure to appear willful after the case had been refiled as a felony DUI, and given 
a new court date as opposed to Blair originally being arrested and charged for misdemeanor 
DUI). 
238 Baradaran, Presumption of Innocence, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., 
at 728, 748 (explaining that judges historically could not “detain defendants because they 
were likely to commit a crime while released” but that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 added 
“dangerousness” reversed that precedent); State v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987) 
(upholding the constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act of 1984). 
239 Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 37, at 546 (noting that even though nationally 
courts consider many factors, when considering release decisions, it is clear that they are 
most concerned about the dangerousness of the defendant); BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 60 
(“While constitutionally suspect . . . predictions of whether defendants will commit a crime 
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cases specifically allow pretrial detention for dangerous defendants. What the 
meaning of a dangerous defendant is, however, is up for much dispute.240 For the 
purposes of this Article, it is important to note that dangerous defendants have 
historically been felony—categorically not misdemeanor defendants—and those 
who cannot be stopped from harming witnesses or victims before trial even with 
reasonable measures.241 What is clear from this section is that there is no uniform 
treatment throughout the states of what constitutes dangerousness adequate to detain 
before trial, and this definition is used too broadly to detain a much larger swath of 
misdemeanor defendants than is necessary. 
Felonies represent generally more violent or serious conduct and such 
defendants are deemed to be more dangerous, even though many felony defendants 
are not dangerous.242 Some courts have appropriately recognized, however, that 
misdemeanor defendants do not pose the same threat as felony defendants. As one 
Texas court remarked: “Ordinarily, those charged with misdemeanors do not present 
the threat to people and property as those charged with felonies. The need for their 
detention is not so great.”243 Another Texas court reasoned that though some 
misdemeanors involve violence, felonies tend to “involve serious violence or anti-
social conduct.”244 The California Supreme Court remarked on the public policy 
reasons for treating misdemeanors and felonies differently, stating that society has a 
stronger interest in “the prosecution of more serious crimes” like felonies because 
they pose a “heightened threat to society than minor [crimes].”245 Additionally, 
                                               
on release are foremost in pretrial release.”). 
240 For an extremely thoughtful exposition of this topic, see Sandra G. 
Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 499 (2018) (“[F]or purposes of 
preventive restraint, there is no clear, relevant distinction between defendants and non-
defendants who are equally dangerous . . . there is no clear normative basis for subjecting 
defendants to preventive restraint that we would not tolerate for equally dangerous people 
not accused of any crime.”). 
241 Baradaran, Presumption of Innocence, supra note 8, at 748–50 (discussing the use 
of the “dangerousness” inquiry being limited to explicitly capital cases before Bail Reform 
Act of 1984 and the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Salerno, stating that “a 
defendant may be detained if he presents a danger to a witness); Baradaran & 
McIntyre, supra note 37, at 503–06 (discussing historical common law practice of 
guaranteeing defendant’s right to bail which was presumed for all but murder defendants and 
then guaranteeing bail for all noncapital offenses).  
242 Oddly enough, felony defendants of the most dangerous type (three or more violent 
felony convictions) are still only likely to commit another violent crime less than 10% of the 
time on pretrial release. See Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 37, at 530. 
243 Ex parte Smith, 493 S.W.2d 958, 959 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). 
244 Armon v. Jones, 580 F.Supp. 917, 926 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (stating that it does not 
violate the constitutional right to equal protection to treat misdemeanor “pretrial detainees” 
different than felony detainees).  
245 People v. Traylor, 210 P.3d 433, 438–39 (Cal. 2009); see also Myers v. The 
Telegraph, 773 N.E.2d 192, 197–98 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (discussing how society views 
misdemeanors and felonies different, the latter as a more serious crime).  
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3358662 
48 DIVIDING BAIL REFORM (FORTHCOMING IOWA LAW REVIEW)  
   
 
research shows that dangerousness is not predicted successfully by courts using a 
typical balance of pretrial release factors. In a 2011 study, Frank McIntyre and I 
found that “judges often detain the wrong people,”246 and that important actual 
predictors of dangerousness are current violent crime charges and a prior convictions 
of three or more violent crimes.247 We also found that for even felony defendants 
with a rap sheet, the average rearrest rates are only about 1%-2% for a pretrial violent 
crime.248 Indeed, most felony defendants do not pose a violent crime risk when 
released on bail—only a small subset of felony defendants do—and misdemeanor 
defendants are even safer to release pretrial. 
In current state statutes, the “dangerousness” of the crime—or the potential 
danger the defendant poses to the public—often serves as an exception to the 
presumption of ROR in a misdemeanor case. Five states have explicitly established 
by statute that this concern represents an exception to ROR.249 Unlike the others that 
seem to combine misdemeanors and felonies, Connecticut’s statute makes clear 
though that only with felony offenses can a court impose financial conditions upon 
a finding that the defendant “threatens the safety of himself or herself or another 
person.”250 
Twenty-eight states consider the dangerousness of the crime specifically by 
statute in both felony and misdemeanor pretrial release decisions.251 For instance, 
                                               
246 Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 37, at 497. 
247 Id. at 557. 
248 Id. The highest risk posed was for defendants charged with a violent crime with 
three violent crime convictions and their chances of committing a violent crime on release 
were about 10%, high enough to detain in my judgment. Id. 
249 ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.011(b)(2) (2018) (stating that ROR may be denied based on 
a finding that it cannot “reasonably ensure . . . the safety of the victim, other persons, and the 
community.”); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1270(a) (West 1995) (“A defendant who is in 
custody and is arraigned on a complaint alleging an offense which is a misdemeanor . . . shall 
be entitled to an own recognizance release unless the court makes a finding . . . that an own 
recognizance release will compromise public safety . . . Public safety shall be the primary 
consideration. If the court makes one of those findings, the court shall then set bail and 
specify the conditions, if any, whereunder the defendant shall be released.”); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 54-64a(2) (2017); N.H.  REV. STAT. ANN. § 597:2(II) (2016) (stating that pending a 
trial, the court will can ether ROR, set bail, or temporarily detain the defendant, dependent 
upon a number of factors, including whether the defendant “will endanger the safety of the 
person or of any other person or the community” upon release); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-
113(1)(c) (2013). 
250 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-64a(2) (2017). 
251 These states seem to apply the dangerousness factor to both misdemeanor and felony 
cases. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3967 (2015); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2105 
(2013); D.C. CODE § 23-1322 (2013); FLA. STAT. § 903.046 (2016); FLA. STAT. § 907.041 
(2017); IDAHO CODE § 19-2904 (2009); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/110-5 (2013); IND. CODE § 
35-33-8-4 (2017); IOWA CODE § 811.2 (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2802 (2013); KY. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 431.520 (West 2014); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 316 (2017); ME. STAT. 
tit. 15, § 1026 (2016); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.02 (2016); MS R RCRP Rule 8.2 (2017); MO. 
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under California statute: “In setting, reducing, or denying bail, a judge or magistrate 
shall take into consideration the protection of the public . . . . The public safety shall 
be the primary consideration.”252 State statutes are not always clear on how a court 
should determine whether the defendant poses a danger. California requires the court 
to look to “alleged injury to the victim, and alleged threats to the victim or a witness 
to the crime charged, the alleged use of a firearm or other deadly weapon in the 
commission of the crime charged, and the alleged use or possession of controlled 
substances by the defendant.”253 Though not all statutes specifically address the 
reason, several reflect a purpose to either protect the community at large or specific 
persons to which the defendant may be a danger.254 Whether a defendant poses a 
danger to the public, herself, or a specific person is a consideration that seventeen 
states have codified in statutes regarding pretrial release, amount and conditions for 
bail, and citations in lieu of custody.255 Four states have established by statute that it 
is a factor to consider in deciding whether to deny bail altogether specifically in 
reference to misdemeanor cases.256  
                                               
REV. STAT. § 544.457 (1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-9-109 (2017); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-
901.01 (2017); NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.4853 (1997); N.D. R. CRIM. P. 46 (2006); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 135.230 (2017); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-13-1.3 (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-
43-4 (2017); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 17.15 (West 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, 
§ 7554 (2016); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-120 (2015); WASH. REV. CODE § SUPER CT CR CrR 
3.2 (2017); WYO. R. CRIM. P. 46 (2018). 
252 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275 (West 2015). 
253 Id.  
254 See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/110-5(a) (2013) (stating whether to grant pretrial, the 
court should consider what condition, “if any, which will reasonably assure . . . the safety of 
any other person or the community.”); see also IND. CODE § 35-33-8-4(b) (2017) (stating that 
in setting bail, courts should consider the amount necessary to “assure the physical safety of 
another person or the community if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant poses a risk to the physical safety of another person or the community.”); IOWA 
CODE § 811.2 (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2802(1) (2013); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. 
art. 316 (2017).  
255 See ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.011(b)(2) (2018); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 12.30.011 
(2018); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1270 (West 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-64a(a) (2017); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 597:2(III) (2016); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-113(1)(c) (2013); FLA. R. 
CRIM. P. 3.125(b)(2) (2013); IOWA CODE § 805.1(b)(3) (2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
431.015(b)(2) (West 2017); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 211(A)(1)(b) (2011); MD. CODE 
ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 4-101(2)(iii) (West 2016); MN. R. CRIM. P. 6.01(a)(1) (2015); VT. R. 
CRIM. P. 3 (2017); WASH. CRIM. R. 2.1(b)(2)(ii) (2017); W. VA. CODE § 62-1-5a(1) (1982); 
WIS. STAT. § 968.085(2)(c) (2017); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-2-103(b)(i) (2011). 
256 COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-113(1)(c) (2013) (stating ROR or bond unless “[t]he 
continued detention or posting of a surety bond is necessary to prevent imminent bodily harm 
to the accused or to another.”); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.581(1) (1991) (stating that 
a person arrested for a misdemeanor that is “punishable by imprisonment for not more than 
1 year, or by a fine, or both, the officer making the arrest shall take, without unnecessary 
delay, the person arrested before the most convenient magistrate of the county in which the 
offense was committed to answer to the complaint[,]”  but if a magistrate is not available the 
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If the court determines it can ensure the protection of the public and specific 
individuals with certain bail conditions, then the defendant may be released; 
however, a few jurisdictions have certain types of offenses which are an exception 
to the right to bail and the defendant should be held on pretrial detention in those 
cases when charged with a felony or misdemeanor. The District of Columbia has 
gone as far as to establish a “rebuttable presumption that no condition or 
combination of conditions of release will reasonably assure the safety of any other 
person and the community if the judicial officer finds by probable cause that the 
person committed” a range of criminal acts, including “a crime of violence…while 
armed[,]” or “a robbery in which the victim sustained physical injury”—among 
others.257 This DC code specifically applies to misdemeanor defendants as well.258 
Courts have similarly denied release in cases where otherwise releasable 
misdemeanor defendants have been deemed dangerous. The Supreme Court of 
North Dakota upheld a trial court’s decision not to grant bail where the defendant 
had three misdemeanor convictions, all of a violent nature, and a pending robbery 
charge against him—even though the defendant made a showing that he was likely 
to show up for future court dates.259 The basis for the court’s decision is that the 
defendant “would create a danger to the public[]” if released.260 Similarly, in State 
v. Goodie, the Louisiana court denied the misdemeanor defendant bail because he 
had violated a protective order on multiple occasions and the court believed his 
behavior toward the victim had escalated to the point that he had become an 
                                               
defendant may be released on bond, unless it is “unsafe to release him or her.”); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 597:2(II) (2016) (stating that pending a trial, the court will can ether ROR, set 
bail, or temporarily detain the defendant, dependent upon a number of factors, including 
whether the defendant “will endanger the safety of the person or of any other person or the 
community” upon release) see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275(a)(1) (West 2014). 
257 D.C. CODE § 23-1322 (2013). Note that all of the crimes of violence are felonies 
even though the person who is arrested can be arrested on a felony or misdemeanor charge 
initially. See D.C. CODE § 23–1331(3) (2013). The “felony or misdemeanor” language was 
added as a bail reform amendment. See Bail Reform, 2000 D.C. Laws 13-310 (Act 13-567). 
258 D.C. CODE § 23–1322 (2013) (“Detention prior to trial.”) Interestingly, the DC code 
only applied this presumption against crimes committed by felony defendants on release but 
expanded the statute to misdemeanor defendants in 2000. The code provides: 
“(a) The judicial officer shall order the detention of a person charged with an offense 
for a period of not more than 5 days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, and direct 
the attorney for the government to notify the appropriate court, probation or parole official, 
or local or state law enforcement official, if the judicial officer determines that the person 
charged with an offense: 
(1) Was at the time the offense was committed, on: 
(A) Release pending trial for a felony or misdemeanor under local, state, or federal 
law….” Id. 
259 State v. Azure, 241 N.W.2d 699 (N.D. 1976). 
260 Id. at 701.  
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3358662 
 DIVIDING BAIL REFORM (FORTHCOMING IOWA LAW REVIEW) 51 
   
 
“imminent danger” to her.261 The above examples seem like decent exceptions to the 
presumptive release right for misdemeanors. 
However, in other cases, states are more likely to honor a categorical refusal to 
detain misdemeanor defendants without substantial threats of physical violence. In 
such a case, the Supreme Court of Vermont declined to uphold the trial court’s 
decision to hold the defendant without bail.262 There the misdemeanor defendant had 
made statements that caused a concern that she may self-harm; however, Vermont 
had carved out an exception prohibiting detention of non-violent misdemeanor or 
felony defendants.263 Further, the Vermont Constitution specifically limits detention 
for dangerousness to where there is clear and convincing evidence of a “substantial 
threat of physical violence” by felony defendant where no conditions can reasonably 
prevent the physical violence.264 Vermont is a good example of a state that continues 
to respect the presumptive release right for misdemeanor defendants. 
Some courts have established that the government bears the burden of proof for 
showing that the defendant is a danger, justifying detention. For example, in 
Massachusetts, the government must prove by “clear and convincing” evidence that 
the defendant would be a danger if released.265 Upon such a showing, the court can 
order preventative pretrial detention.266 In making a showing that defendant is 
dangerous, the government is not required to establish a so-called “nexus” between 
the dangerous crime charged and the parties to whom the defendant may be a danger 
to.267 In other states like North Dakota, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the 
requirement that the government bears the burden of proof.268 
Some of the state statutes specifically identify what constitutes a dangerous 
crime. However, many states do not specify this by statute. In many of these states, 
it is unclear and inconsistent what exactly constitutes a dangerous or violent crime. 
                                               
261 State v. Goodie, 2017-693 (La. App. 3 Cir. 8/23/17); 226 So.3d 1130. 
262 State v. Kane, 2016 VT 121, ¶¶ 3–10, 203 Vt. 652,160 A.3d 1020.  
263 Id. 
264 State v. Lontine, 2016 VT 26, ¶ 44, 201 Vt. 637, 142 A.3d 1058 (finding that a 
defendant who was charged with aggravated domestic violence was lawfully denied bail) 
(quoting Vermont Constitution, ch. II, § 40(2)); see also ARK. R. CRIM. P. 8.5 (2018); State 
v. Houng, 2009-Ohio-2955, ¶¶ 15–16 (stating that the right to bail applies to all offenses 
except capital and felony offenses where “the proof is evident or the presumption great and 
where the person poses a substantial risk of serious physical harm to any person or to the 
community.”(citing Ohio Const. Article I, Section 9)). 
265 Mendonza v. Commonwealth, 673 N.E.2d 22, 34 (Mass. 1996). 
266 Mendonza v. Commonwealth, 673 N.E.2d 22, 34 (Mass. 1996). 
267 Id. For instance, the defendant need not actually have harmed the individual for the 
government to successfully establish that the defendant poses a danger to the individual. Id. 
at 34. 
268 State v. Azure, 241 N.W.2d 699, 701 (N.D. 1976). The Supreme Court of North 
Dakota stated “The appellant argues that the burden of establishing that the defendant is 
likely to flee and poses a danger to the community rests with the State. We disagree. The 
North Dakota rule on release after conviction…is silent … as to the relative burdens of proof 
carried by the State and the defendant on this issue.” Id.  
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Some states include misdemeanors in such categories and other states stick to the 
historical understanding and only detain pretrial for dangerous and serious crimes.269 
Hawaii law, for instance, describes a “serious crime” as “murder or attempted 
murder in the first degree, murder or attempted murder in the second degree, or a 
class A or B felony, except forgery in the first degree and failing to render aid…”270 
In contrast, Florida’s definition consists of numerous forms of crime—both felony 
and misdemeanor—including but not limited to: “[a]rson; [a]ggravated assault; 
[c]hild abuse; [k]idnapping; [h]omicide; [m]anslaughter; [s]exual battery” and 
more.271 In a Florida case, the appeals court upheld the trial court’s decision to 
release the defendant on bail, even though he had committed three counts of battery 
on a law enforcement officer, two counts of resisting with violence, one count of 
criminal mischief, a misdemeanor, and one count misdemeanor DUI[]” because 
none of these crimes constituted a “dangerous crime” under Florida statute and 
sufficient bail conditions had been entered to ensure the public safety.272  
Overall, what is clear is that a dangerous crime or defendant is not clearly 
defined among the states but yet most states use it as a factor even for misdemeanor 
offenses. Further, it is also clear that misdemeanor crimes have been improperly 
tethered to felony offenses and courts have justified pretrial detention for even minor 
acts of assault. Though some states clearly maintain the historically established right 
of presumptive release for misdemeanor defendants, and do not limit it except for 
with serious violent crimes. 
 
3.  Nature of the Charge and weight of evidence 
 
Another factor that is highly influential for courts in determining release is the 
nature of charge (or circumstances of the crime) and weight of the evidence 
pertaining to the charge. Here, the court considers how serious the charge is and how 
much evidence there is to prove the charge. Both of these considerations, especially 
the latter, are highly problematic for due process and the presumption of 
innocence.273 Yet both of these considerations are important in determining both 
felony and misdemeanor release. 
                                               
269 Almazrouei v. State, 971 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (reversing the 
trial court’s decision to deny bond because the accused had not been charged with 
“dangerous crimes”); see also Swanson v. Allison, 617 So. 2d 1100, 1100 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1993) (finding that a defendant charged with domestic abuse—misdemeanor battery—
was entitled to bail because battery does not constitute a “dangerous crime” under Florida 
statute); HAW. REV. STAT. § 804-3 (1987) (applying to both misdemeanor and felony 
offenses).  
270 HAW. REV. STAT. § 804-3 (1987). 
271 FLA. STAT. § 907.041 (2017). 
272 Almazrouei v. State, 971 So.2d 185, 186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). 
273 See Baradaran, Presumption of Punishment, supra note 221, (explaining that 
weighing of evidence is clearly a duty of jurors not judges); Baradaran, Presumption of 
Innocence, supra note 8, at 770–72 (arguing that weighing of evidence against a defendant 
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The majority of states have statutes that consider the “nature” of the crime 
charged in determining bail. Thirty-two states have established that the “nature of 
the crime” should be considered in the pretrial release decisions.274 Some 
jurisdictions identify this factor in considering “dangerousness,” directly identify 
violent crimes, or consider it with the weight of the evidence against defendant.275 
                                               
is a violation of due process because the presumption of innocence protects defendants and 
“historically judges were limited to predicting whether the defendant would appear at 
trial.”)); see also BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 200 (explaining that the Due Process Clause 
is violated when the judge determines “the weight of the evidence against a defendant in a 
pretrial hearing without counsel” because the Due Process Clause requires “a conviction of 
guilt by a jury,” not a judge). 
274 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3967 (West 2015); see also Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, 
§ 2105(b) (2013); D.C. Code § 23-1322(e)(4) (2013); Fla. Stat. § 903.046(2)(a) (2016); 725 
Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/110-5(a) (2013); Ind. Code § 35-33-8-4(b)(7) (2017); Iowa Code § 
811.2(2) (2013); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-2802(8) (2013); La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. ART. 
316(5) (2017); Me. Stat. tit. 15, § 1026(4)(A) (2016); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 276, § 58 (2014); 
Minn. R. Crim. P. 6.02(2)(a) (2018); Miss. R. Crim. P. 8.2(a)(6) (2017); Mo. REV. Stat. § 
544.455(2) (2013); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-9-109(2)(a) (2017); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-901.01 
(2017); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 178.4853(7) (1997); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-534(c) (2016); N.D. R. 
Crim. P. 46(a)(3)(A) (2018); Ohio R. Crim. P. 46(C)(1) (2018); Or. Rev. Stat. § 
135.230(7)(b) (2017); Pa. R. Crim. P. 523(A)(1) (2016); S.C. Code Ann. § 17-15-30(A) 
(2015); S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-43-4 (2017); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-11-115(b)(7) (1978); 
Tex. CODE Crim. Proc. Ann. § 17.15(3) (West 1993); Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-120(E)(1) 
(2015); WaSH. Crim. R. 3.2(c)(8) (2017); W. Va. Code § 62-1C-3 (1965); Wyo. R. Crim. P. 
46.1(d)(2) (2018). 
275 See Mendonza v. Commonwealth, 673 N.E.2d 22, 26 (Mass. 1996); see also Knapp 
v. State, 477 S.E.2d 621, 623 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that after an evidentiary hearing 
on issue of whether to grant appeal bond in misdemeanor cases, the trial court must determine 
“whether there is a substantial risk the defendant will pose a danger to others in the 
community…”); State v. Kane, 2016 VT 121, ¶ 12, 203 Vt. 652,160 A.3d 1020 (providing 
that under Vermont statute defendants are entitled to bail on misdemeanor violations of 
probation if the violation was non-violent and did not constitute a new crime); State v. 
Goodie, 2017-693, p. 12–13 (La. App. 3 Cir. 8/23/17); 226 So.3d 1130, 1137–38. Vermont 
courts consider the following factors: “the nature and circumstances of the offense, the 
weight of the evidence against the accused, the accused's family ties, history of employment, 
financial resources, ties to the community, record of convictions, record of appearance at 
court proceedings, and the character and mental condition of the accused.” State v. Morrison, 
No. 2007-350, 2007 WL 5313415, at *1 (Vt. Sept. 1, 2007) (citing State v. Blackmer, 631 
A.2d 1134, 1137 (Vt. 1993)); see also ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.011(c)(2) (2018); ARK. R. 
CRIM. P. 5.2(d)(vi)(C) (2018); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1270 (West 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 
16-4-113(1)(c) (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-64a(2) (2017); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.125(b)(3) 
(2013); IOWA CODE § 805.1(b)(3) (2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.015(b)(2) (West 
2017); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 211(A)(b) (2011); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 
4-101(c)(2)(iii) (West 2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.581(3) (1990); MN R. CRIM. P. 
6.01(b)(1) (2015); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-427 (1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.4851(1) (2007); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597:2(II) (2016); PA. R. CRIM. P. 519(B)(1)(b) (2013); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 40-7-118 (2012); VT. R. CRIM. P. 3 (2018); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-74 (2014); WASH. 
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In a recent New York study, the most important factor in determining whether 
a defendant would be released before trial was the severity of the charge. Indeed it 
was the “most powerful driver of current bail decisions.”276 This includes whether a 
charge is a misdemeanor or felony—which is appropriate, and a welcomed 
distinction.277 Some states have made clear that in misdemeanor cases, the weight of 
the evidence—or how likely a defendant is to be convicted—is an important factor 
in determining bail.278 As many as thirty-one states indicate that courts should 
consider the weight of the evidence in making pretrial release decisions.279 At least 
eight of those statutes expressly provide the weight of the evidence as a part of the 
calculus in deciding whether the defendant should be released at all: Arkansas,280 
                                               
CRIM. R. 3.2 (2017); W. VA. CODE § 62-1-5A (1982); WIS. STAT. § 968.085 (2017); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 7-2-103(b) (2011) (“A person may be released if, after investigation, it appears 
that the person: Does not present a danger to himself or others; [or] [w]ill not injure or destroy 
the property of others”). 
276 MICHAEL REMPEL ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, JAIL IN NEW YORK CITY: 
EVIDENCE-BASED OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORM viii (2017), available at 
https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/Publications/jail-in-new-york-
city/legacy_downloads/NYC_Path_Analysis_Final-Report.pdf. 
277 Id. The study also considered whether the charge was violent or nonviolent. All of 
these were important in terms of charge severity. 
278 FLA. STAT. § 903.046 (2016) (applying to both misdemeanor and felony charges); 
see also ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.011 (2018) (applying to misdemeanors and some class C 
felonies); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3967 (2015) (applying to both misdemeanor and 
felony charges). 
279 John P. Gross, The Right to Counsel But Not the Presence of Counsel: A Survey of 
State Criminal Procedure for Pre-trial Release, 69 FLA. L. REV. 831, 850–53 (2017). See 
Yording v. Walker, 683 P.2d 788, 792 (Colo. 1984) (concluding that a refusal to permit the 
introduction of evidence pertinent to whether bail should be granted was erroneous); see also 
Blackwell v. Sessums, 284 So. 2d 38, 39 (Miss. 1973) (affirming denial of bail where the 
evidence was not clear that proof was evident that defendant was guilty). 
280 ARK. R. CRIM. P. 8.5(b)(vi) (2018) (stating that the court should consider the 
“likelihood of conviction and the possible penalty” in the pretrial decision). 
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Florida,281 Idaho,282 Illinois,283 Maryland,284 Montana,285 Pennsylvania,286 and 
Tennessee.287  
Considering the nature of the crime is arguably a relevant factor in considering 
felony bail, as violent felony defendants with a serious violent history may not be 
eligible for bail. However, weighing evidence against any defendant—felony or 
misdemeanor—is inappropriate for a judge in a pretrial hearing.288 Weighing of 
evidence is part of the role of the jury and should only be done during trial.289 
Further, the weight of the evidence against an individual shouldn’t matter at the 
misdemeanor stage. Even if there seems to be a mound of evidence that a defendant 
committed a misdemeanor, she should still be entitled to release before trial. And it 
should not matter what the nature of a misdemeanor crime is—whether violent or 
nonviolent—and a defendant should be released before trial except in rare 
circumstances where a defendant may be incompetent or unable to be restrained 
from harming a victim or witness with clear and convincing evidence. 
 
                                               
281 FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131(3) (2018) (“In determining whether to release a defendant 
on bail or other conditions, and what that bail or those conditions may be, the court may 
consider . . . the weight of the evidence against the defendant”). 
282 IDAHO CRIM. R. 46(c)(6) (2017) (“The determination of whether a defendant should 
be released on the defendant’s own recognizance or admitted to bail, and the determination 
of the amount and conditions of bail, if any, may be made after considering any of the 
following factors: … the nature of the current charge and any mitigating or aggravating 
factors that may bear on the likelihood of conviction and the possible penalty”). 
283 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/110-5(a) (2016) (“In determining the amount of monetary 
bail or conditions of release, if any ... the court shall ... take into account such matters as the 
nature and circumstances of the offense charged . . . the likelihood of conviction, the sentence 
applicable upon conviction, the weight of the evidence against such defendant…”). 
284 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 4-216(e)(1)(A) (West 2016) (“In determining 
whether a defendant should be released and the conditions of release, the judicial officer shall 
take into account the following information, to the extent available: …the nature of the 
evidence against the defendant, and the potential sentence upon conviction”). 
285 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-9-109(2)(b) (2015) (“In determining whether the defendant 
should be released or detained, the court shall take into account the available information 
concerning: …the weight of the evidence against the defendant ...”). 
286 PA. R. CRIM. P. 523(A)(1) (2016) (“[T]he bail authority shall consider . . . any 
mitigating or aggravating factors that may bear upon the likelihood of conviction and 
possible penalty…”). 
287 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-115(b)(7) (2016) (“In determining whether or not a 
person shall be released as provided in this section…the magistrate shall take into account: 
… the apparent probability of conviction and the likely sentence . . .”). 
288 See Baradaran, Presumption of Punishment, supra note 221; see also BAUGHMAN, 
supra note 4, at 200–02 (“[W]eighing facts about a defendant’s guilt before trial is both a 
violation of Due Process and the Sixth Amendment.”).  
289 See Baradaran, Presumption of Punishment, supra note 221; see also BAUGHMAN, 
supra note 4, at 201 (“On top of violating Due Process, judges are infringing upon the Sixth 
Amendment right to trial by jury in determining facts at the bail hearing.”). 
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3.  Criminal Record 
 
While a defendant’s criminal record has been a factor in considering whether 
to release a felony defendant, it has now also become relevant in determining 
whether to release a misdemeanor defendant. Historically, a misdemeanor defendant 
has been released as a matter of course, but now that the release factors have often 
been combined for both types of crimes, it has also become important for both 
felonies and misdemeanors.290 Some judges admit that when they see a record of 
warrants, they cannot help but set bail, even in a misdemeanor case.291  Colorado, 
California and Mississippi have listed criminal history as a specific ground for 
denying bail in misdemeanor cases.292 Additionally, if the defendant has a warrant 
is also a factor that some courts consider, or whether trial has begun.293 After a 
defendant has been convicted of a misdemeanor, most courts determine that she is 
not entitled to bail, even if the conviction is pending appeal.294 The rationale for this 
                                               
290 Yates v. State, 679 S.W.2d 538, 540 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984) (finding that the defendant 
was not likely to appear in court and could therefore be held without bail where the defendant 
had committed a DUI while on bond).  
291 In Misdemeanorland, Issa Kohler-Hausmann examines how in New York City, 
criminal history plays a significant role in judges’ bail evaluations. She describes one judge 
who feels that “even if he believes the eventual disposition in a case he sees at arraignments 
will not involve a prospective jail sentence, he feels obligated to set bail if the person has a 
record of bench warrants.” KOHLER-HAUSMAN, supra note 5, at 164–65. In fact, the judge 
says, “‘Record is the first primary thing that you look at. . . . You’re pretty sure they’re not 
going to make bail no matter what you set. So now you’re torn. . . . But they have a history 
of bench warranting. How can I not set bail on the case?” Id.  
292 COLO REV. STAT. § 16-4-113 (2013) (referring to misdemeanor crimes specifically); 
see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275 (West 2015); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-3-18 (1980) 
(specifying misdemeanors). 
293 For example, in New York and North Dakota once a trial commences, the trial court 
has the discretion to hold a misdemeanant without bail. People ex rel. Sweeney v. Fallon, 
141 N.Y.S. 303 ( N.Y. App. Div. 1913); see also N.D. R. CRIM. P. 46 (2006). 
294 Gallie v. Wainwright, 362 So. 2d 936, 941 (Fla. 1978); see also Ex parte Caldwell, 
125 S.W. 25, 25–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1910) (holding that the defendant was not entitled to 
bail pending retrial). Under Florida statute, in some instances after a misdemeanor 
conviction, the court will be entirely barred from granting bail. See Dotson v. State, 764 
So.2d 6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). For example, generally where the defendant has been 
convicted of a felony, he will not be permitted bail pending review, “unless the defendant 
establishes that the appeal is taken in good faith, on grounds fairly debatable, and not 
frivolous. However, in no case shall bail be granted if such person has previously been 
convicted of a felony, the commission of which occurred prior to the commission of the 
subsequent felony, and the person’s civil rights have not been restored or if other felony 
charges are pending against the person and probable cause has been found that the person 
has committed the felony or felonies at the time the request for bail is made.” FLA. R. CRIM. 
P. 3.691(a) (2018); see also State v. Azure, 241 N.W.2d 699, 700 (N.D. 1976) (stating that 
defendant may be released on bail after a conviction and pending an appeal “only if it appears 
(1) that the appeal is not frivolous, (2) that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay, 
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is that the defendant is no longer presumed innocent “and is not entitled to admission 
to bail as a matter of right.”295  
Overall, since felony bail has always involved some discretion—especially for 
serious violent offenses, considering a defendant’s criminal history does not offend 
constitutional rights or historical precedent. However, misdemeanor bail has 
generally been a presumptive right, so consideration of criminal history is generally 
not appropriate in this context. 
 
4.  Community Ties, Residential and Employment Circumstances 
 
Finally, courts sometimes consider a group of catch-all factors often called 
community ties or residential and employment circumstances.296 Specifically, some 
                                               
(3) there is sufficient reason to believe that the conditions of release will reasonably assure 
that the defendant will not flee, and (4) there is sufficient reason to believe that the defendant 
does not pose a danger to any other person or to the community.”). Under Oklahoma statute, 
where the defendant has a pleaded guilty or nolo contendere to a misdemeanor charge, if the 
defendant withdraws the plea, he or she is entitled to bail. Roberts v. Morgan, ex rel. Mun. 
Court of City of Oklahoma City, 1998 OK CR 31, ¶ 5, 965 P.2d 382, 383. But a defendant 
may be entitled to bail even after conviction if the defendant has been sentenced to probation 
and proceedings to revoke bail is initiated; pending the revocation of probation the defendant 
is entitled to reasonable bail. Ex parte Smith, 493 S.W.2d 958, 959 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). 
But see State v. Henley, 363 P.3d 319, 328 (Haw. 2015) (“As this court recently noted in 
State v. Kiese, . . . the right to bail shall continue after conviction of a misdemeanor, and … 
an accused misdemeanant… is entitled to bail as a matter of right after conviction and 
pending appellate review.” (internal citations omitted)). 
295 Williams v. City of Montgomery, 739 So. 2d 515, 518 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) 
(quoting ALA. R. CRIM. P. R. 7.3(b)) (internal citations omitted); see also State v. Parker, 220 
N.C. 416, 17 S.E.2d 475, 477–78 (1941) (holding that after a conviction has been entered, 
the defendant is not entitled to bail and the trial court has extensive discretion in assessing 
bail if it so chooses). In Virginia, a defendant has right to bail when judgement is suspended 
on a misdemeanor charge. Ramey v. Commonwealth, 133 S.E. 755, 756 (Va. 1926); see also 
Cox v. State, 416 So. 2d 511, 512 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (noting that “[w]hether the 
conviction is misdemeanor or felony, no absolute constitutional right to post-conviction bail 
exists” and that it was within the trial court’s discretion to deny the defendant bail based on 
his having a pending felony charge against him); But see State v. Henley, 363 P.3d 319, 328 
(Haw. 2015) (noting that Hawaii maintains a right to bail even after the misdemeanant has 
been convicted); Ex parte Spanier, 258 P.2d 1072 (Cal Dist. Ct. App.1953) (holding that the 
defendant was not entitled to bail because he never appealed the misdemeanor conviction). 
296 See ARK. R. CRIM. P. 8.5 (2018); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2105 (2013) 
(“In determining whether the accused is likely to appear as required and that there will be no 
substantial risk to the safety of the community the court shall, on the basis of available 
information, take into consideration . . . the length of residence in the community…”);ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3967 (2015) (citing “length of residence in the community” as a factor 
to consider when deciding ROR or amount of bail); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 8.5 (2018) (citing “past 
and present residence,” and “strong ties to the community” as factors); FLA. STAT. § 903.046 
(2016) (considering the defendant’s “length of residence in the community”); FLA. STAT. § 
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state statutes require the court to consider the defendant’s residential status and 
financial status.297 Arkansas and Colorado require the court to consider the 
defendant’s “past and present residence” and “any other facts tending to indicate that 
the defendant has strong ties to the community and is not likely to flee the 
jurisdiction.”298 Other courts consider whether the defendant is employed and even 
whether the defendant owns a home or cell phone in considering release.299 In a 
                                               
907.041 (2017) (considering the defendant’s “length of residence in the community”); 725 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/110-5 (2018) (considering “prior residence” and “length of residence in 
the community” as factors); IND. CODE § 35-33-8-4(b) (2017) (citing “length and character 
of the defendant’s residence in the community” as factors); IOWA CODE § 811.2(2) (2013) 
(citing “length of the defendant’s residence in the community” as a factor); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 22-2802(8) (2013) (citing “length of residence in the community” as a factor); ME. STAT. 
tit. 15, § 1026(4) (2018) (citing “[t]he defendant’s length of residence in the community and 
the defendant’s community ties” as factors); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 58 (2018) (citing 
the “length of residence in the community” as a factor); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.02(Subd. 2) 
(2016) (citing the “length of residence in the community” as a factor); MS R RCRP Rule 
8.2(a) (2017) (noting that the “residence of the defendant, including consideration of real 
property ownership, and length of residence in the defendant’s domicile” are factors); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 544.455(2) (2013) (citing the “length of his residence in the community” as a 
factor); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-9-109(2) (2017) (citing the “length of residence in the 
community, community ties” as factors); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-901.01 (2017) (considering 
the “length of the defendant’s residence in the community”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.4853 
(1997) (citing “length of residence in the community” and “ties to the community” as 
factors); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30 (McKinney 2017) (citing the “length of his 
residence if any in the community” as a factor); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534(c) (2017) 
(considering the “length of his residence in the community”); see also N.D. R. CRIM. P. 
46(a)(3) (2006) (considering the “the length of the person’s residence in the community”); 
OHIO CRIM. R. 46(C) (2006) (considering the “length of residence in the community”); Pa. 
R. Crim. P. 523(A) (2016) (considering “the length and nature of the defendant’s residence 
in the community”); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-13-1.3 (1992) (considering “[t]ies to this 
community and to other communities.”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-15-30(A) (2015) (considering 
the “length of residence in the community”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-43-4 (2017) 
(considering the “length of the defendant’s residence in the community”); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 40-11-115(b) (1978) ( considering the “defendant’s length of residence in the 
community”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7554(b) (2017) (considering the “length of residence 
in the community”); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-120(E) (2015) (citing “length of residence in the 
community [and] community ties” as factors); WASH. REV. CODE § SUPER CT CR CrR 
3.2(c) (2017) (considering the “length of the accused’s residence in the community”); WYO. 
R. CRIM. P. 46.1(d) (2018) (considering the “length of residence in the community [and] 
community ties” as factors). 
297 ARK. CODE ANN. § 8.5(b)(i)-(ix) (2018). 
298 ARK. R. CRIM. P. 8.5(b) (2018); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-113(1)(d) (2013) (stating 
that the misdemeanor defendant must be ROR unless there the defendant has “no ties to the 
jurisdiction of the court reasonably sufficient to assure his or her appearance”). 
299 See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.4853 (1997) (“status and history of employment”); 
MS R RCRP Rule 8.2(a) (2017) (“consideration of real property ownership”). 
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recent California study, judges said that a factor that significantly impacted their 
decision to release a defendant is her community ties, specifically whether the 
defendant has family present in the courtroom, whether they appear to be a “good 
family”, and whether the defendant has kids or employment.300  These types of 
factors have gained even more importance with bail reform in several states. 
While we know that bail is often a balancing test in many jurisdictions,301 there 
is little data on how judges actually balance these factors and the primary reasons 
they choose to deny bail or, indeed, how they make pretrial decisions altogether. 
However, we do know that judges heavily consider dangerousness of the defendant 
and previous violent crime history in felony cases.302 In a study specific to felony 
defendants, California judges discussing ROR specifically named appearance in 
court as an important factor in the pretrial release consideration.303 It is unclear given 
the lack of research what factors are most important for misdemeanor judges. What 
it important however, is that there should not be factors or a balancing test involved 
in determining misdemeanor bail. The consideration of any factors—besides that a 
defendant is charged with a misdemeanor should not be relevant to release before 
trial—except for in emergency circumstances where the misdemeanor defendant 
poses an imminent threat. The next section addresses another problematic area in 
misdemeanor release. In many jurisdictions, bail schedules set money bail for 
misdemeanants, which limits release for many defendants who are safe to release 
nationwide.  
 
B.  Money Bail Schedules Prohibit Misdemeanor Defendants from Release 
 
Many courts throughout the country rely on money bail for misdemeanor 
defendants, rather than releasing them on their own recognizance—which should be 
the default approach. Bail amounts in misdemeanor cases vary vastly throughout the 
                                               
300 Ottone and Scott-Hayward, supra note 77, at 28. 
301 People v. Arnold, 132 Cal. Rptr. 922, 926 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1976) (further 
stating that a decision on such an “important individual interest [as the right to bail] should 
be accompanied by at least a brief statement of reasons explaining the basis for such 
decision.” (internal citations omitted)). One Texas court states that courts must conduct a 
“balancing test,” essentially weighing the interest of the government to keep the defendant 
detained against the personal liberty interest of the defendant. See ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 
Texas, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1143 (S.D. Tex. 2017). 
302 Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 37, at 545–46 (noting the factors judges consider 
when deciding to deny bail and also discussing the importance of criminal history); see also 
Ottone and Scott-Hayward, supra note 77, at 25–26. 
303 Ottone and Scott-Hayward, supra note 77, at 27. 
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states,304 and even by county.305 In setting bail amounts, some courts use “bail 
schedules.”306 A bail schedule is a scheme that lists—usually in graph form—the 
standardized money bail amount based on the offense charged and sometimes the 
defendant’s criminal history or other characteristics.307 Today, twenty states use bail 
schedules in misdemeanor cases.308 Some bail schedules are established by statutes 
                                               
304 See Bykov v. Rosen, 175 Wash. App. 1072, 2013 WL 4069513, at *1 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2013) (noting that the district court set bail at $25,000 for misdemeanor trespass); see 
also Ex Parte Melartin, 464 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. App. 2015) (stating that $500 bail is 
often set for a first-time DUI misdemeanor offense); Dept. of Liquor Control v. Calvert, 195 
Ohio App. 3d 627, 2011-Ohio-4735, 961 N.E.2d 247, at ¶2 (noting that bail was set for 
$1,250 for two misdemeanor charges: underage under the influence and disorderly conduct).  
305 Nevada is one such state where bail schedules widely vary by county. See Nevada 
Law Journal Staff, Statewide Rules of Criminal Procedure: A 50 State Review, 1 NEV. L. J. 
F. 1, 13 (2017). For instance, some list various offenses, New River Township Bail Schedule, 
CHURCHILL CTY. (Jan. 2013), http://www.churchillcounty.org/DocumentCenter/View/3022, 
and others address crimes by seriousness—gross misdemeanor versus misdemeanor, see 
Standard Bail Schedule, RURAL JUSTICE COURTS OF CLARK CTY. (May 2015), 
http://www.clarkcountynv.gov/justicecourt/boulder/Services/Documents/RURAL%20JUS
TICE%20COURTS%20-%20STANDARD%20BAIL%20SCHEDULE.pdf. 
306 For example, Utah’s former bail schedule can be found at 
https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/ucja/append/c_fineba/FineBail_Schedule.pdf; See 
also Uniform Bail Schedule (Felony and Misdemeanor), SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL. CTY. OF 
ORANGE (2018), https://www.occourts.org/directory/criminal/felonybailsched.pdf.; 
Misdemeanor Bail Schedule for the Harris County Criminal Courts at Law, HARRIS CTY. 
COURTS (2012), http://www.ccl.hctx.net/criminal/Misdemeanor%20Bail%20Schedule.pdf; 
HARRIS CTY. CRIMINAL COURTS AT LAW, RULES OF COURT 10, available at 
http://www.ccl.hctx.net/attorneys/rules/rules.pdf; HAWAI’I STATE BAR ASS’N, 2016 
CRIMINAL LAW FORUM REPORT 5 (2016), available at 
https://hsba.org/images/hsba/HSBA%20Special%20Events%20and%20Programs/Bench%
20Bar/Report%20of%20the%202016%20Criminal%20Law%20Forum%20(12-20-
16)%20ver5.pdf.   
307 BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 47; see also Lindsey Carlson, Bail Schedules: A 
Violation of Judicial Discretion?, 26 CRIM. JUST. 12, 13 (2011). 
308 Gross, supra note 279, at 857–59 (listing “Alabama, Alaska, California, Colorado, 
Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.”) Utah and California no 
longer rely on their bail schedules in most cases. See Paighten Harkins & Jessica Miller, 
Utah Courts quietly rolled out a new way to set a suspect’s bail based on one’s risk. Bail 
bondsmen are not pleased, SALT LAKE TRIB. (June 7, 2018), 
https://www.sltrib.com/news/2018/06/06/utah-courts-quietly-rolled-out-a-new-way-to-set-
a-suspects-bail-based-on-ones-risk-bail-bondsmen-are-not-pleased/; see also Robert 
Salonga & Alexei Koseff, Gov. Brown signs Bill Eliminating Money Bail in California, 
MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 29, 2018), https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/08/28/gov-brown-
signs-bill-eliminating-money-bail-in-california/. Mississippi also provides courts with 
monetary recommendations on bail. See MISS. R. CRIM. P. 8.2 (2017). In Florida, the 
Thirteenth District Judicial Circuit in Hillsborough has established bail schedule. Thirteenth 
Judicial Circuit Hillsborough Cty., Fla., Uniform Bail Bond Schedule Admin. Order S-2018-
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and others are implemented informally by local officials.309 Moreover, while some 
bail schedules are mandatory, others serve as mere recommendations to the court.310 
Some bail schedules consider factors relating to defendant like personal 
circumstances, flight risk, or ability to pay,311 and others are less flexible.312 
Honolulu’s misdemeanor bail schedule, for instance, includes whether this is a first 
offense or whether the individual is in the system already (pending felonies or 
probation/parole), whether the person is transient or used force or a weapon and the 
defendant’s candor.313  
Bail schedules are problematic for misdemeanor bail for a number of reasons. 
Bail schedules remove judicial discretion to determine bail.314 Even when bail 
schedules purportedly give judges flexibility, studies demonstrate that they are relied 
on extensively.315 Any efficiency that may come from bail schedules is outweighed 
by the injustice it imposes on poor defendants who often cannot pay the minimum 
                                               
022 (2018), http://www.fljud13.org/Portals/0/AO/DOCS/S-2018-022.pdf.  
309 Carlson, supra note 307, at 13. 
310 Id. In Alaska, only a bail schedule for misdemeanors exists; the state has declined 
to establish one for felonies. ALASKA R. CRIM. PRO. 41(e) (2018); see also Presiding Judge 
Administrative Order Establishing a Statewide Bail Schedule, ALASKA CT. SYS. (Dec. 2017) 
https://public.courts.alaska.gov/web/jord/docs/bail-schedule12-17.pdf (establishing a 
statewide bail schedule for misdemeanors). 
311 Harris County’s recent bail schedule includes some additional factors like nature of 
the offence and aggravating and mitigating factors, ability to pay , future safety of victim and 
community and employment history and prior criminal record of defendant. HARRIS CTY. 
CRIMINAL COURTS AT LAW, RULES OF COURT 10, available at 
http://www.ccl.hctx.net/attorneys/rules/rules.pdf. 
312 See NATAPOFF, supra note 148; see also In the Matter of a Uniform Bond Schedule 
for Maricopa County Limited Jurisdiction Courts, Admin. Order No. 2015-002, 3 (Super. Ct. 
Ariz. 2015), available at 
https://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/SuperiorCourt/AdministrativeOrders/AdminOrder
s/Admin%20Order%202015-002.pdf.  (setting a presumptive bail amount for defendants 
except when personal circumstances dictate otherwise). 
313 HAWAI’I STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE 2016 CRIMINAL LAW FORUM 5 (2016), 
available at 
https://hsba.org/images/hsba/HSBA%20Special%20Events%20and%20Programs/Bench%
20Bar/Report%20of%20the%202016%20Criminal%20Law%20Forum%20(12-20-
16)%20ver5.pdf. Note, however, that research indicates that it is extremely difficult for 
judges or police to determine whether a defendant is being truthful, without verifying. Paul 
Ekman et al., A Few Can Catch a Liar, 10 PSYCHOL. SCI. 263, 265 (1999) (“Our findings 
suggest that judgments that someone may be lying will have value only if they are made by 
certain professionals, and even then not all of these judgments will be accurate. Most of us 
would do well to entertain some skepticism about our ability to detect deception from 
demeanor.”). 
314 James A. Allen, “Making Bail”: Limiting the Use of Bail Schedules and Defining 
the Elusive Meaning of “Excessive” Bail, 25 J.L. & POL’Y 637, 656–58 (2017).  
315 Ottone and Scott-Hayward, supra note 77, at 25–26. 
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bail amount.316 Moreover, bail schemes are, in part, responsible for increasing 
pretrial detention—due to defendants’ inability to pay.317 Indeed, studies show that 
though bail is set, the majority of defendants granted bail are detained until trial 
because they cannot afford to make bail.318 
The U.S. Constitution prohibits excessive bail,319 as reasonable bail is the 
standard.320 “The touchstone for identifying excessive bail under the Eighth 
Amendment is . . . whether bail is set at “a figure higher than an amount reasonably 
calculated” to ensure that the defendant appear at trial.321 “Reasonableness” depends 
on the individual circumstances of a case.322 Thus, courts are provided significant 
discretion in deciding when bail is reasonable,323 and are allowed to consider a 
number of factors to determine whether bail is reasonable.  Where bail used to be 
reasonable when it was attainable for defendants—particularly for misdemeanor 
defendants who were released as a default—now courts consider factors used for 
felony defendants to determine  release.324 For example, judges commonly consider 
whether the defendant is likely to appear for court proceedings,325 the nature of the 
                                               
316 Allen, supra note 314, at 656–58. 
317 Id. at 655. 
318 Ottone and Scott-Hayward, supra note 77, at 36. 
319 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
320 Hobbs v. Reynolds, 289 S.W.3d 917, 920 (Ark. 2008). (“A criminal defendant has 
an absolute right before conviction, except in capital cases, to a reasonable bail.”). 
321 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1951). 
322 Turner v. Fitzsimmons, No. 102881, 2015 WL 3421474 at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 8th 
Dist. May 27, 2015); see also State v. Norcross, 546 P.2d 840, 841–42 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) 
(quoting Gusick v. Boies, 233 P.2d 446, 448 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1951)). 
323 See Balltrip v. People, 401 P.2d 259, 262 (Colo. 1965); see also A.Z. v. State, 248 
So.3d 27, 37 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017) (“[T]he amount of bail is discretionary, to be set by the 
court.”).  
324 Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 859 (“Though there was no specific absolute right to bail in misdemeanor cases, 
the general rule and practice was that those charged with anything other than a capital crime 
were released on bail . . . .”).  
325 See People v. Barbarick, 214 Cal. Rptr. 322, 324–26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (stating 
that the likelihood of the defendant appearing in further court proceedings was the principal 
consideration in setting bail); see also Mun. Court of Huntsville, Madison Cty. v. Casoli, 740 
S.W.2d 614, 616 (Ark. 1987); People v. Arnold, 132 Cal. Rptr. 922, 925 (Cal. App. Dep’t 
Super. Ct. 1976); In re Underwood, 508 P.2d 721, 723–24 (Cal. 1973) (“The purpose of bail 
is to assure the defendant’s attendance in court when his presence is required, whether before 
or after conviction. Bail is not a means for punishing defendants, nor for protecting the public 
safety . . . [D]etention of persons dangerous to themselves or others is not contemplated 
within [California’s] criminal bail system, and if it becomes necessary to detain such persons, 
authorization therefor must be found elsewhere, either in existing or future provisions of the 
law.” (internal citations omitted)).  
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crime,326 the seriousness of the crime,327 the defendant’s dangerousness,328 and the 
defendant’s criminal history.329 In Arizona, judges are empowered to consider a 
defendant’s “character and reputation” in deciding the amount of bail.330 Courts have 
indicated that decisions regarding bail amounts are valid except where it is “clear” 
that it is excessive.331 It is important to note that courts have not equated “excessive” 
with “unaffordable”: bail may be reasonable even when the defendant does not have 
the means to pay it.332 As a result, bail for even simple crimes like assault can be 
several thousand dollars and still be lawful.333 Indeed, reasonable bail under the 
Constitution for misdemeanor offenses looks just like the calculus for serious felony 
offenses. It is rarely challenged, and even when challenged, the court has discretion 
to set high bail for many reasons.334 
Bail amounts ranging from $1,000 to $20,000 have regularly been set for 
misdemeanor crimes across the country. Under Mississippi’s bail statute, for 
instance, the recommended bail amounts for misdemeanor offenses are progressive: 
the more serious the misdemeanor, the higher the range of bail the court may set.335 
For a misdemeanor punishable by a year in jail, the court has the discretion to set 
                                               
326 See State v. Norcross, 546 P.2d 840, 841–42 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (quoting Gusick 
v. Boies, 233 P.2d 446, 448 (Ariz. 1951)). 
327 People v. Arnold, 132 Cal. Rptr. 922, 925 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1976).   
328 See ALASKA STAT. § 12.30.011(b)(2) (2018); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-
113(1) (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597:2(II) (2016) (stating that pending a trial, the 
court can either ROR, set bail, or temporarily detain the defendant, dependent upon a number 
of factors, including whether the defendant “will endanger the safety of the person or of any 
other person or the community” upon release). 
329 People v. Arnold, 132 Cal. Rptr. 922, 925 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1976); see 
also State v. Norcross, 546 P.2d 840, 841–42 (Ariz. 1976) (quoting Gusick v. Boies, 233 P.2d 
446, 448 (Ariz. 1951)). 
330 State v. Norcross, 546 P.2d 840, 841–42 (Ariz. 1976) (quoting Gusick v. Boies, 233 
P.2d 446, 448 (Ariz. 1951)). 
331 State v. Norcross, 546 P.2d 840, 841–42 (Ariz. 1976) (quoting Gusick v. Boies, 233 
P.2d 446, 448 (Ariz. 1951)); see also Balltrip v. People, 401 P.2d 259, 262 (Colo. 1965). 
332 Brangan v. Commonwealth, 80 N.E.3d 949, 959 (Mass. 2017). 
333 See Clarke v. State, 491 S.E.2d 450, 451 (Ga. 1997) (discussing how a defendant 
charged with battery was assessed bail in the amount of $2,500). 
334 For example, in Turner v. Fitzsimmons, an Ohio case, the defendant was charged 
with six misdemeanor offenses and his bail was set at $5,000 for each count in the total 
amount of $30,000. Turner v. Fitzsimmons, No. 102881, 2015 WL 3421474 at *1 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 8th Dist. May 27, 2015). The defendant moved to reduce bail, but the trial court refused 
to do so because of the defendant’s extensive criminal history and the danger that he might 
flee once released. Id. On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision determining 
that while excessive bail is prohibited what is reasonable rests on the individual 
circumstances of the case. Id. at *2. Here, considering the defendant’s extensive criminal 
history, the nature of those crimes (weapon offenses, drug charges, theft), and the defendant’s 
likely propensity to flee, the trial court was within its discretion to assess bail at $5,000 per 
count. Id. 
335 MISS. R. CRIM. P. 8.2(c) (2017). 
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bail from the minimum of $500 to $2,000.336 For misdemeanors punishable by a 
maximum of six months jailtime, bail may be as low as $250 and as high as 
$1,000.337 Other states that have counties either requiring or suggesting 
misdemeanor bail as high as bail for some felony charges include  Alabama,338 
California,339 Illinois,340 Utah,341 and Colorado.342 As mentioned, this contradicts 
hundreds of years of common law bail history throughout which pretrial release for 
felonies was intentionally approached very differently than release for 
misdemeanors.343 For instance, in Alabama the misdemeanor bail is higher than 
felony bail in some instances.344 In Los Angeles and Orange County,345 for instance, 
                                               
336 Id. 
337 Id. 
338 ALA. R. CRIM. P. 7.2(b) (2017).   
339 California has some of the highest bail schedules in the nation—if not the highest. 
Each county has its own bail schedule and it is not uncommon for the recommended bail to 
be as high as $10,000 for a misdemeanor. See Bail Schedule for Infractions and 
Misdemeanors, SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL. CTY. OF L.A. (2018), 
https://www.lacourt.org/division/criminal/pdf/misd.pdf; see also Uniform Bail Schedule 
(Felony and Misdemeanor), SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL. CTY. OF ORANGE 3–10, 16 (2018), 
https://www.occourts.org/directory/criminal/felonybailsched.pdf.    
340 Special Order S06-13: Bond Procedures, CHI. POLICE DEP’T (Aug. 14, 2018), 
http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12a9fb0e-d1912-aa0c-
91c4eb0600275ea8.html (noting that for a Class A or B misdemeanor, bail is $1,500 and for 
a Class C misdemeanor, $1,200). 
341 Uniform Fine/Bail Forfeiture Schedule, UTAH CTS. (May 9, 2018), 
https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/ucja/append/c_fineba/FineBail_Schedule.pdf; see 
also Changes to the 2018 State of Utah Uniform Fine/Bail Forfeiture Schedule, UTAH CTS. 
(2018), https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/ucja/append/c_fineba/FineBail_Schedule-
Changes.pdf. 
342 See Chief Judge Order Regarding Eighteenth Judicial District Bond Schedule, 
COLO. CTS. (Apr. 7, 2015), 
https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/file/Court_Probation/18th_Judicial_District/18th_C
ourts/Arapahoe/CJO%2015-4%20Bond%20Schedule%20(Final%204-7-15).pdf 
(suggesting that on Class 1 Misdemeanor charges bail should be set to $5,000—as high as 
the recommended bail for a Class 6 and Class 5 felony charge). 
343 See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
344 ALA. R. CRIM. P. 7.2(b) (2017). In Alabama, the suggested bail for Class A 
Misdemeanors is $300 to $6,000. For certain felonies, the bail recommendation is as low as 
$1,000. Id. 
345 See Uniform Bail Schedule (Felony and Misdemeanor), SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL. 
CTY. OF ORANGE 3–10, 16 (2018), 
https://www.occourts.org/directory/criminal/felonybailsched.pdf. In Orange County the bail 
schedule lists significantly large bail amounts for felonies; however, bail for certain 
misdemeanors is listed as high as $15,000. For unlisted misdemeanors, bail is $500. Id. at 
16. In Riverside County, California, bail for misdemeanors punishable by roughly over nine 
months or a year is $5,000. Felony and Misdemeanor Bail Schedule, SUPERIOR COURT OF 
CAL. CTY. OF RIVERSIDE 13 (2018), 
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a significant portion of the misdemeanors listed, bail is $20,000, or even $25,000, 
and for many popular misdemeanors $1,000.346 
Whether the defendant’s ability to pay bail comes into play depends on the 
state. Twenty-six states have established by statute that courts should consider 
defendant’s ability to pay bail as a factor in setting bail.347 For example, in Vermont 
whether the defendant can pay is not alone controlling, but is among the factors 
courts may consider when setting bail.348  Illinois’s statute states that “[t]he amount 
                                               
https://www.riverside.courts.ca.gov/bailschedule.pdf?rev=2018. 
346 Bail Schedule for Infractions and Misdemeanors, SUPERIOR COURT OF CAL. CTY. OF 
L.A. (2018), https://www.lacourt.org/division/criminal/pdf/misd.pdf. Because of recent bail 
reform legislation passed in California, these schedules will not be in effect for much longer. 
In August 2018, California Governor Jerry Brown signed Senate Bill 10, which will go into 
effect in October 2019. Robert Salonga & Alexei Koseff, Gov. Brown signs Bill Eliminating 
Money Bail in California, MERCURY NEWS (Aug. 29, 2018), 
https://www.mercurynews.com/2018/08/28/gov-brown-signs-bill-eliminating-money-bail-
in-california/. 
347 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3967(B)(7) (2015); see also ARK. R. CRIM. P. 
8.5(b)(i) (2018); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 2105(b) (2019); FLA. STAT. § 903.046(2)(c) 
(2016); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/110-5(a) (2018); IND. CODE § 35-33-8-4(b)(2) (2017); IOWA 
CODE § 811.2(2) (2013); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2802(8) (2018); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. 
ANN. art. 316(4) (2017); ME. STAT. tit. 15, § 1026(4)(C)(4) (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 
276, § 58 (2018); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 6.02(2)(Subd. 2)(e) (2018); MISS. R. CRIM. P. 8.2(a)(13) 
(2017); MO. REV. STAT. § 544.455(2) (2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-9-109(2)(b)(i) (2017); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-901.01 (2017); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(2)(a)(ii) (McKinney 
2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-534(c) (2017); N.D. R. CRIM. P. Rule 46(a)(3)(C) (2018); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 2937.222(C)(3)(a) (West 2002); 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-13-
1.3(c)(10) (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-15-30(A)(3) (2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-
43-4 (2017); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-11-115(b)(2) (1978); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 
17.15(4) (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7554(b)(1) (2017); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-
120(E)(2) (2018); W. VA. CODE § 62-1C-3 (1965); WYO. R. CRIM. P. § 46.1(d)(3)(A) (2018); 
Brangan v. Commonwealth, 80 N.E.3d 949, 954 (Mass. 2017) (stating that the court “must 
consider a defendant's financial resources, but is not required to set bail in an amount the 
defendant can afford if other relevant considerations weigh more heavily than the 
defendant’s ability to provide the necessary security for his appearance at trial.”); State v. 
Norcross, 546 P.2d 840, 841–42 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) (“[T]he court should consider . . . the 
ability of the accused to give bail, which includes his own pecuniary condition as well as the 
possession of friends able and willing to give bail for him.” (quoting Gusick v. Boies, 233 
P.2d 446, 448 (Ariz. 1951))); State v. Jackson, 384 S.W.3d 208, 216–17 (Mo. 2012) (“The 
trial judge is required . . . to consider defendant’s financial resources in setting bail as well 
as other relevant conditions . . . ”). 
348 W. VA. CODE § 62-1C-3 (1965) (listing “financial ability” as a factor that courts 
should consider in its pretrial release decision); see also State v. Pratt, 2017 VT 9, ¶ 16, 204 
Vt. 282, 291–92, 166 A.3d 600, 606 (2017) (“Although ‘financial resources’ may not be 
identical to ‘ability to pay,’ the two concepts are related; a defendant’s financial resources 
may affect the defendant's ability to post bail at a particular level and is among the factors a 
court should consider in setting bail. But nothing in the statute suggests that financial 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3358662 
66 DIVIDING BAIL REFORM (FORTHCOMING IOWA LAW REVIEW)  
   
 
of bail shall be … [n]ot oppressive … [and] [c]onsiderate of the financial ability of 
the accused.”349 Under Hawaii law, bail “should be so determined as to not suffer 
the wealthy to escape by the payment of a pecuniary penalty, nor to render the 
privilege useless to the poor[,]” but Hawaiian courts still need only include the 
defendant’s ability to pay in deciding the amount of bail. 350 In Arizona, in 
considering whether the defendant can pay bail, the court may look to the 
defendant’s own finances as well as whether she has friends willing to pay bail for 
her.351 And in Chicago, a defendant who cannot post bail can be released without 
posting bail if they meet a series of conditions.352  
Misdemeanor bail amounts of up to $50,000 have been found reasonable and 
$2,000 unreasonable, and courts have allowed increases in bail amounts to give 
attorneys more time to prepare—without any regard to the defendant’s case. In State 
v. Huss, an Iowa case, the court found a $50,000 bail was not unconstitutional even 
though it was twenty-five times the scheduled amount for the misdemeanor offense 
of aggravated drunk driving.353  The court held that the abnormally high bail amount 
was justified considering the defendant’s criminal history (which included multiple 
felonies).354 In contrast, the Hawaii court in State v. Henley, found that a trial court 
abused its discretion in increasing a defendant’s bail from $200 to $2,000 on appeal 
because the facts did not support the trial court’s belief that the defendant was a 
flight risk.355 The primary reason the trial court gave in raising the defendant’s bail 
was that he was a flight risk because he had only recently moved to the area and, at 
                                               
resources was intended to be the controlling factor rather than one of several factors that 
guide the trial court’s evaluation of the least restrictive means of ensuring a defendant’s 
appearance.” (citing 13 V.S.A. § 7554(b))). 
349 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/110-5(b)(2)–(3) (West 2018). 
350 State v. Henley, 363 P.3d 319, 328 (Haw. 2015) (quoting HAW. REV. STAT. §804-9 
(2014)). 
351 State v. Norcross, 546 P.2d 840, 841–42 (Ariz. 1976) (quoting Gusick v. Boies, 233 
P.2d 446, 448 (Ariz. 1951)). 
352 Special Order S06-13: Bond Procedures, CHI. POLICE DEP’T V (Aug. 14, 2018), 
http://directives.chicagopolice.org/directives/data/a7a57be2-12a9fb0e-d1912-aa0c-
91c4eb0600275ea8.html. An arrestee cannot be released on an individual bond if (1) the 
individual cannot be identified, (2) the individual is unwilling to be fingerprinted; (3) the 
misdemeanor involves the unlawful use of weapons; (4) the individual is arrested on a 
warrant; (5) the individual “has sufficient cash or an approved credit/debit card to post” 10 
percent or the full amount of the bond; (6) the individual is a “verified gang member” charged 
with a jailable offense; (7) the individual is a parolee; (8) the misdemeanor involves the abuse 
of an animal still in possession of its owner; or (9) the individual has violated the conditions 
of bail bond.  
353 State v. Huss, No. 09-0574, 2010 WL 200043 at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2010). 
354 State v. Huss, No. 09-0574, 2010 WL 200043 at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2010). 
The court was also concerned about defendant’s mental illness and how that contributed to 
the crimes. Id. at *2. 
355 State v. Henley, 363 P.3d 319, 328–30 (Haw. 2015). 
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$200, the defendant’s father could pay bail.356 The Supreme Court of Hawaii found 
this determination of flight risk insufficient, and remanded the case.357 Sometimes 
bail is fixed based on reasons that have nothing to do with the defendant or the charge 
against him. In an Alaska case, for instance, the defendant’s bail was increased from 
$500 to $1000 simply because the attorneys on the case needed more time to “further 
prepare in light of the latest developments.”358   
Several courts have recently deemed money bail unconstitutional if defendants 
cannot afford it. In Chicago, one court issued an order requiring judges to set bail at 
an amount that defendants can afford if they are not a danger to the community.359 
In San Francisco, the Office of the Treasurer published a report criticizing the cash 
bail system and recommended that it be abandoned.360 According to the report, even 
though misdemeanor defendants were released more often in San Francisco than 
other counties, eighty-five percent of the county’s “jail population is pretrial.”361 
Among those, only 40 to 50 percent are eligible for release on bail.362 But the 
“median nonrefundable bail fee needed for release is $5,000” and a 2016 Federal 
Reserve survey shows that forty-six percent of Americans “do not have emergency” 
savings and could not pay such a fee.363 Additionally, the report showed that people 
of color are disproportionately impacted by bail and their bails are set higher than 
white defendants.364 The cost of detaining individuals per day on average is 
                                               
356 Id. at 329. 
357 Id. at 329–30. 
358 Ashepak v. State, No. 6828, 1983 WL 807944, at *1 (Alaska Ct. App. Nov. 23, 
1983). 
359 Cir. Ct. of Cook Cty., Gen. Order No. 18.8A (“[It] is intended to ensure no defendant 
is held in custody prior to trial solely because the defendant cannot afford to post bail, to 
ensure fairness and the elimination of unjustifiable delay in the administration of justice, to 
facilitate the just determination of every criminal proceeding, and to preserve the public 
welfare and secure the fundamental human rights of individuals with interests in criminal 
court cases . . .”); Press Release, Cir. Ct. of Cook Cty., Evans changes cash-bail process for 
more pretrial release (July 17, 2017), 
http://www.cookcountycourt.org/MEDIA/ViewPressRelease/tabid/338/ArticleId/2561/Eva
ns-changes-cash-bail-process-for-more-pretrial-release.aspx. 
360 CHRISTA BROWN, OFF. OF THE TREASURER & TAX COLLECTOR OF THE CITY & 
COUNTY OF S.F., FIN. JUST. PROJECT, DO THE MATH: MONEY BAIL DOESN’T ADD UP FOR 
SAN FRANCISCO (June 2017), available at 
https://sftreasurer.org/sites/default/files/2017.6.27%20Bail%20Report%20FINAL_2.pdf. 
This report criticizes the bail system because it creates a “two-tiered system of justice” where 
people with wealth “may purchase their freedom . . . while those with no resources must wait 
in jail until their trial.” Id. The report also detailed the abuses of the commercial bond system 
and the waste of money. San Francisco spent $3.2 million jailing people whose cases were 
dismissed or never filed. Id.  
361 BROWN, supra note 360.  
362 Id. 
363 Id. 
364 Id. 
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significantly more ($74.61) than supervising them on release, ($7.17) per day.365 
Based on these defects, San Francisco recommended moving away from money bail 
to a risk based system.366 Others have recently moved away from cash bail for 
misdemeanors. In 2018, the Manhattan District Attorney made a policy to not 
request money bail for nonviolent misdemeanors.367 District Attorneys in Brooklyn, 
Westchester, and Philadelphia have made similar policies.368 
Recently some jurisdictions have moved away from money bail by prohibiting 
this practice or by at least eliminating cash-only court systems. Courts in Ohio, 
Minnesota, Tennessee, Montana, Wyoming and other states have relied on “cash-
only” courts—meaning that the only method of release in those courts is full cash 
payment by defendant all at once in order to obtain release.369 Recently, with bail 
reform efforts, a few courts have deemed this practice unconstitutional but many 
courts still persist with a cash-only bail system.370 Cash only bail subjects defendants 
                                               
365 Bail in America: Unsafe, unfair, ineffective, PRETRIAL JUST. INST., 
http://www.ma4jr.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Bail-in-America.pdf (last visited Dec. 
2018).  
366 BROWN, supra note 360.  
367 Anna Maria Barry-Jester, You’ve Been Arrested. Will You Get Bail? Can You Pay 
It? It May All Depend On Your Judge, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (June 19, 2018), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/youve-been-arrested-will-you-get-bail-can-you-pay-it-
it-may-all-depend-on-your-judge/. 
368 ANDREA Ó SÚILLEABHÁIN & COLLEEN KRISTICH, PARTNERSHIP FOR THE PUB. 
GOOD, CRUELTY AND COST: MONEY BAIL IN BUFFALO 20 (2018), available at 
https://ppgbuffalo.org/files/documents/criminal-
justice/cruelty_and_cost_money_bail_in_buffalo.pdf. 
369 It is difficult for a defendant to obtain that much cash at one time. State v. Rodriguez, 
192 Mont. 411, 418, 628 P.2d 280, 284 (Mont. 1981) (noting that “rarely can a defendant 
obtain the cash” when there is a cash bond requirement). 
370 See State v. Hance, 2006 VT 97, ¶17, 180 Vt. 357, 364, 910 A.2d 874, 880 (2006) 
(“To construe the ‘sufficient sureties’ clause as permitting cash-only bail would increase 
government power to engage in pretrial confinement, a result which cannot be reconciled 
with the history of the ‘sufficient sureties’ clause or our own cases discussing bail, in which 
we have recognized the threat to individual liberty inherent in pretrial detention.”); see also 
State v. Brooks, 604 N.W.2d 345, 352–54 (Minn. 2000), as modified (Mar. 15, 2000) 
(holding that cash-only bail violates the Minnesota constitution and a district court cannot 
restrict the form of surety to cash, or real property, or any other specific kind of acceptable 
surety without nullifying the right); Smith v. Leis, 106 Ohio St. 3d 309, 2005-Ohio-5125, 
835 N.E.2d 5, at ¶ 83 (holding that cash-only bail violates the Ohio constitution); Lewis Bail 
Bond Co. v. Gen. Sessions Court of Madison Cty., No. C-97-62, 1997 WL 711137 at *5 
(Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1997) (holding that cash-only bail violates the Tennessee 
constitution). But see Saunders v. Hornecker, 2015 WY 34, ¶ 35, 344 P.3d 771, 781 (2015) 
(“In sum, we hold that the term ‘sufficient sureties’ refers to a broad range of methods . . . 
[which] include cash-only bail, as determined in the discretion of the trial court and subject 
to the constitutional safeguard that bail not be excessive.”); State v. Rodriguez, 192 Mont. 
411, 418, 628 P.2d 280, 284 (1981) (holding that cash-only bail may not be imposed unless 
specific factors are satisfied). But see Ex parte Singleton, 902 So. 2d 132, 135 (Ala. Crim. 
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to de facto pretrial detention since a defendant who cannot pay a large amount of 
bail at once is detained.371 California has made broad statewide bail reforms by 
passing Senate Bill 10 in 2018.372 Senate Bill 10 signed in August 2018 eliminates 
money bail in California in favor of risk assessments of defendants and nonmonetary 
release.373 Unfortunately, this bill, while noteworthy for eliminating money bail has 
other problems due to the risk assessment replacing it that will be discussed in the 
next section.   
Requiring money bail, particularly using bail schedules, is not only bad policy 
for misdemeanors but violates constitutional and historic practice. Money bail that 
prohibits release violates rights of due process and the presumption of innocence 
that guarantee a misdemeanor defendant bail.374 Not only that, but money bail has 
been found by several courts to violate the due process and equal protection clauses 
of the Fourteenth Amendment as well.375 For a defendant to be prohibited from 
release before trial simply because they cannot afford to pay their bail amount 
violates their constitutional right to an individualized hearing and the right to be 
treated the same as wealthier peers.376 Misdemeanor bail amounts have reached the 
                                               
App. 2004) (“Based on the wording of the Alabama Constitution of 1901, our statutes, and 
our rules we cannot say that Art. I, § 16, Ala. Const.1901, prohibits a judge from setting a 
‘cash only’ pretrial bail.”); Fragoso v. Fell, 111 P.3d 1027, 1031 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) 
(holding that Arizona law does not prohibit cash-only bail); State v. Briggs, 666 N.W.2d 573, 
584 (Iowa 2003) (holding that Iowa law does not bar cash-only bail); State v. Jackson, 384 
S.W.3d 208, 217 (Mo. 2012) (“Considering these purposes and the history of bail as well as 
the numerous understandings of the word ‘sufficient surety,’ imposing cash-only bail does 
not violate . . . the Missouri Constitution.”).  
371 State v. Hance, 2006 VT 97, ¶¶ 1–17, 180 Vt. 357, 358–64, 910 A.2d 874, 876–81 
(2006) (discussing the historical development of bail: “This history demonstrates that ‘[b]ail 
acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the defendant’s interest in pretrial 
liberty and society’s interest in ensuring the defendant’s presence at trial.’”). The argument 
for cash-only bail is that the purpose of bail is to ensure the defendant appears for court dates, 
and trial courts must be equipped with myriad means to do this, including imposing cash-
only bail. Saunders v. Hornecker, 344 P.3d 771, 780–81 (2015). 
372 Salonga & Koseff, supra note 346. 
373 Id. 
374 See Baradaran, Presumption of Innocence, supra note 8, at 776; see also Baughman, 
History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note 8, at 845–46; Baradaran, Presumption of 
Punishment, supra note 221, at 401–02. 
375 BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 169–73 (discussing Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053 
(5th Cir. 1978); Pierce v. City of Velda City, No. 4-15-CV-570-HEA, 2015 WL 10013006 
(E.D. Mo. June 3, 2015); Cooper v. City of Dothan, No. 1:15-CV-425-WKW, 2015 WL 
10013003 (M.D. Ala. June 18, 2015); Rodriguez v. Providence Community Corrections, 
Inc., 191 F. Supp. 3d 758 (M.D. Tenn. 2016); Walker v. City of Calhoun, Georgia, No. 4:15-
CV-0170-HLM, 2016 WL 361612, at *14 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016); State v. Blake, 642 So. 
2d 959 (Ala. 1994)).  
376 See, e.g., ODonnell v. Harris Cty., Texas, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1133–34 (S.D. Tex. 
2017), aff’d as modified, 882 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2018), and aff’d as modified sub nom. 
ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018) (plaintiffs arguing that individuals 
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level of felony crimes in too many situations. And defendants are forced to remain 
behind bars because they cannot afford to pay even small amounts of bail. Most 
misdemeanor cases are dismissed so the cost of detaining so many defendants is also 
not worth any gain to the public. Overwhelmingly, misdemeanor defendants are safe 
to release before trial and do not ever need to be subject to money bail.  
The next section discusses the problem that risk assessments pose in bail reform 
movements nationwide, and how they often contribute to the felony-centric nature 
of misdemeanor bail. 
 
C.  The Danger of Risk Assessments 
 
Jurisdictions across the country are becoming inundated with pretrial risk 
assessments as the preferred tool for the third wave of national bail reform.377 Many 
states have adopted risk assessments with an eye towards improving pretrial 
detention rates, mitigating the fiscal impact of  bail and encouraging better outcomes 
for pretrial defendants.378 Risk assessments are lauded by some as a breakthrough in 
pretrial release,379 but as with any decision mechanism, the details are important. 
There have been a few important criticisms of risk assessments.380 Scholars criticize 
                                               
arrested for misdemeanor offenses who were unable to pay their bail spent a longer time 
detained than those who were able to pay, violating DPC and EPC rights); Pugh v. Rainwater, 
572 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1978); Pierce v. City of Velda City, No. 4-15-CV-570-HEA, 2015 
WL 10013006 (E.D. Mo. June 3, 2015); Cooper v. City of Dothan, No. 1:15-CV-425-WKW, 
2015 WL 10013003 (M.D. Ala. June 18, 2015); Rodriguez v. Providence Community 
Corrections, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 3d 758 (M.D. Tenn. 2016); Walker v. City of Calhoun, 
Georgia, 2016 WL 361612, at *14 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 28, 2016); State v. Blake, 642 So. 2d 959 
(Ala. 1994). 
377 BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 44–45 (documenting the third wave of bail reform); 
Sonja B. Starr, The Risk Assessment Era: An Overdue Debate, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 205, 
205 (2015) (describing an “era” of risk assessments due to their pervasiveness nationally). 
378 PRETRIAL JUST. INST., THE STATE OF PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 15 (2017), 
available at https://university.pretrial.org/viewdocument/state-of-pretrial-justice-in-americ 
(last accessed Jan. 2, 2019). 
379 Gouldin, supra note 220, at 841 (noting that risk assessment tools “promise to 
improve judges’ pretrial calculations of the likelihood that a released defendant will either 
failure to appear for trial . . . or commit other crimes”); Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk 
Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV. 304, 305 (2018) (“Proponents of risk 
assessment argue that by replacing the subjective, error-prone, and ad-hoc assessments of 
judges with scientifically validated prediction tools it is possible to dramatically reduce 
incarceration rates without affecting public safety.”). 
380 See Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 495–96, 562 
(2018) (discussing the potential for pretrial risk assessment tools to “exacerbate race and 
class inequalities”); see also Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. ___, ___ 
(forthcoming 2019) [hereinafter Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out] (discussing the inherent 
problems with attempting to predict future crime and noting that some kinds of risk may be 
beyond the ability of risk assessment tools to measure without racial distortion); Megan 
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risk assessments for exacerbating racial bias,381 depending inappropriately on 
family, socioeconomic, and neighborhood variables,382 and for failing to increase 
pretrial release rates.383 These are all important criticisms that should be addressed. 
However, there is another critical but unidentified problem with most risk 
assessments. Risk assessments do not distinguish between felony and misdemeanor 
charges. Most risk assessments, including, for instance, the leading Arnold 
foundation pretrial risk assessment tool, provides the same increased risk for a prior 
felony or misdemeanor conviction.384 Due to this major oversight, many 
misdemeanor defendants can be categorized as high risk and detained for a pretrial 
misdemeanor crime—in violation of the clear historic right to misdemeanor release. 
This section provides several examples of this particular problem in prominent risk 
assessment instruments, and concludes that states should shift their focus to a goal 
of a less than 10% release rate, rather than relying exclusively on a risk assessment 
in bail reform. 
Risk assessments are used to determine the risk posed by an individual 
defendant and the likelihood that she will pose a danger of harm, commit a new 
offense, or fail to appear in court.385 Many states and counties are implementing risk 
assessment tools to set bail. Risk assessment tools are “informed by data analyses of 
millions of criminal cases” and aim to provide judges with objective information to 
assess the relative risk of a defendant to make pretrial release decisions.386 The 
leading risk assessment tool is the Public Safety Assessment (PSA), designed by the 
Arnold Foundation.387 The PSA determines a risk score by considering “whether the 
                                               
Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV. 303, 304–10 (2018) 
(stating that risk assessment is not a “magic bullet that will increase the number of people 
released pretrial with no concomitant costs in terms of the crime or appearance rate.”); Sonja 
B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 
STAN. L. REV. 803, 806 (2014) (arguing that tools dependent on “demographic, 
socioeconomic, family, and neighborhood variables” are imprudent and inaccurate). 
381 Mayson, supra note 380, at 495–96. 
382 Starr, supra note 380, at 806. 
383 See Stevenson, supra note 380, at 304 (discussing failures in pretrial release numbers 
despite risk assessments). 
384 Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors and Formula, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD 
FOUND. 3 (2016), https://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/PSA-Risk-
Factors-and-Formula.pdf. While I have not done a comprehensive review of all state risk 
assessments, I have examined most of the leading ones and they do not distinguish between 
felony and misdemeanor convictions or charges. 
385 Amber Widgery, Guidance for Setting Release Conditions, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATURES (May 13, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-
justice/guidance-for-setting-release-conditions.aspx.  
386 CHRISTINE BLUMAUER ET AL., PRETRIAL JUST. INST., ADVANCING BAIL REFORM IN 
MARYLAND: PROGRESS AND POSSIBILITIES 23 (2018), available at 
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?Documen
tFileKey=6286908b-8228-0970-9c72-e9ee52f91c9b&forceDialog=0. 
387 See supra note 384 (As of February 2018, “[t]hirty-eight jurisdictions, including the 
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current offense is violent; whether the person has a prior misdemeanor or felony 
charge; the person’s age at the time of the arrest; and how many times the person 
failed to appear at a pretrial hearing in the last two years.”388 The PSA gives a 
defendant the same additional increased risk score for a prior felony conviction or a 
misdemeanor conviction.389 It also gives the same score for a previous violent felony 
or misdemeanor.390 The PSA fails to distinguish between misdemeanors and felonies 
at all, even though felonies are much more serious.391 The use of the PSA in these 
states highlights some of the benefits and problems associated with pretrial risk 
assessments, including the lack of differentiation between misdemeanors and 
felonies. Some states that do not use the PSA also face similar challenges.392  
Kentucky—one of the first states to institute a risk assessment based pretrial 
release system393—has legislation that aims to be aggressive in releasing individuals 
and reducing the number of individuals in custody, but unfortunately falls short. The 
Kentucky bill establishes an empirical research-based approach to pretrial risk 
assessment,394 and requires state-funded supervision and intervention to slowly 
adopt evidence-based approaches.395 It specifies that non-financial release is 
                                               
states of Arizona, Kentucky and New Jersey, and large cities such as Charlotte, Chicago and 
Houston” used the PSA). 
388 Id. As discussed below, Utah adopted the Arnold Foundation’s PSA in May 2018. 
Utah Public Safety Assessment Frequently Asked Questions, UTAH CTS. (June 8, 2018), 
https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/reports/psa/faq.html.  
389 Public Safety Assessment, supra note 384, at 3. 
390 Id. 
391 For further discussion of this issue, see supra note 29.  
392 BLUMAUER ET AL., supra note 386, at 23. For example, in Maryland, six of twenty-
four counties “use risk assessment tools, but only two . . . use a tool that has been empirically 
validated.” Id. Even the four counties however who use validated tools, classify over 27 
misdemeanors as high and medium risk offense categories. Angela Roberts & Nora Eckert, 
As Maryland courts meld artificial intelligence into bail decisions, concerns follow, CAPITAL 
NEWS SERV. (Dec. 21, 2018), https://cnsmaryland.org/interactives/spring-2018/plea-
bargain/pretrial-riskscore.html; see, e.g., St. Mary’s County Pre-Trial Release Risk 
Assessment, CAPITAL NEWS SERV., 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/5662874/SMC-Pretrial-Worksheet.pdf (last 
accessed Jan. 2, 2019) (classifying over 27 misdemeanors as high and medium risk offense 
categories). In essence, these tools are guaranteeing that many misdemeanor defendants who 
should have the right to release will be detained before trial. 
393 Kentucky and Virginia have both used algorithmic risk assessment tools in criminal 
justice decision-making for decades. MEGAN T. STEVENSON & JENNIFER L. DOLEAC, AM. 
CONST. SOC’Y, THE ROADBLOCK TO REFORM 5 (2018), available at 
https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/RoadblockToReformReport.pdf. 
394 Fifteen other states use similar data-driven approaches. Amber Widgery, Guidance 
for Setting Release Conditions, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (May 13, 2015), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/guidance-for-setting-release-
conditions.aspx.  
395 MARK HEYERLY, KY. PRETRIAL SERVICES, PRETRIAL REFORM IN KENTUCKY 13 
(2013), available at https://www.acluga.org/sites/default/files/pretrial-reform-in-kentucky-
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“presumptive” for low and moderate risk defendants and indicates that financial 
release should be the exception if the defendant is a flight risk or danger to the 
community.396 The risk assessment algorithm is only a tool, however, and final 
decisions are left up to judges.397 If Kentucky judges had followed the risk 
assessment recommendations in all cases, the pretrial release rate for low and 
moderate risk defendants would have increased by 37% since 2011.398 Data shows 
that Kentucky judges do not always follow these recommendations. The actual 
pretrial release rate for low and moderate risk defendants increased by only 4% over 
this time period.399 Similarly, in Virginia, the pretrial risk assessment tool aims to 
identify the 25% lowest-risk non-violent offenders and divert them from prison or 
jail.400 The median judge in Virginia diverts only 40% of defendants who are 
recommended for diversion by the risk assessment algorithm.401 In short, data from 
Kentucky and Virginia shows that pretrial risk assessment tools “had little to no 
impact on incarceration rates” because there is great variation in the way judges use 
them.402 And unfortunately, California’s new proposed risk instrument is largely 
borrowed from the Kentucky/PSA model.403 
Even when Kentucky judges follow the risk assessment recommendation, 
however, the release decisions for misdemeanor defendants can be unfair and 
unnecessarily harsh when compared to felony defendants. For example, under 
Kentucky’s PSA and with all other factors being the same, a defendant with a prior 
conviction of misdemeanor battery involving a push and another defendant with a 
felony conviction for an attack with a knife would receive the same PSA score.404 
                                               
kentucky-pretrial-services-2013.pdf; see also H.R. 463, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2011).   
396 Id. The bill also empowers the court to credit as much as $100 for each day the 
defendant serves in jail before trial, including up to the full amount of bail. Id. at 14. 
397 STEVENSON & DOLEAC, supra note 393, at 5. 
398 Id. 
399 Id. But see Uniform Crime Report January–September 2017, N.J. ST. POLICE (Oct. 
13, 2017, 7:52 AM), http://www.njsp.org/ucr/pdf/current/20171013_crimetrend.pdf 
(detailing that New Jersey’s bail reform efforts have allowed drops in jail numbers of 15% 
in the first six months and the number of unconvicted people held in jail dropped by more 
than a third (34.1%) between mid-2015 and mid-2017). 
400 STEVENSON & DOLEAC, supra note 393, at 6. 
401 Id. at 7. 
402 Id. at 2. 
403 Samantha Young, Kentucky Eyed as a Model for Reforming California’s Costly Bail 
System, TIMES OF SAN DIEGO (Aug. 12, 2017), 
https://timesofsandiego.com/politics/2017/08/12/kentucky-eyed-as-model-for-reforming-
californias-costly-bail-system/. 
404 Q & A: Profile Based Risk Assessment for US Pretrial Incarceration, Release 
Decisions, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 1, 2018, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/01/q-profile-based-risk-assessment-us-pretrial-
incarceration-release-decisions#_ftnref1. See also Public Safety Assessment, supra note 384, 
at 3. Kentucky is one of forty jurisdictions that have adopted the LJAF PSA. Pretrial Justice, 
LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND. (2018) 
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The absurdity of this result is clear. The defendant with the prior violent felony is 
clearly more dangerous to society, yet under the Kentucky system and others like it, 
administrators and judges would see the same PSA score when evaluating the 
defendants, potentially resulting in an identical release decision for both. 
These same mistakes appear in the most recently proposed bail reform risk 
assessments. In May 2018, Utah rolled out a pretrial risk assessment program to 
improve release decisions and better inform judges.405 The Utah Public Safety 
Assessment uses nine factors that are designed to predict “whether a defendant will 
commit new criminal activity, commit new violent criminal activity, or fail to appear 
in court if released before trial.”406 The nine factors are: age at current arrest, current 
violent offense, pending charge at the time of the offense, prior misdemeanor 
conviction, prior felony conviction, prior violent conviction, prior failure to appear 
in the past two years, prior failure to appear older than two years, and prior sentence 
to incarceration.407 Taking these factors, the risk assessment program software uses 
an algorithm to calculate two scores representing the likelihood that a defendant will 
commit a violent crime if released or will fail to appear in court.408 This system has 
been lauded as an improvement over the old system where judges only knew the 
charged offense and what was in a probable cause statement.409 However, this Utah 
tool is flawed—like the others—in failing to distinguish between misdemeanors and 
felonies in important ways. For instance, under the new Utah risk assessment, an 
individual who is charged with a nonviolent crime (possession of a controlled 
substance) who has a previous conviction for a misdemeanor and no violent crime 
history but five failures to appear, is ordered to be detained.410 The research has made 
clear that a failure to appear is not cause for pretrial detention, and that simple 
                                               
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/initiative/criminal-justice/pretrial-justice/. 
405 Gillian Friedman, Poor People are Trapped Behind Bars. How Utah is Using an 
Algorithm to get some of them out, DESERET NEWS (June 17, 2018, 5:15 AM), 
https://www.deseretnews.com/article/900021826/poor-people-are-stuck-behind-bars-how-
utah-is-using-an-algorithm-to-get-some-of-them-out.html. 
406 Public Safety Assessment: Risk Factors and Formula, UTAH CTS. 2 (Aug. 23, 2016), 
https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/reports/psa/docs/PSA-Risk-Factors-and-Formula.pdf. 
407 Id. 
408 Id. at 3. 
409 Friedman, supra note 405. Utah Third District Judge Kara Petitt has commented that 
the new system allows her to “make better-informed decisions—whether that was to release 
the individual with appropriate conditions, or to hold the individual in jail . . . .” Paighten 
Harkins & Jessica Miller, Utah Courts quietly rolled out a new way to set a suspect’s bail 
based on one’s risk. Bail bondsmen are not pleased, SALT LAKE TRIB. (June 7, 2018), 
https://www.sltrib.com/news/2018/06/06/utah-courts-quietly-rolled-out-a-new-way-to-set-
a-suspects-bail-based-on-ones-risk-bail-bondsmen-are-not-pleased/. 
410 Public Safety Assessment, supra note 406; A Guide to Manually Calculating a 
Public Safety Assessment (PSA) – Utah May 2018, UTAH CTS. (May 23, 2018), 
https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/reports/psa/docs/PSA%20Manual%20Calculation%20
Guide.pdf.  
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reminders can dramatically reduce failure to appear.411 Failure to appear is often an 
indication that follow up should be made and appearances increase dramatically 
when postcards or reminder calls and emails are made to the defendant.412 In 
addition, the Utah risk assessment treats a previous conviction for a misdemeanor 
the same as a conviction for a felony. Individuals without a violent crime history 
charged with nonviolent crimes are not a danger to society and should not be 
detained before trial. 
New Jersey began using the same nine factors and algorithm that Utah has now 
adopted in 2017.413 New Jersey’s assessment results in many defendants being 
released pretrial subject to a range of conditions.414 For low-risk individuals, a judge 
may just direct a police officer to text or call defendants to remind them of court 
dates; higher-risk defendants can be given electronic monitoring bracelets.415 
Unfortunately, because it is based on the same Arnold PSA as the Kentucky and 
Utah systems, New Jersey’s tool also fails to distinguish between misdemeanors and 
felonies by giving criminal defendants a set point value for any prior conviction 
without differentiating between misdemeanors and felonies.416 However, one thing 
New Jersey does do is that it limits the number of violent crimes that are listed as 
higher risk.417 As a comparison, Utah lists over 220 crimes as violent (misdemeanors 
and felonies) and New Jersey only lists about half that number as violent crimes.418 
                                               
411 See Gouldin, supra note 225, at 731–32 (noting that studies have shown that 
alternatives to detention are effective in reducing FTA rates). 
412 Id. at 732 (“Pretrial detention … [is] unnecessary for defendants who could be 
nudged back to court on the appointed day with a simple and inexpensive reminder.”). 
413 See Stuart Rabner, Bail Reform in New Jersey, TRENDS IN ST. CTS. 28 (2017), 
https://www.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/Trends%202017/Bail-Reform-New-Jersey-
Trends-2017.ashx. 
414 See id. 
415 See id. 
416 Public Safety Assessment: New Jersey Risk Factor Definitions, N.J. CTS. (March 
2018), 
https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/psariskfactor.pdf?cacheID=RmwcVxz.  
417 Public Safety Assessment: New Jersey Risk Factor Definitions, N.J. CTS. (Mar. 
2018), 
https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/psariskfactor.pdf?cacheID=RmwcVxz. 
The New Jersey risk assessment specifically limits violent crimes in the following way: “An 
offense is not categorized as violent when the crime involves recklessness or negligence, 
unless it is charged at the level of manslaughter or homicide. In addition, an offense involving 
threats, intimidation, harassment, and similar behavior is not categorized as violent, with the 
exception of stalking, which is categorized as violent.” Id. at 1. The types and quantity of 
low-level violent crimes listed are limited, which help increase the number of misdemeanants 
who can obtain release before trial. Id. at 1, 5–7. 
418 Compare Utah Violent Offenses, Utah Courts, (unpublished manuscript on file with 
author), with Public Safety Assessment: New Jersey Risk Factor Definitions, N.J. CTS. (Mar. 
2018), 
https://www.njcourts.gov/courts/assets/criminal/psariskfactor.pdf?cacheID=RmwcVxz. 
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This is an improvement and could be why New Jersey has improved release rates 
overall—though it is still detaining more than 10% of defendants pretrial. 
Colorado’s pretrial risk assessment strategy, which has been held up as a 
“national model” of bail reform, makes the same mistake of conflating 
misdemeanors and felonies.419 The Colorado law, passed in 2013, requires that 
pretrial services programs “make all reasonable efforts to implement an empirically 
developed pretrial risk assessment tool.”420 The Colorado assessment uses a point 
system outlined in the figure below: 
  
                                               
419 CRIM. JUSTICE POL’Y PROGRAM, HARV. L. SCH., MOVING BEYOND MONEY: A 
PRIMER ON BAIL REFORM 15 (2016), available at http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/assets/FINAL-
Primer-on-Bail-Reform.pdf. 
420 COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-106(4)(c) (2013) (amended 2017). 
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Using these scores, judges can sort defendants into risk categories and set bail 
or release conditions accordingly. The Colorado system allows risk scores, public 
safety rates, and court appearance rates to be compared among defendants to inform 
judicial decisionmaking.421 Despite being lauded as a success, Colorado’s system is 
flawed in the same way as the Arnold PSA and many other risk assessment tools. 
                                               
421 See The Colorado Pretrial Assessment Tool (CPAT), COLO. ASS’N OF PRETRIAL 
SERVICES 9 (June 2015), 
https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?Documen
tFileKey=47e978bb-3945-9591-7a4f-77755959c5f5 [hereinafter CPAT]. Data shows a 
direct correlation between risk category and appearance rates, indicating that the factors used 
in Colorado’s system are good predictors. The same correlation appears with respect to 
public safety rates. See Risk-based Pretrial Site Visit: Denver Pretrial Services, NAT’L CONF. 
OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 10, 2014), 
http://www.ncsl.org/Documents/CJ/GregMauroPresentation.pdf. Whether these are good 
public policy is a different question. See Starr, supra note 380, at 806; see also Mayson, 
supra note 380, at 562. 
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For items 7 and 8 (“past jail sentence” and “past prison sentence”), the Scoring Tips 
state that a “yes” should be recorded “regardless of the level of offense (e.g., felony 
or misdemeanor).”422 Item 10 (“other pending cases”) similarly does not make a 
distinction between whether those cases are on misdemeanor or felony charges.423 A 
“yes” answer on all three of these items would put any criminal defendant into at 
least the second risk category under the Colorado system even if all three “yes” 
answers were related to misdemeanor charges or convictions.424 Under the Colorado 
system, past jail sentences or pending cases could even be for misdemeanor driving 
related offenses, and an individual could be classified as high risk given the point 
structure. Again Colorado fails to account for the misdemeanor right to release and 
the concomitant recognition that misdemeanors are by nature much less serious 
crimes than felonies. 
California’s newly proposed risk assessment—set to take effect in 2019—is 
similarly flawed. Regarding risk to public safety and risk of failure to appear, Senate 
Bill 10 classifies defendants as low-risk, medium-risk or high-risk and sets various 
conditions for release based on these categories.425 Under the new law, low-risk 
defendants must be released on recognizance, “prior to arraignment,” and “with the 
least restrictive nonmonetary condition” that will reasonably protect the public and 
ensure that the person returns to court.426 Medium-risk defendants must be released 
or detained based on local standards, but if they are released, it must be subject to 
the same standards as with low-risk individuals.427 High-risk individuals must 
remain in custody until their arraignment.428 Though Senate Bill 10 eliminates 
money bail, some commentators have argued that it gives judges too much discretion 
to detain defendants pending trial.429 Under the proposed bill, prosecutors can file a 
motion for “preventive detention” based on public safety and other concerns.430 This 
could potentially allow judges to detain even low-risk defendants. 
When classifying defendants as low, medium, or high risk, the California bill 
requires that Pretrial Assessment Services use a “validated risk assessment tool,”431 
which is defined by the bill as a risk assessment tool “selected and approved by the 
court . . . from the list of approved pretrial risk assessment tools maintained by the 
Judicial Council.”432 Whatever tool is chosen to be part of this list must be “accurate 
and reliable in assessing the risk” of criminal defendants failing to appear in court 
                                               
422 CPAT, supra note 421, at 6  
423 Id. at 7. 
424 See id. at 6–9. It is also disturbing that this risk assessment considers charges and 
convictions similarly, blatantly ignoring the presumption of innocence. Id.  
425 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.10 (West) (effective Oct. 1, 2019). 
426 See id. 
427 See id.   
428 See id. § 1320.10(e)(1), (h).  
429 Salonga & Koseff, supra note 346. 
430 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1320.17–18 (West) (effective Oct. 1, 2019). 
431 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.10(e)(1) (West) (effective Oct. 1, 2019). 
432 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.7(k) (West) (effective Oct. 1, 2019). 
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or jeopardizing public safety.433 In short, even when the new bill goes into effect, 
California will not have a standard risk assessment tool that will be used statewide, 
instead leaving courts to decide which tools they will use.434 It remains to be seen 
whether risk assessment tools like the Arnold PSA or others that do not distinguish 
between misdemeanors and felonies will be placed on California’s approved tool list 
by the Judicial Council, but with a loophole in the proposed bill that allows even 
low-risk defendants to be detained pretrial, the developments from California thus 
far are not promising. 
States have recognized that money bail is not good policy and have begun 
replacing it with risk assessments. While this data-driven approach is commendable 
and a step in the right direction, the risk assessments used by states fail in one 
significant way. States universally have (like with their statutes) treated 
misdemeanor and felony convictions as one in the same in assessing defendant risk. 
A defendant is treated as equally risky if he has a former misdemeanor assault and 
a felony assault, and in some jurisdictions there is no distinction made between 
violent or nonviolent misdemeanors. This type of loophole has allowed many 
individuals with misdemeanor driving violations to be detained unnecessarily before 
trial.435 States need to rethink these risk assessments and at a minimum distinguish 
between misdemeanors and felonies in considering current charges and conviction 
records. As an additional way to create meaningful reform, states should also make 
a goal of a less than 10% pretrial detention rate.436 Only fourteen states currently 
meet this goal, including states who have made bail reform a priority.437 A goal such 
as this may help guide judicial discretion in applying risk assessments and serve as 
an important reminder of the presumptive right of misdemeanor release. Without 
such a goal, the first two waves of bail reform have failed, and the current third wave 
of bail reform is doomed to face a similar outcome. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
In recent years, misdemeanors and bail reform have attracted significant 
attention from scholars and policymakers.438 In the last three years, states have 
                                               
433 See id. 
434 Colin Wood, California is ditching bail, and now courts must choose a risk 
assessment tool, STATESCOOP (Sept. 5, 2018), https://statescoop.com/california-is-ditching-
bail-now-courts-have-to-choose-a-risk-assessment-tool/.  
435 NATAPOFF, supra note 5, at 1–18. 
436 PRETRIAL JUST. INST., THE STATE OF PRETRIAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 11–12 (2017), 
available at https://university.pretrial.org/viewdocument/state-of-pretrial-justice-in-americ 
(last accessed Jan. 2, 2019) (noting that the states of Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, 
and Washington had less than 10% pretrial detention rates as of 2017).  
437 Id. 
438 See, e.g., KOHLER-HAUSMANN, supra note 5; Stevenson & Mayson, supra note 5; 
Joe, supra note 5; Heaton et al., supra note 39, at 713–18. 
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passed hundreds of new pretrial release laws.439 There are over 200 bills related to 
pretrial release pending in thirty-nine state legislatures across the country.440 While 
attention to the issue of bail is certainly important and necessary to reform, most of 
these efforts are destined to fail. These reform efforts all conflate misdemeanors and 
felonies, resigning many defendants to detention or money bail who should be 
released pretrial. Many recommend risk assessments that do not treat minor 
misdemeanor crimes separately from major felony offenses. And many states rely 
on money bail for both misdemeanors and felonies—making it nearly impossible for 
most poor defendants to obtain release. Most state schemes recommend the same 
exact factors for felony and misdemeanor release without realizing that 
misdemeanor release is a pretty-near absolute right and requires no balancing test. 
Misdemeanors are less serious crimes than felonies. Today misdemeanors 
make up the bulk of cases in criminal court.441 Release on bail is a time-honored 
historical right for nonserious crimes. Consequently, the weighing of 
misdemeanants’ right to pretrial release against the same factors felons face is a 
violation of that historic right. Indeed, in assessing misdemeanants for pretrial 
release, courts should be concerned with finding the least restrictive means by which 
to ensure the defendant will appear for court. They should not be weighing factors 
                                               
439 Trends in Pretrial Release: State Legislation Update, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Apr. 2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/ImageLibrary/WebImages/Criminal%20Justice/pretrialenact
ments_2017web_v02.pdf; 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/110-5(a-5) (2018) (creating a 
presumption that any conditions of release imposed shall be nonmonetary in nature and that 
courts shall impose the least restrictive means necessary); IND. CODE § 35-33-8-3.8 (2017) 
(mandating that courts consider releasing a defendant without money bail if the results of a 
pretrial risk assessment show that the defendant does not present a substantial risk of flight 
or danger); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1320.10 (West) (effective Oct. 1, 2019) (classifying 
defendants as low-risk, medium-risk, or high-risk and setting various conditions for release 
based on these categories); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-64a(a)(2) (2017) (barring cash-only bail 
for certain crimes and restricting the use of financial considerations for release in 
misdemeanor crimes); N.J. STAT. ANN § 2A:162-17 (West 2017) (creating categories of 
pretrial release conditions applicable in certain circumstances); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-4-
105 (2017) (imposing conditions on bond for certain offenses); UTAH CODE. ANN. § 77-20-
1 (West 2017) (allowing persons eligible for bail to be released with or without money bail 
based on the court’s discretion). 
440 See State Pretrial Policy: Bill Tracking Database, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATURES (Oct. 18, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-
justice/state-pretrial-policy-bills-tracking-database.aspx. Between 2015 and 2016, 14 states 
passed laws either expanding or restricting eligibility for pretrial release. Trends in Pretrial 
Release: State Legislation Update, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Apr. 2018), 
http://www.ncsl.org/portals/1/ImageLibrary/WebImages/Criminal%20Justice/pretrialenact
ments_2017web_v02.pdf. 
441 Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 
1057 (2015) (“[T]he ten million misdemeanor cases filed annually comprise around eighty 
percent of state dockets.”). 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3358662 
 DIVIDING BAIL REFORM (FORTHCOMING IOWA LAW REVIEW) 81 
   
 
of guilt or innocence, or of dangerousness except in very rare circumstances. Judges 
are not especially skilled in predicting dangerousness anyway.442 Defendants who 
pose a threat of violence while released are extremely rare—even felony defendants, 
but especially misdemeanor defendants.443 On the other hand, even a few days of 
pretrial detention almost certainly causes serious harm to the lives of defendants.  
At common law, misdemeanor defendants were usually granted pretrial release 
as there was a presumption of release in such cases.444 Misdemeanor defendants had 
a right to bail, unlike defendants charged with capital crimes and some felony 
defendants.445 The idea was (and, in many respects, still is) that misdemeanors are 
less serious crimes and as less serious crimes, defendants in such cases do not pose 
the same threat to society as defendants charged with violent felonies.446 
Misdemeanor bail looks drastically different today. Indeed several states today set 
misdemeanor bail rates as high as felony rates and up to $20,000 in some cases. 
Detaining an individual based on their ability to pay bail has been found to be 
a constitutional violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.447 Denial 
of a misdemeanor defendants’ right to release is also a violation of the longstanding 
presumption of innocence. And most states even have their own statutory and 
constitutional rights guaranteeing release for misdemeanor defendants, except in 
unusual cases.448 Often rather than guaranteeing release, courts leave these important 
rights to the mercy of balancing tests that determine if the government interest 
outweighs personal liberties.449 Instead, U.S. jurisdictions should abandon bail laws 
and reform efforts, money bail schemes and risk assessments that conflate 
misdemeanors and felony crimes. Minor crimes should always be dealt with 
separately. The liberty interest for misdemeanor cases is much stronger, yet the harm 
for defendants is as serious.  Evidence demonstrates that detention before trial leads 
to three-times higher conviction rates, higher rates of pleading guilty, sentences that 
                                               
442 See Baradaran & McIntyre, supra note 37, at 558 (concluding that “if the goal is to 
prevent crime, judges are often releasing and detaining the wrong groups.”). 
443 For instance, an average felony defendant has a 1.9% chance of committing a violent 
crime on pretrial release. Even the most dangerous felony defendant who is charged with a 
violent crime and has four convictions for previous violent crimes (who should be detained) 
only commits a violent crime once in every thirty instances. Baradaran & McIntyre, supra 
note 37, at 527, 530. 
444 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, THE AMERICAN STUDENTS’ BLACKSTONE: COMMENTARIES 
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; IN FOUR BOOKS 1002 (George Chase ed., Banks & Brothers 3d 
ed. 1890) (1877). 
445 Id. 
446 The Law Respecting Bail, 7 IRISH L. TIMES & SOLIC. J. 404, 404 (1873). See also 
supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text. 
447 See supra note 375 and accompanying text. 
448 See supra Part III. 
449 See, e.g., ODonnell v. Harris Cty., Texas, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1143 (S.D. Tex. 
2017), aff'd as modified, 882 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2018), and aff'd as modified sub nom. 
ODonnell v. Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018) (applying the balancing test articulated 
by the Supreme Court in Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). 
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are twice as long,450 and even higher recidivism rates even after a few days behind 
bars.451 
The majority of individuals in our nations jails are unconvicted people.452 One-
third of them are serving short misdemeanor sentences and 85% are in for nonviolent 
and minor offenses—with 80% of them having their charges dropped during their 
stay.453 What these numbers indicate is that many incarcerated individuals can safely 
be released and never serve in jail. U.S. jurisdictions should shift their bail reform 
goals to include guidelines for release that aim to detain ten percent or fewer 
misdemeanants. While 10% is certainly an arbitrary number—it is probably close to 
maximum number of misdemeanor defendants that should be detained for 
emergency reasons. This goal combined with a revised data-driven risk assessment 
that avoids the flaws of all of the current instruments will actually divide bail reform. 
Without goals for reduced detention, bail reform efforts will continue to change 
factors and methods but fail in the ultimate goal. Without a focus on important 
constitutional rights and a goal to actually increase actual numbers of release, we 
will continue to fail at reducing incarceration rates and improving defendant rights. 
By returning to a once-obvious bifurcation between misdemeanor and felony bail, 
we would not only solve prison overcrowding, but lay the foundation for clarifying 
wider due process protections that have been lost for many pretrial defendants. 
                                               
450 ODonnell v. Harris Cty., Texas, 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1143–44 (S.D. Tex. 2017), 
aff'd as modified, 882 F.3d 528 (5th Cir. 2018), and aff'd as modified sub nom. ODonnell v. 
Harris Cty., 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018). 
451 Baughman, History of Misdemeanor Bail, supra note 8, at 874; Heaton et al., supra 
note 39, at 718 (finding that pretrial detainees are more likely to commit future crimes than 
similarly situated defendants who have been released). 
452 BAUGHMAN, supra note 4, at 1–17. 
453 Id.  
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